Tag: Tunisia
Covid crackdowns and mobilization
“Government responses to the new coronavirus are disrupting civil society all over the world. But while government measures are dramatically restricting civic space, the global crisis is also catalyzing new forms of mobilization.” On May 20, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a discussion on “Global Civil Society and the Pandemic.” The discussion was moderated by Thomas Carothers and featured three other guest speakers:
Thomas Carothers (Moderator): Senior Vice President for studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yousseff Cherif: Deputy Director of Columbia Global Centers, Tunis
Maureen Kademaunga: Doctoral Researcher at the Human Economy Research Program, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: Associate Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Vijayan MJ: Independent researcher and writer, Research Collective, New Delhi, India
Current context
In his opening remarks, Carothers touched on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s current research on the state of civil activism throughout the world. There are conflicting narratives. On one hand, there has been a trend toward governmental restriction on the role and function of civil society. On the other hand, a new generation of dynamic, fluid, and tech-savvy civil activists has emerged despite increasing state restrictions.
Carothers believes that the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies this dualism within civil society. Many governments throughout the world have implemented state lockdowns and have increased restrictions on freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. Carothers views the current period as “the most restrictive period in living memory for civic activism.” Despite this fact, Carothers highlights that the COVID-19 pandemic creates an enormous need for citizens to engage, respond, and find ways to improve governmental responses to the virus.
Changing roles
Cherif highlights new roles the COVID-19 pandemic has created for civil society groups in Tunisia. Many organizations have shifted their work from democracy promotion and governance to combating COVID-19. This includes aiding hospitals, distributing masks, and cleaning public spaces. In places where the government has proven to be inefficient or too weak to act, civil society groups have continued the work of government and have led COVID-19 relief initiatives. Although the Tunisian government has shown interest in working with these groups during the pandemic, Cherif believes that future cooperation remains unlikely.
Kademaunga believes that the government of Zimbabwe has utilized the COVID-19 crisis to justify further restrictions on civil society groups. Government human rights abuses against civil society groups in Zimbabwe are increasing. Simultaneously, these groups continue to increase their efforts in assisting the government of Zimbabwe in the provision of essential services during the current lockdown.
Vijayan states that civil society groups in India quickly changed their agendas at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. During the initial stages of the pandemic, civil society groups took charge when the Indian government remained absent. Indian civil society groups have been more efficient than the Indian government in devising a plan of action.
Transformation of activist means
Cherif observes that the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the online presence of civil society groups on various digital platforms throughout the Arab world. Civil society groups have utilized webinars as spaces for new online discussions. Notably, some have started to increase their educational initiatives online.
Kademaunga predicts that the shift towards online platforms post-COVID-19 will harm those in rural areas who do not possess widespread digital access. Previously, in Zimbabwe they accounted for the majority of civil society participation. Kademaunga stressed that this changing dynamic will foster heightened inequality between rural and urban areas. Ultimately, those within urban centers will dominate the agenda making processes for civil society groups.
A pivotal moment for legitimacy
Cherif regards the COVID-19 pandemic as pivotal to how ordinary citizens view the legitimacy of civil society groups. Previously, the majority of Tunisians viewed civil society groups as unfavorable and distant from the rest of society. Due to their integral role in providing support during the current crisis, these groups have gained legitimacy and favorability.
Kademaunga believes that the COVID-19 pandemic will bring about a major change in the perception of civil society society groups in Zimbabwe. Traditionally, the government of Zimbabwe has fueled negative discourse against civil society groups. However, the role of civil society groups in providing aid amid the COVID-19 pandemic disproves negative stereotypes that portray these groups as being in opposition to the interests of general citizens.
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Consensus is hard
Following elections in September and October, Tunisia is having difficulty forming a government. Presiding is a populist president without a political party who has in the past proposed radically overhauling the entire system, abolishing political parties, and creating a form of direct democracy.
On February 19, the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion on “The State of Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and the Power and Perils of Consensus Politics.” The discussion featured four speakers:
Daniel Brumberg, director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University and a senior non-resident fellow at POMED,
Sharan Grewal, an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary,
Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, a scholar at Wesleyan University in the College of Social Studies and Government, and
Sabina Henneberg, a postdoctoral fellow in the African Studies Program at SAIS.
William Lawrence, a visiting professor of political science and international affairs at American University, moderated
Current context
Hammami attributed the difficulty of forming a government to the fragmented parliament and the president, whose lack of party affiliation contributed to the disarray. President Said designated Elyes Fakhfakh as the new prime minister because of Ennahda’s inability to gain enough votes to form a new government. Fakhfakh excluded Heart of Tunisia from his coalition because of Nabil Karoui’s corruption cases, scandals, and lobbying with the Israelis. Ennahda withdrew its support from Fakhfakh to call for a government of national unity. A new parliamentary election would be risky. President Said thus invited UGTT, which is a labor union with political legitimacy, to act as a mediator between Fakhfakh’s government and opposing parties.
Consensus politics
Brumberg indicated that social, ideological, political, and geographical divisions in the society show Tunisia’s divisions. Identity politics reflect concern of exclusion, make a majoritarian system difficult. For a diverse group to achieve consensus, parties have to postpone difficult issues, such as economic reforms, the need for a supreme court, and security reforms. Brumberg believes that there’s no alternative to deal with Tunisia’s pluralistic structure other than reaching a consensus. If Tunisians were to move beyond the consensus, to deal with the issues that have been postponed and approach a majoritarian system, it could be troubling for the entire state.
Grewal added that consensus politics was important from 2011 to 2014 during the establishment of the constitution. The transition to democracy should be done only once rules are set. The national unity government in 2015 continued the transition, thus postponing divisive issues. The parties thereby escaped blame for failed policies and avoided bringing back the polarization that plagued 2012-13.
Henneberg attributed the 2012-13 polarization to Ennahda’s inexperience, insecure domestic context, and the rise of opposition to the Egyptian Islamist government. She agreed that Tunisia required an inclusive consensus to write a successful constitution. This resulted in the establishment of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet to overcome the polarization.
Ennahda’s concerns
Hammami argued that Ennahda is in favor of sustaining consensus politics, which helps it to survive. Ennahda’s support for including Heart of Tunisia in the parliament was due to the lack of consensus to pass political, security, and economic reforms. Grewal noted that Ennahda also has concerns about Fakhfakh, who might repolarize politics.
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Tunisia looks for a government
Nine years after the revolution, although the Tunisian government brought effective democratic change, little economic or social progress has been made. In October, Kais Said, a political newcomer, won the presidential election with 73% of the vote, beating Nabil Karoui, who was previously jailed for corruption. Ennahda won the parliamentary election and selected Habib Jemli to be prime minister-designated. However, on January 10, Habib Jemli stepped down as he failed to win a vote of confidence.
On January 14, Carnegie Endowment for International Studies hosted a discussion on the topic of what Tunisians are expecting from their new leaders and what will happen if those expectations are not met. The discussion included three young Tunisians: Amir Ben Ameur, a social activist who advocates for youth development and democracy, Aymen Abderrahmen, a program coordinator in the Leadership Division at IREX, and Oumayma Ben Abdallah, a human rights research and Tunisia analyst. The discussion was moderated by Sarah Yerkes, a fellow in the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Why the government failed to form
Abderrahmen explained the political system in Tunisia and emphasized that Tunisians are sick of the replication of political phases. They lack trust towards the previous government because it failed to fulfill its reform and anti-corruption promises. They also believed that the government was too weak to deliver economic reforms.
Abdallah attributed the failure to the lack of administrative transparency, parliamentary consensus and participation, and detailed reform guidelines. Ameur blamed lack of transparency and the lack of common ground between Jemli and rival parties. He pointed out the government’s failure to tackle real problems. Corruption galvanized doubts among Tunisians.
Remedies
Ameur thinks Tunisia needs a government with greater accountability. The government should bring out detailed, grassroot reforms in a long-term vision. Tunisians need more confidence in government despite current hardships . Abdallah wants more transparency and conviction. She also noted that since the current parliament is fragmented, the new/proposed government should result from political consensus.
To fix unemployment, the government needs a clear strategy for social and economic reform. Abderrahmen noted that the government has recently publicized some plans, but further work in this direction is needed.
Enthusiasm for the transition
All three guests indicated that Tunisians feel deprived of dignity because revolutionary demands were not met. Ameur claimed that young people still have some hope for the government because launching another revolution would be a devastating move. He and Abdallah acknowledged that Tunisia is overall a free country, but economic challenges are still severe. Politicians need to fulfill their promises.
Why the President won
Abderrahmen noted that President Said didn’t try to cater to young people. People were not voting for Said, but against Karoui. Ameur underlined that the younger generation likes Said because he made no promises. Although other candidates had more political and government experience, people were not confident in them as they previously failed to deliver. Abdallah is concerned that since the president ran as an independent, he has no parties backing him, which will make it hard to tackle corruption problems.
The next government
Abderahmen hoped to see another election so that different parties may come up with a consensus. Ameur expressed a desire to have more young people lead the government. Abdallah was not enthusiastic about a new election, which can generate political risks. Instead of presenting a new election, it is urgent to find solutions to economic and social problems.
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Good election, big challenges
On October 29 the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted an event entitled “Observations from the Tunisian Election.” Tunisian Ambassador Fayçal Gouia delivered the opening remarks and participated in the panel discussion. Georgetown Professor and North Africa specialist William Lawrence moderated the discussion. Panelists included Jeffrey England, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Patricia Karam, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa division of the International Republican Institute (IRI), Sarah Yerkes, Middle East Fellow at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace, and Thomas Hill, senior program officer for North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
England emphasized that the joint election observation undertaken by NDI and IRI demonstrated several positive aspects of the Tunisian election. Despite the fact that the July 25 death of former President Essebsi required the election to be held sooner than originally planned, it was peaceful and administered professionally. England also highlighted that the Parliamentary and Presidential debates that were held for the first time are evidence that the democratic system continues to mature. He noted that while there are lingering questions about turnout in the election, there was a larger pool of voters in both rounds than expected. England felt that because President Kais Saied does not belong to a political party he may be better able to hold the parties in Parliament to account.
Karam agreed that the election observation demonstrated several positive developments but noted that Tunisia should amend several aspects of its electoral framework prior to the next election, including campaign finance regulations, media rules, and the interaction between the judicial and electoral systems. Polling shows a crisis of confidence in politicians, growing dissatisfaction with the democratic experiment, and the sense that Tunisian political parties lack a clear vision for economic reform. This dissatisfaction is particularly deep among Tunisian youth, with preliminary data showing that youth turnout in the election may have been as low as 16%. Karam believes Tunisians voted for Saied because they prioritized stability in government, even if it comes with older, more conservative ideas.
Yerkes argued that while Saied received 70% of the votes, giving him a strong mandate, the incarceration of his opponent Karoui during the election was a significant flaw in the democratic process. She believes the election was unquestionably free but does not think it was fair. Karoui’s incarceration highlighted the need for Tunisia to implement a system for absentee voting. The electoral law allows prisoners to vote but there is currently no mechanism for them to do so, meaning that Karoui was unable to vote for himself.
Several panelists agreed that Tunisia’s economy was the key issue in this election and will play a key role in the future of its democracy. Gouia stated that job creation and delivering economic reform will be the first priority of the new administration. England asserted that while the electorate’s main concern was revolution in 2011 and identity in 2014, now people want to see results, particularly on economic issues. Hill argued that the Tunisian social contract has shifted so that graduates expect the government to create jobs for them rather than being entrepreneurial. England agreed, stating that the economic problems cannot be solved before the next election. He felt that the government should focus on developing a long-term plan to reform the economy and attempt to reframe the people’s expectations so that they understand that economic change will take time.
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Watch the pot
The pot is boiling once again in North Africa. Sudanese President Bashir, in power since 1993, is under arrest and his country under de facto martial law. Algerian President Bouteflika has resigned after almost 20 years in power. Libyan General Haftar is trying to take Tripoli by force. The smart money is betting he will bog down in a stalemate with opposing militias from Western Libya.
Not everyone is in turmoil. Morocco and Tunisia, which both embarked on political reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring, are at least for now continuing in that direction. Egypt’s President and former Field Marshall Sisi has restored its military dictatorship, cracked down hard on both Islamist and secular opposition, and embarked on some economic reforms.
Less visible in all these countries is the role of the Gulf potentates. The United Arab Emirates has backed both Sisi and Haftar, hoping to they will eradicate Islamists from their polities. Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Saudi-led coalition fighting against the Houthis in Yemen has used mercenary Sudanese troops, thus indirectly supporting Bashir. Iran has backed the Houthis but has not engaged heavily in North Africa, since there are few Shia there. Tehran’s interests are much stronger in Syria and Iraq.
American engagement in North Africa has been sporadic and targeted mainly against violent Islamist extremism, especially in Libya and more indirectly in Egypt. President Trump has said Libya is Europe’s problem, which makes a lot of sense since Spain, France, and Italy all have strong stakes in North Africa due to migration as well as oil and gas supplies. The problem is that the Europeans have found it hard to combine their efforts. Instead they compete for influence and undermine each other. It is unlikely that they will find a way to use their considerable clout to good effect.
The result will likely be that the North Africans will be left to find their own way. That might not be the worst of all possible worlds, even if it is fraught with risks. Libya’s downward spiral after its 2011 revolution does not suggest much indigenous capacity to manage without international help. But Libyans have always resisted it and are now vitiating the latest UN efforts to unify its state structures and begin the process of recovery from civil war.
Sudan and Algeria have better prospects. Their revolutions have so far been mostly nonviolent (apart from the force the police and military have indulged in). Nonviolent revolutions have a much higher probability of generating peaceful and democratic outcomes. But in both places the strong role of the military runs the risk of a detour to autocratic rule, as in Egypt. That is a contingency the demonstrators will have to guard against, so as not to fall into the Sisi trap.
The trick is to bring the pot to boil, but not let it boil over. If it does, extremists will exploit the situation. North Africa is not immune to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and more localized jihadist organizations. Derna in Libya, where the US marines fought “on the shores of Tripoli,” has seen several revivals of extremists since Qaddafi fell, though Haftar for now seems to have things there under control. Tunisia has likewise generated lots of foreign fighters for the extremists, despite its so far successful political transition.
Let’s keep an eye on this pot.
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At a crossroads
The Arab Center for Washington DC hosted a panel discussion April 4 about “Algeria’s Protests and the Prospects for Change.” The panel included Marina Ottaway, Middle East Fellow at The Wilson Center, Geoff D. Porter, president of North Africa Risk Consulting Inc., Hugh Roberts, Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History at Tufts University, and Sara Yerkes, Middle East fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Roberts spoke about the unanimity and uniformity of the Algerian protests demanding the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, step down. Six Fridays of protest passed so far in a friendly manner: people chanting the slogan “the system must depart.” Although the president has resigned, it is much harder to get the entire system to leave, as it would be impossible to import a new one. Elements of the system should be preserved, Roberts said, but unfortunately the protesters have not yet come to this conclusion.
According to Roberts, the protests were successful in large part due to support from groups like National Organization of Mujahideen (veterans), lawyers, judges, school teachers, and some radical political parties. Most importantly, Gaid Salah, vice minister of defense, who was appointed by the resigned president and supported him in the past, has also aligned himself with the uprising. The military will try to convince ex-President Liamine Zerwoual, known for his integrity and transparency, to run the transitional period. Failing to do so, it could be hard to legitimize the presidency with the people.
Ottaway note that Algeria was widely viewed as immune to the 2011 Arab Spring. Eight years later that was no longer the case, as Algerians took to the street and high-level officials around the president sacrificed him. It is however still unclear whether the opposition can force a new system. The outcome of the uprising in Algeria will be determined not by how soon elections are held, but by how successful the regime’s opponents are in moving from protest in the street to becoming participants in the transition. Protesters need to remain in the streets to put pressure on the regime, while also organizing to become effective political players. Tunisia offers an example of a slow transition with broad-based participation that led to real change. By contrast, Egypt embarked on a much faster process with narrow participation, resulting in an entrenched militay.
Yerkes gave an overview of the effect of the Algerian protests on neighboring countries, mainly Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco said it “will not interfere or comment” on the Algerian protests. Morocco hopes the new Algerian government will reach an agreement regarding the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is also worried it could be next, as most North African presidents have either been ousted or run away. While Moroccans favor the Algerian protests, the government would rather see the situation return to normality. In Tunisia, there is a big worry the insecurity will affect the Western border between the two countries, which was once a harbor for terrorists. Tunisia won’t be able to handle chaos in Libya and in Algeria. Tunisia’s president has not said a word about the Algerian protest movement, but he would like to see his country’s “successful spring” being replicated elsewhere.
Porter argues the political structure of Algeria has not changed since independence. There are four elements that make it unique:
- War veterans are held in high esteem but have lost their connection with young people.
- The military does not know where its role starts and ends, and whether it is a political actor or only a guarantor of stability.
- People have a kind of blind trust in the military reflected in the slogan “Army and the people are brothers.”
- Rule of law is uncertain.
Bottom line: the government is emphasizing the importance of consensus at this critical juncture, but the reason for the current situation is lack of consensus, in particular on a new president. Where this crossroads will lead is still unclear.
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