Month: December 2010
A (very) long war in Afghanistan
Fred and Kim Kagan offer today in the Washington Post a vigorous defense of the Obama Administration’s strategy in Afghanistan. They argue that there have been significant military gains, that progress can continue even without full Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and Taliban safe havens in Quetta and Waziristan, and that we have to worry not only about military success but also about “stability and legitimacy of the political order” at the local level when transitioning security responsibilities to the Afghans. They rightly see efforts to strengthen local and central governance not as “mission creep” but as necessary components of the overall counter-insurgency strategy. They also argue that we need an Afghanistan that will continue to host American forces on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, presumably for as long as there is a threat from Pakistan-based enemies.
Let’s be clear: this is a formula for an even longer war than currently planned, one that the President is not fully committed to, as the Kagans implicitly recognize. We are very far from Afghanistan acquiring the kind of local and central governance required–we have barely begun, even after nine long years of war, to think about strengthening provincial governance, and the national government can at best be described as spotty. It will be more than several years before many Afghan provincial governments, and important Kabul ministries, will be able to prioritize and execute projects that benefit citizens in ways that make them think twice before helping a cousin who happens to be in league with the Taliban or a local drug/war lord.
The problem as I see it is that we have deployed nowhere near the civilian capabilities required to help the Afghans establish even half decent governance in areas the Taliban contest. The problem is not money. Andrew Exum has made it eminently clear that there is too much money flowing, often into the wrong pockets, at the moment. The problem is the one the UN has been studying lately: we don’t have enough civilians with the talents, training and protection required to enable them to help build institutions.
Afghanistan is a particularly difficult state-building environment, because of widespread illiteracy and poverty, the unsafe and insecure environment, miserable infrastructure and deeply entrenched poppy economy.
Ahmed Rashid usefully reminds us
…the key question for General Petraeus is not how many Taliban he kills, but whether the bare bones of an Afghan state—army, police, bureaucracy—which have been neglected so badly in the past nine years, can be set up by 2014. Moreover, can Afghan leaders, including the President, win the trust of a people who have put up with insecurity, gross corruption, and poor governance for many years?
Moreover, keeping U.S. troops along the Durand line indefinitely could make the task even more difficult, as it provides a rallying point for those Afghans who resent the American presence (not to mention that it might be as readily outflanked in Yemen and Somalia as the Maginot line was in Belgium). Only if we are willing to face up to the substantial human resources required to meet the state-building challenge should we try. The alternative, a deal with the Taliban, starts looking good if you think we don’t have what it takes.
PS: To their credit, and the Washington Post’s, the Kagans are described in today’s paper as “independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan.” Precisely what this means is unclear, but it is certainly better than the past practice of not mentioning when op/ed writers have worked for the military, as many have done. It is hard to find a Washington thinktanker who hasn’t accepted at least a trip to Iraq or Afghanistan funded by the Defense Department (present company excepted–but caveat emptor–I’ve been at least 10 times to Baghdad and once to Kabul on tickets provided by the United States Institute of Peace, sometimes bought with money provided by the State Department).
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Rusty pivot points
My appetite for writing about the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review got satiated with my first comment about a draft that circulated in Congress. I saw good intentions to amp up civilian operations and some movement of the deck chairs, but little in the way of novelty or resources.
Colleagues at CSIS see more in the exercise than I did, so I refer you to them for their commentary called “Pivot Points.” I certainly agree that Secretary Clinton evinces serious commitment and enthusiasm to changing the way business is done, especially in building more unity of effort between State and USAID, but some of what they see as new I see as old wine in new bottles.
The supposedly strengthened role of ambassadors, for example, is an old standby that is codified already in “Chief of Mission Authority,” which makes American ambassadors on paper the modern equivalent of absolute monarchs vis-a-vis other government agencies (the one important exception being deployed military forces). But try to use that authority in a way that another agency really doesn’t like and you’ll discover what many absolute monarchs discovered: authority depends on consent of the governed. It is the rare agency that cannot outbox the State Department once the issue comes stateside.
Another example: there really is nothing new in the notion that AID will lead in humanitarian crises and State will lead in political and security crises. That is the way it has always been done in practice, even if no one had really written it down. And many crises, even the natural disasters, have elements of both.
Nor is the concept of partnerships, in particular public/private ones new, though I admit that the word is used a whole lot more today than when foreign assistance was mainly a government-funded enterprise. What changes with the weakening government effort that justifies more frequent use of the word?
The devil is in the details, as my CSIS colleagues point out. Let’s wait to see what is really implemented.
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Let the Kosovars decide
I’m getting calls and emails asking what should happen now in response to the Council of Europe trafficking and other allegations against Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci.
My answer: a serious judicial investigation is in order, one led by internationals, but beyond that let the Kosovars decide.
I am already on the record advocating a serious investigation, so I have no objection to the Council of Europe passing a resolution Thursday asking for one. I can’t comment more specifically since I’ve only found the draft, which I suppose might not be identical to the final version. If the idea is an EU Lex-led investigation, I hope Pristina, Tirana and Belgrade will all pledge and implement full cooperation.
Lots of folks would like to tell Prime Minister Thaci to tough it out, or to resign, or to step aside. Not me.
He has vigorously denied the accusations. We’ll see a first reaction among a constituency that has favored him in the January 9 re-run of the voting in five municipalities where there were apparent ballot irregularities. If that is done properly, the electoral commission will certify the results and the government formation process will begin.
At that point the Kosovar political system will have to decide whether it wants a government led by Hashim Thaci to initiate talks with Belgrade or prefers to look for other leadership. The internationals, especially the U.S. Embassy in Pristina, are used to telling the Kosovars what to do, and the temptation will be great. It should be resisted.
This is a critical moment for Kosovo’s political institutions. Pushing one way or the other could generate a serious backlash, or allow politicians to duck their responsibilities, ruining an opportunity for them to take a responsible and wise decision. Interfering with democratically elected politicians as they grapple with a political crisis will not help the immediate situation or strengthen the Kosovo institutions.
All of what I write above assumes that no further evidence on the truth or falsity of the allegations against the Prime Minister emerges. The assertions in the Council of Europe report are hearsay and guilt by association–no American court would be much interested in them, though the police might well look for further evidence.
Hashim Thaci has the right to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty in a proper court, not in a Council of Europe parliamentary inquiry which he was apparently given no opportunity to rebut. Serbian President Tadic has already said he is prepared to talk with Thaci, despite the accusations. The question now will be whether the Kosovars want Thaci to represent them. Patience and restraint would be my counsel to the internationals.
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The good news from Iraq
I am not sure which is the better indicator: the arrest of extremists in advance of the (mostly) Shia holy day of Ashura and the relative quiet yesterday and today, or the Economist’s report that traffic accidents are up and the authorities are again issuing drivers’ licenses in Baghdad.
These non-events signal that things are improving in Iraq and that the Iraqi security forces are beginning to be capable of protecting the citizenry. Another good indicator: complaints about corruption are on the rise (but see this critique of Transparency International’s rating of Iraq before reaching conclusions about how it ranks overall). Corruption is not something you worry about when mass murder is occurring.
Of course the week was not entirely peaceful, and tomorrow there could be another horrific event. But give credit where it is due–my hat is off to Prime Minister Maliki, Interior Minister Bolani and the others responsible for security, as well as to ordinary Iraqis for their long suffering and fortitude. Ashura has been a particularly bad moment for violence in Iraq since 2004. To pass the week without the kind of multiple, politically significant attacks that Al Qaeda likes to direct against Shia worshippers is good news in my book.
Iyad Allawi has agreed to join the governing coalition if there is genuine power-sharing. Now if Prime Minister Maliki can name a government and get it approved in parliament by Christmas eve, when his 30 days runs out, that would be the icing on the cake.
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No real Afpak strategy review
Okay, now I get it. There is nothing more than the five-page “overview” being released from the Administration’s Afpak strategy review.
This is disreputable, even if it tells us more than any 100-page tome about how badly things are going. Yes, there is a fairly recent progress report to the Congress (bless them for requiring it!), and the intel materials have leaked all over the New York Times. But to give the public nothing on the legitimacy of the Karzai government? Nothing on negotiations with the Taliban? Precious little on Pakistan’s support, or lack of support, for going after Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Nothing on progress in particular communities in promoting local governance and economic development?
Silence tells us most of what we need to know. But what should be said about those who commented yesterday on the five pages as if it was the whole thing? Maybe nothing, as that too speaks for itself.
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