The super bowl of Egyptian politics

I know most of the American public is more interested in the Packers and Steelers today, where the outcome will be clear and unequivocal.  But Egypt is still in play, and it is far harder to tell in which direction Cairo is headed than to choose the Super Bowl winner.

It is certainly tempting to sympathize with the demonstrators who say President Mubarak has to go first, and only then will negotiations be meaningful.  But the sad fact is that would leave Egypt, according to its Mubarak-designed constitution, either in the hands of Vice President Omar Suleiman (in case of temporary unavailability of the President), torturer in chief of the Egyptian secret services, or Speaker of the People’s Assembly (in case of the President’s resignation), Ahmad Fathi Sorour, a party hack who has presided for more than 20 years over a puppet parliament and is said to have designed much of the repressive legislation of the Mubarak regime.

Moreover, no free and fair election can be held in Egypt without amendments to the constitution, which in its present form requires that the elections be held in 60 days from the removal of the president and that candidates pass muster in the People’s Assembly, whose members are overwhelmingly Mubarak cronies chosen in fraudulent elections in December. Can either Suleiman or Sorour be trusted to steer the ship of state towards free and fair elections that would replace that parliament as well as the president and almost certainly sink the regime and all that holds fast to it?

There is another path:  treat the constitution as the scrap of paper it is written on and try to hack a new path towards democracy.  Some would have this done by an army takeover; others might prefer the army to install a civilian caretaker government that might even leave Mubarak in place, force him to allow a new parliament to be elected freely and fairly, amend the constitution, then proceed with presidential elections.  This would necessarily be a government that could not command a majority in the current People’s Assembly, so it would depend for its effectiveness on the army force-marching the parliament to the desired results.

So there is a fork in the road:

• stick with the constitution, which despite its faults offers a clearly marked path that leads we know not where;
• abandon the constitution and try to hack a new path through the regime’s many brambles towards democracy.

The Americans, who have a good deal of clout in the matter, seem to be opting for the former, because they know and like Omar Suleiman and hope he will maintain stability but lead eventually in the right direction, which of course for them means not only democracy but also protection of their interest in seeing the Israel/Egypt peace treaty maintained.  At least some of the opposition political parties also seem inclined to stick with the constitution, but others might prefer the extra-constitutional route.

The people in Tahrir square want to be sure their sacrifices will be honored with a result that meets their expectations.  They seem devoted to the proposition that Mubarak must step down, but far less interested in the constitutional route than in an army-led transition.  Most Egyptians seem to trust the army’s guarantee more than Suleiman’s.  But if Suleiman can keep army backing, that will give him a great advantage.

Whether Mubarak resigns or not is becoming less relevant to the outcome, as his power is waning.  It seems to me that replacement of the current government with one that includes many people clearly and unequivocally devoted to democracy is in order.  Until that or Mubarak’s removal happens, the demonstrators had better hold on to Tahrir square and be prepared to fill it quickly, as they did on Friday, with peaceful and good-humored people.

A statement just issued by Suleiman’s office, supposedly on the basis of discussions today with representatives of the protesters and the political opposition, tries to steer the outcome in the constitutional direction (but there is no sign the protesters have subscribed yet).  While offering unspecified constitutional amendments, the guarantees are far from robust:

“In implementation of these commitments the following measures will be taken:

1. A committee will be formed from members of the judicial authority and a number of political figures to study and recommend constitutional amendments, and legislative amendments of laws complimentary to the constitution to be completed by the first week of March.

2. The Government announces the establishment of a bureau to receive complaints regarding, and commits to immediately release, prisoners of conscience of all persuasions. The Government commits itself to not pursuing them or limiting their ability to engage in political activity.

3. Media and communications will be liberalized and no extra-legal constraints will be imposed on them.

4. Supervisory and judiciary agencies will be tasked with continuing to pursue persons implicated in corruption, as well as pursuing and holding accountable persons responsible for the recent breakdown in security.

5. The state of emergency will be lifted based on the security situation and an end to the threats to the security of society

6. All participants expressed their absolute rejection of any and all forms of foreign intervention in internal Egyptian affairs.

Third: A national follow-up committee will be established and composed of public and independent figures from among experts, specialists and representatives of youth movements, and will monitor the implementation of all consensual agreements, and issues reports and recommendations to the Vice-President.

In addition, all participants in the dialogue saluted the patriotic and loyal role played by our Armed Forces at this sensitive time, and affirmed their aspirations for a continuation of that role to restore of calm, security and stability, and to guarantee the implementation and of the consensus and understandings that result from the meetings of the national dialogue.”