peacefare.net

Is Obama selling out the protesters?

Ross Douthat in the NY Times is full of praise for President Obama’s caution and realpolitik with respect to Egypt:

Obama’s response to the Egyptian crisis has crystallized his entire foreign policy vision…it’s clear that the administration’s real goal has been to dispense with Mubarak while keeping the dictator’s military subordinates very much in charge. If the Obama White House has its way, any opening to democracy will be carefully stage-managed by an insider like Omar Suleiman, the former general and Egyptian intelligence chief who’s best known in Washington for his cooperation with the C.I.A.’s rendition program. This isn’t softheaded peacenik dithering. It’s cold-blooded realpolitik.

Or is it just a mistake?

The president has been remarkably unclear in the last day or two about where Egypt should be going. Democracy talk is out again.  I am with him all the way if he wants to suggest that Egyptians should decide their own fate, but when he says Cairo can’t go back where it came from he is suggesting something else: that as long as it doesn’t go all the way back to a Mubarak-style autocracy, the U.S. may be prepared to accept or help stabilize the outcome.

That is a message Omar Suleiman no doubt enjoys hearing, as he clearly has no intention of taking Egypt much more than a meter or two down the path of “reform.”  And it may be a message welcome to some in Congress.  But do we really think that Egyptians will accept a revolution that gives power to the man President Mubarak might have given power to even in the absence of the street protests?  It may be realist, but is it realistic?

Of course behind this “realism” lies fear:  in particular of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Reuel Gerecht, also in the NY Times today, clarifies why fear of the Brotherhood coming to power is overblown, even if the organization itself continues to be odious.  In fact, he argues that bringing it into a broad democratic tent might be the best thing that could happen to defuse and even reverse radicalization among Sunnis. An analogous experiment is underway with Moqtada al Sadr’s Shia political forces in Iraq, so far without any great detriment to the U.S.

My hope is that President Obama is somewhat less realist than Douthat thinks, and somewhat more pragmatic about the need to ensure that he is not seen as selling out the protesters.  If Omar Suleiman is able to restore autocratic “stability” to Egypt, and if President Obama is perceived as having helped him do it, the next protests will not be as benign towards the United States as those of the last ten days.

PS: This is a lot better than the Black-eyed Peas half-time show:

Cairo starts down a constitutional path to we know not where

In the bright light of the first day of the work week here in DC things are even clearer than they were yesterday: the Egyptian regime and the Obama Administration are sticking with a constitutional route to a still ill-defined but “representative” end-state, while the protesters are prepared to go the extra-constitutional route to full-fledged parliamentary democracy. As Mohamed El Baradei put it yesterday on CNN:

We need to abolish the present Constitution. We need to dissolve the current Parliament. These are all elements of the dictatorship regime, and we should not be — I don’t think we will go to democracy through the dictatorial Constitution.

This is no small matter, but the protesters are not likely to get their way unless the army comes over to their side more definitively than seems likely at present.  In the meanwhile, they will need to keep up the pressure through a continuing presence in Tahrir square and other efforts to mobilize supporters, who seem tired but not quite exhausted.

Failing that, Vice President Omar Suleiman will go all the way for a game-winning touchdown.  It is clear today that, despite the regime’s claims to the contrary, his statement yesterday was not agreed with the protesters, but it more than likely represents the maximum intent of the regime, which is to pre-empt and co-opt the protests rather than change the Egyptian political system in any fundamental way.  It falls short of promising anything like representative parliamentary democracy, and it implicitly leaves President Mubarak in office until the end of his term.  President Obama likewise could not be vaguer about where things are headed:  Egypt he said yesterday cannot go “back to what it was.”

For both Obama and Suleiman, keeping President Mubarak in place is important not only for the sake of “stability” but also because his leaving office would trigger–under the current constitution–elections in 60 days.  The Muslim Brotherhood, even if illegal, is the most organized of Egypt’s opposition parties and might do very well in elections held that soon.  While President Obama is trying to sound nonchalant about the Brothers, he definitely does not want them winning Egypt’s first really competitive elections.

Many secular protesters would not want that either, even if for the moment they find themselves in the anti-regime camp with the Brotherhood.  But their solution is for President Mubarak to resign and Egypt to be governed extra-constitutionally while it prepares for elections, presumably not within the 60 day time limit.  They might want to see something like what is going on right now in Tunisia, where a new Interior Minister has prohibited the former ruling party from operating. Mr. Suleiman is not interested in that idea being imported into Egypt.

Bottom line is the same as yesterday:

• stick with the constitution, which despite its faults offers a clearly marked path that leads we know not where; or
• abandon the constitution and try to hack a new path through the regime’s many brambles towards democracy.

For the moment, Cairo seems headed for the constitutional path to we know not where.

As I got some grief yesterday for not publishing all of Omar Suleiman’s statement, I include below the whole thing:

“The Vice-President held a series of meetings with representatives of the full spectrum of political parties and forces, as a well as a number of youths from the 25 January movement. The meetings arrived at the following consensus:

All participants of the dialogue arrived at a consensus to express their appreciation and respect for the 25 January movement and on the need to deal seriously, expeditiously and honestly with the current crisis that the nation is facing, the legitimate demands of the youth of 25 January and society’s political forces, with full consideration and a commitment to constitutional legitimacy in confronting the challenges and dangers faced by Egypt as result of this crisis, including: The lack of security for the populace; disturbances to daily life; the paralysis of by public services; the suspension of education at universities and schools; the logistical delays in the delivery of essential goods to the population; the damages to and losses of the Egyptian economy; the attempts at foreign intervention into purely Egyptian affairs and breaches of security by foreign elements working to undermine stability in implementation of their plots, while recognizing that the 25 January movement is a honorable and patriotic movement.

The participants in the national dialogue agreed on a number of political arrangements, and constitutional and legislative measures, which the participants agreed by consensus would be of a temporary nature until the election of new president at the end of the current presidential term, including:

First: Implementing the commitments announced by the President in speech to the nation on 1 February 2011:

1. No nomination for a new presidential term will take place;

2. A peaceful transition of authority within the constitutional framework;

3. The introduction of constitutional amendments to articles 76 & 77, and related constitutional amendments needed for the peaceful transition of authority;

4. Legislative amendments related to the amendments of the constitution;

5. Implementation of the rulings of the Court of Cassation, regarding challenges to the People’s Assembly election

6. Pursuit of corruption, and an investigation into those behind the breakdown of security in line with the law

7. Restoring the security and stability of the nation, and tasking the police forces to resume their role in serving and protecting the people.

Second: In implementation of these commitments the following measures will be taken:

1. A committee will be formed from members of the judicial authority and a number of political figures to study and recommend constitutional amendments, and legislative amendments of laws complimentary to the constitution to be completed by the first week of March.

2. The Government announces the establishment of a bureau to receive complaints regarding, and commits to immediately release, prisoners of conscience of all persuasions. The Government commits itself to not pursuing them or limiting their ability to engage in political activity.

3. Media and communications will be liberalized and no extra-legal constraints will be imposed on them.

4. Supervisory and judiciary agencies will be tasked with continuing to pursue persons implicated in corruption, as well as pursuing and holding accountable persons responsible for the recent breakdown in security.

5. The state of emergency will be lifted based on the security situation and an end to the threats to the security of society

6. All participants expressed their absolute rejection of any and all forms of foreign intervention in internal Egyptian affairs.

Third: A national follow-up committee will be established and composed of public and independent figures from among experts, specialists and representatives of youth movements, and will monitor the implementation of all consensual agreements, and issues reports and recommendations to the Vice-President.

In addition, all participants in the dialogue saluted the patriotic and loyal role played by our Armed Forces at this sensitive time, and affirmed their aspirations for a continuation of that role to restore of calm, security and stability, and to guarantee the implementation and of the consensus and understandings that result from the meetings of the national dialogue.