Day: February 13, 2011
My debut on bloggingheads
Recorded Friday with Ussama Makdisi of Rice University, discussing next steps in Egypt, but it can no longer be embedded. Watch it here.
Maliki ueber alles?
While we’ve all been preoccupied with Tunisia then Egypt, an Iraqi Supreme Court decision has called into question the independence of the central bank, the electoral commission, the human rights commission and the integrity commission. Reidar Visser has commented on the electoral commission aspect, but arguably the central bank is even more important. The big issue is accumulation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister.
Here are the most obviously relevant articles of the Iraqi constitution:
Article 102:
The High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are considered independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives, and their functions shall be regulated by law.
Article 103:
First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and administratively independent institutions, and the work of each of these institutions shall be regulated by law.
Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of Representatives. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and Media Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.
What the court apparently decided is that agencies with an “executive” function have to be subordinated to the executive branch, not the Council of Representatives, in order to respect the separation of powers. This is obviously pretty deep legal water in which I don’t know how to swim, so I am reluctant to dive in.
But it also raises important questions about the survivability of democracy in Iraq, where accumulation of power has a long and unhappy history. Independent agencies are a frequent feature of the landscape in democratic societies, and independent central banks are regarded as absolutely vital to macroeconomic stability, which Iraq has enjoyed for the most part since the fall of Saddam Hussein. If executive branch supervision refers exclusively to financial probity and other administrative questions, that is one thing (though perhaps not entirely without problems). If executive branch decision is going to mean that these institutions are no longer in any serious sense independent, that is another.
We shouldn’t leap to conclusions, but I certainly hope the U.S. embassy in Baghdad is inquiring and letting the Prime Minister know that those who fought and paid for Iraq’s relative freedom would not be interested in seeing it undermined by an overly aggressive effort to centralize power.
Egyptian army scraps constitution, keeps cabinet
The Armed Forces communique’ no. 5, issued today, does the following (according to Egyptian Chronicles):
1. Freezes the current constitution.
2. Dissolves both chambers of parliament.
3. Announces the army will rule the country for a 6 month transitional period until August.
4. Forms a committee to amend some constitution articles.
5. Continues Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet until a new one is named (unclear when).
6. Asserts that Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, the minister of defense, will represent the country.
7. Egypt respects its international treaties.
The main potential difficulty here is the continuation of Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet, which is the last one appointed by then President Mubarak. It is hard to imagine that the protesters will be pleased with that, though most will welcome the freezing of the Mubarak-era constitution and dissolution of its parliament, fraudulently elected in December. It is easy to imagine however that the Army wants to keep at least some of the ministers in place–otherwise it has to find new people to run the ministries, which would raise all sorts of difficult political and technical issues.
I had some experience with a military regime in Brazil 1982-85, where I was a U.S. diplomat. The Brazilian armed forces had enjoyed exercising power and a privileged position for some time, but by the time I arrived they had realized that running the country was just too difficult. They preferred to get back to playing soldier. So they decided to turn the country back to the civilians, who have done a pretty good job since. My sense is that the Egyptian military already knows that running the country is too hard–they need help and are prepared to get it from Mubarak’s cabinet (which of course includes quite a few of their colleagues).
The question is whether the protesters will accept this or insist, as they have said they would, on dismissal of the cabinet. This immediate question is related to a broader one: how much accountability will there be for crimes and corruption under the Mubarak regime? Leaving the cabinet in place now virtually guarantees that accountability will be postponed, if not skipped altogether. How many files will be destroyed by the Mubarak-appointed ministers? Several of them have already been barred from leaving the country. Can the Army really leave in power ministers who can’t be trusted to leave Egypt? Not to mention Vice President Omar Suleiman, who appears to remain quietly in office.
One other point: the six-month transition period. That would be consistent with new elections in by September, when they were due for the presidency anyway. I won’t be surprised to see this period extended. It might even be wise to extend it, if the time is used to allow people to organize political parties that can seriously compete with Mubarak’s NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which will have a head start. Six months are also not too long to get the electoral mechanism into shape–it is used to running fraudulent elections, not competitive ones.
Revolutions move in phases. The first phase is over. But there is more to come. I’d bet on a new cabinet, which really is needed to ensure that the subsequent phases move in the right direction. But when the Army will recognize the necessity I can’t predict.