Anyone still interested in Macedonia?

Last time I headlined a blog post asking whether anyone out there was interested in Macedonia, I got a ton of visitors to www.peacefare.net, so I thought I would try again.  Here are my notes for a presentation I did yesterday.  I was asked to focus on cross-border linkages.  No fair asking what others said, or who else was there, or where this discussion was held:  it was done (in DC) under Chatham House rules.  Needless to say, these notes were not delivered verbatim, but they are true to what I said and represent my views:

Macedonia

March 21, 2011

1.      I was asked to explore the interconnections in the Balkans – including cross-border issues – from a Macedonia-focused perspective.

2.      I suppose being a talking head on the Balkans over the past 15 years does gives me some perspective on the issues.  Before that I was Mr. Federation in Bosnia as well as an office director in State Department Intelligence and Research in 1996-97, when we tracked Dayton implementation, the virtual collapse of Albania, the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Zajedno demonstrations.

3.      Let there be no doubt:  what happens in Kosovo does not stay in Kosovo, and what happens in Bosnia doesn’t stay in Bosnia.

4.      I imagine it is perfectly obvious to all of us that ethnic partition in either of Macedonia’s neighbors could be catastrophic for Macedonia.  Certainly the Macedonians understood this when they recognized Kosovo, hoping that its borders would not be changed, and proceeded successfully with the demarcation of their own border with the new state.

5.      Likewise, if Macedonia comes apart it will affect Kosovo and Bosnia.  That is not the issue today, but I can assure you it was the issue in 2000/2001, when a very calm and rational Prime Minister Georgievski called me in, making me promise that I would not bring the American Ambassador or Jim Pardew.

6.      He then told me he wanted to partition Macedonia and asked that I take that message back to Washington.

7.      I refused, telling him I did not work for the U.S. Government but knew perfectly well how unwelcome his proposal would be.

8.      The problem with partition is not only the idea of drawing a line, but the difficulty of deciding where to draw it.  This is especially true for Macedonia, where the largest Albanian city is Shkup.  Look at the difficulties that have arisen over a Church museum on the “wrong” side of the river.  Can you imagine what it would take to draw a new national border at the river?  The answer is clear:  war.  And that war would quickly spread to Kosovo and to Bosnia.

9.  So disintegration is subject to the domino theory in the Balkans.  What about integration?

10.  Certainly we know that integration works well for the organized crime networks, which have no difficulty cooperating across borders.

11.  I hasten to add that this is also true for the taxi drivers.  One day in 2000 or 2001, when my staff had failed in weeks of efforts to arrange ground transportation from Belgrade to Pristina, I called the concierge at the Hyatt.

12.  The next day Milenko, the doctor of taxi cab science, deposited me at Gate 3, Podujevo, and I was picked up by his “colleague” from Pristina.

13.  I have taxi-hiked all over the Balkans since.

14.  Once I got to Pristina, I quickly ran out of Serbian cell phone credits.  Psst, I whispered to the concierge in the hotel Baci.  Would it be possible to buy more here in Pristina.  Of course he said loudly, any of the guys on the street will sell you credits for your Serbian phone.

15.  So integration is possible in the Balkans, and basically healthy even if it involves gray market cell phone credits.

16.  The problem is that the official efforts at integration are always running behind the unofficial ones.

17.  Macedonia in particular has been slow to take advantage of what Europe is offering.

18.  There are reasons for this:  The big threat in the Balkans today is lack of progress: on the Macedonia name issue, on Bosnia’s constitutional reforms, on Pristina/Belgrade dialogue.  That last has begun to move, and I hope it will produce good results.

19.  These are long-standing irritants that are being allowed to remain unresolved and are blocking progress towards NATO and the EU. This is a mistake—Brussels and the Balkan capitals need to find a way of moving forward, even if only slowly. Washington should help, but it doesn’t want to play the primary mover role any longer.

20.  Macedonia has been a candidate country for EU membership since December 2005.  Its progress is at best slow:  the progress report in November 2010 has lots of “little progress,” “limited progress,” “modest progress.”

21.  It seems to me the way the government covers for this is to be belligerent:  towards the EU, the US and Greece.

22.  Let me say a final word on the name issue, because it is the main obstacle to more rapid integration of Macedonia into NATO and the EU.

23.  I testified years before the US recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name that it should do so, and I got then Senator Joe Biden wagging a finger “no” in my face for my trouble.

24.  I am entirely sympathetic to the Macedonian position in substance:  a country is entitled to call itself, its people and its language anything it wants.  If nothing else, the interim accord, which allows Macedonia to use the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, should apply.

25.  I hope they win their case at the International Court of Justice, which might at least get Macedonia into NATO, where it belongs.

26.  But I can’t help but suspect that Prime Minister Gruevski uses the name issue for political purposes, not only getting votes but also hiding lack of progress on EU reforms.

27.  The EU could be tougher with Macedonia—they give a lot of euros to Skopje every year.

28.  The name issue will presumably be settled in court, or not.

29.  But is it time to make the money more conditional on EU-required reforms?