Month: March 2011
Egypt is important, but Libya and Yemen are urgent
While I sympathize with Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne on the importance of Egypt to the Arab world, Cairo is proceeding healthily if not rapidly in the right direction. Libya and Yemen are more urgent problems for U.S. policy makers.
A week ago, the question of whether to intervene in Libya was already urgent. Nothing that has happened since has made it less so. Gaddafi has managed not only to hold Tripoli but to demonstrate that he can punch into the western oil town of Zawiya at will while hassling the rebellion in the east from the air. It is only a matter of time before his superior fire power, more consolidated position and inclination to attack civilian populations causes a major disaster. If you are interested, Jeffrey White provides the best analysis of the military situation I have seen.
I understand of course that diplomacy is slow and more art than science. But I also understand that leadership is critical to getting diplomatic ducks in a row. While clear enough about wanting Gaddafi out, and correct to want to consult rather than impose, the time has come for some American decisions. theatlantic.com will publish in the next hours my list of options to be considered. Here I would like to focus on the importance of two other things: getting Gaddafi out of there and maintaining a unified alternative to him.
Gaddafi has spent the last couple of days dangling the possibility of negotiations. He knows this will divide his opponents, some of whom will be ready to talk. But talk will inevitably lead to Gaddafi remaining in Libya, something that really won’t work. The regime is so closely tied to his family that for any serious change to take place he has to be out of there, with his offspring. He long ago gave up any claim he might have had to a peaceful retirement in a desert tent. The best he can hope for now is Zimbabwe or Venezuela, something that should be negotiated not with the rebels but with Harare or Caracas.
The rebels are showing signs of trying to get organized, as well as indications that they are finding it difficult to remain united. They need to remember what Ben Franklin said just before signing the Declaration of Independence: “We must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.” American diplomacy should by now be in touch with the Interim Transitional National Council. (I’ve included the website link, even though the precise relationship between the website and the council is not entirely clear to all observers, because it contains interesting documents.) It is exceedingly important that the international community start channeling information and assistance through an institution that can claim legitimacy with most of the rebellion. That will help consolidate unity.
Yemen, a frontline state in the fight with Al Qaeda, is becoming almost as urgent as Libya. President Saleh is losing his grip. Yesterday he used lethal force against student demonstrators, and he has lost the loyalty of important tribes. Yemen has not plunged as precipitously into civil war as Libya, but the potential is certainly there, as separatists both in the north and the south may see an opportunity to achieve their goals in a country where declining oil production, water shortages and qat addiction have already weakened the state dramatically.
The Americans should be aiming for a negotiated solution in Yemen, closer to the outcome in Egypt than in Libya. Sanaa has a reasonably moderate opposition, one highly compromised by association with the regime but now standing up a bit more courageously to demand that Salih leave this year rather than stay on to the end of his term in 2013, as he has proposed. In Yemen, too, some sort of unified opposition/protester institution is needed to speak with one voice and carry forward a delicate political maneuver to remove the president by the end of this year, using the meantime to develop and implement an alternative that can begin the difficult process of reconstructing a state that is very close to collapse.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Plus jamais!
This post is contributed by an Ivoirian student living in the U.S.
Following numerous peace agreements, presidential elections were finally held in Cote d’Ivoire in November 2010 to put an end to the decade-long political instability in the country. In the aftermath of this election, qualified as fair and transparent by the international community, Cote d’Ivoire has plunged into turmoil. Incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, supported by some elements of the army, refused to step down and is accusing the international community—including the UN, which supervised the elections—of orchestrating an electoral putsch.
As the international community is absorbed by the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, very little attention has been given to the numerous human rights violations in the West African nation, where the elected president Mr. Alassane Ouattara and his government are trying to run the country from an Abidjan hotel under UN protection.
On a daily basis, the national media—controlled by Mr.Gabgbo—relay propaganda messages against the UN, the international community, the elected government those who support it. Northerners are particularly subject to attack. Mosques have been burned and imams killed, with Gbagbo’s security forces either participating directly or standing by to supervise. Like Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda, national television in Cote d’Ivoire continues to have a disastrous effect on the already bleak situation of the country. International media have been banned in Cote d’Ivoire and local journalists are being intimidated and even abducted by the forces loyal to Gbagbo.
The same forces have contained all demonstrations by using lethal force. According to the UN, the official death toll is now close to 400. Unofficial sources are closer to over 600. Last Thursday, a peaceful demonstration of women ended in a blood bath as forces loyal to Mr.Gbagbo opened fire in the crowd. This event has been reported in the US media but no image has filtered out so far. Here is a link to amateur video of this event. Viewer discretion is advised as these images are extremely disturbing.
The African Union panel appointed to find a peaceful solution to the crisis last week asked for an extension of one month. This is more time than the Ivorian people can afford. Mr Ggagbo has to be stopped immediately. Cote d’Ivoire is no longer susceptible to mediation.
As advocated by ICG on March 3, the UN should support an immediate military intervention of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States, which has intervened successfully in other instances). In addition action needs to be taken to shut down the national television, which plays a destructive role by openly supporting and legitimizing violence, including against the UN peacekeeping force. This could be accomplished easily with the appropriate technology by jamming frequencies.
In taking these actions, the international community could contribute to avoiding another Rwanda-in-the-making in Cote d’Ivoire. “We did not realize” should no longer be an excuse for inaction. Cote d’Ivoire is slowly slipping into a civil war that could destabilize West Africa. It is imperative that the international community keep it on the agenda.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Not yet time to use oil reserves
Dan Yergin is right: it is not yet time to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Why not?
The 727 billion barrel SPR is intended for use in an oil supply disruption. Libya has partially disrupted its own oil supplies, but they are relatively small, about 1.5 million barrels per day of exports. Oil prices are spiking, but not because of the Libyan supply disruption. As Yergin says, they are anticipating risks in the future, risks like demonstrations in Saudi Arabia that might disrupt the massive supplies that come from its Shia-populated Eastern Province.
We should be urging oil exporting countries to increase their production in response to higher prices, which they are likely to do in any case, and holding our own reserves in reserve for the possibility that things will get worse, possibly much worse. The market is telling us that is a real possibility.
I spent the years 1982-85, when oil prices fell sharply, preparing for an oil supply disruption and the resulting spike in prices as the U.S. representative to the emergency committee at the International Energy Agency. I trust the plans we developed then for a coordinated (with friends and allies) draw of oil stocks early in a supply disruption have been much improved since. Relatively small emergency drawdowns of the SPR were authorized during Desert Storm in 1991 and after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Loans and exchanges have been used to meet other exigencies.
I understand that there is a real need for the White House to be seen as doing something to counter the rise in oil prices and defend the economic recovery. But there is a real risk that turmoil in the Middle East will eventually disrupt many millions of barrels per day of oil supply, making things much worse than they are today. I’d wait to see the whites of oil disruption’s eyes before using our most important, but inherently limited, weapon to defend against a price spike.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Is Maliki becoming a dictator?
While I was publishing an op/ed in the Washington Post optimistic about prospects for democracy in Iraq, my former colleagues (Sean Kane and Jason Gluck) at the United States Institute of Peace were giving interviews to the New York Times for a piece that views Maliki as broadening his powers in ways that threaten Iraqi democracy. Who is right?
My view is that we all are.
There is no question but that Maliki aspires to enhanced powers, and recent constitutional court decisions have given him some. We’ll have to wait and see what he does with the administrative oversight he has gained over the central bank and the electoral commission, about which I have already expressed concern. I’ll be surprised if Maliki can get away with monkeying with the central bank. The electoral commission though is another matter, and especially important. I have little doubt that Maliki, if allowed, will exploit his position in ways that enable him to enhance his power and to stay in office for as long as he likes, which could well mean beyond the 2014 retirement date he has announced. That is what I would expect of any good politician, and certainly Maliki has proven that he is one.
But I also have little doubt that there are other forces at work in Iraqi society, where there is relative freedom for them to work. Most directly relevant is the parliament, which needs to learn how to check the executive’s ambitions. The previous parliament was quite accomplished at this–it had learned how to stop financing the prime minister’s pet projects, some of considerable merit, and thereby exert influence on him. This new parliament will have to learn similar tricks. The parliament would do well to use the power of the purse to force Maliki to appoint Interior and Defense Ministers, portfolios that he is still holding himself.
The collapse of the ill-fated proposal for a National Council for Strategic Priorities, led by Maliki’s archrival Ayad Allawi, enhances the prospects for parliament taking a firmer stand. As Reidar Visser has suggested, it is time for Allawi to focus his attention on checking prime ministerial power, even if his coalition members remain in the government (that’s my view, not Reidar’s).
The constitutional court has unfortunately been a disappointment. Its decision that only the executive can initiate legislation is particularly concerning, but I don’t really see how it can seriously inhibit parliamentary oversight and legislative activism. Presumably any proposed legislation can be amended. Maliki lost many votes in the previous parliament, despite his nominal parliamentary majority. Why shouldn’t he lose them in this one as well?
The demonstrators are another important check on Maliki, whose security forces have handled them badly and committed many gross human rights violations–the parliament would do well to focus some attention on accountability for those. But when Ayatollah Sistani is asking the government to provide better services, it is clear that Maliki cannot ignore the protests, which may well grow.
It is important to remember that all of this is occurring while Iraq is still threatened by both an Al Qaeda-linked insurgency and Iranian-back Shia militias. Maliki isn’t wrong to worry about the demonstrations being exploited by anti-constitutional forces. His responsibility is to protect the country from enemies, foreign and domestic. The protesters, the parliament and the constitutional court should be ensuring that he does it strictly within the limits of the “state of law,” which happens to be the name of his electoral coalition.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Liar, liar pants on fire!
It is really hard to recommend this superbly done interview with Saif al Islam, who simply lies his way through:
Bravo Al Jazeera English!
The threat of surprises at the end should not be taken lightly. He and his father no doubt have some nasty moves planned.
PS: For those who need an antidote:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Refighting the Bosnian war
The arrest in Vienna on a Serbian warrant of the Bosnian general who led Sarajevo’s defense at the beginning of the Bosnian war in 1992 is the latest Belgrade effort to rewrite history. Jovan Divjak, an ethnic Serb, is accused of war crimes for an incident in May 1992. During the UN-negotiated evacuation of a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) general an his aides from Sarajevo, the UN-protected convoy, which without authorization from the Bosnian side carried soldiers, weapons and files, was attacked and 18 people killed.
The merits of the war crimes accusations have already been considered in London last year, in the case of Ejup Ganic. The British court found that the Serbian authorities had abused the judicial process and released Ganic, after months house detention.
But if you want to see for yourself Divjak’s role, get the documentary The Death of Yugoslavia (it’s available from Google Videos on line) and watch the general call for those firing on the convoy to stop. It’s in part 4. Start with Divjak at about minute 28, and watch the part about the detention by the JNA of Bosnian President Izetbegovic, which is essential background to the convoy incident at minute 44.
Why would Belgrade pursue this legal case now? Serbia’s current leadership is mainly focused on getting the country into the EU, but it is also determined to satisfy nationalist sentiment by establishing that Serbs were victims during the wars in Yugoslavia. I have no problem myself in acknowledging that: Serbs suffered not only during the war, but also thereafter under the continued autocracy of Slobodan Milosevic.
But it is past time–almost 20 years have gone by–for Serbs to adopt a version of history that is recognizable by their antagonists. Arresting Divjak is as much an abuse of judicial process as the arrest of Ejup Ganic and dishonors Serbia’s democracy.
PS: The thesis that Belgrade is refighting the Bosnian war is elaborated in more detail and with ample support in an RFE piece by Nenad Pejic. He writes
Standing behind all these cases are figures in Serbia’s security organs, police, and military who are backed by far-right political forces….Despite having all these cases dismissed one after another — and the case against Divjak will surely be dismissed as well — the rightists have achieved their goal. Serbian media covered all the arrests with patriotic jingoism, and ethnic tensions across the Balkans were inflamed. Divisions were deepened. Tolerance suffered another setback. The soil was prepared for future conflicts or partitions. And pro-Western forces in Serbia have been sent a strong message about the power of the far right. They are still fighting a war that has been lost.
PPS: I guess if the Austrian Foreign Minister thinks the extradition of Divjak is “unthinkable” that means it won’t happen. But the request is still an embarrassment to Serbia.
RSS - Posts
