The Middle East Institute and the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique are cosponsoring a conference today on “Protracted Displacement Challenges Facing Sudan: What Scope for EU-US Cooperation.” They wisely ignored their title for the first session and focused instead on the broader political and military dimensions of the situation a few months before Southern Sudan becomes a separate state on July 9. I’ll try to give a quick summary of a rich set of presentations.
Jan Pronk, former Dutch Minister for International Assistance and former UN Envoy to Sudan, offered 10 lessons from his experience:
- Humanitarian assistance and military intervention are not sufficient; a political strategy is needed to prevent conflict.
- The political strategy needs to be timely, early enough in the game to avoid escalation and establishment of facts on the ground that will be impossible to reverse.
- The international community needs the political capacity to intervene early based on a UN Security Council mandate, but without having to go through UNSC procedures each time–this would mean a committee mandated by the UNSC but under the authority of the Secretary General.
- Nothing works unless there is a common approach based on consensus that allows joint action, avoids sending conflicting signals and eliminates the possibility of divisive tactics used by the host country.
- Such a comprehensive approach may have to be implemented step by step, but within an overall political framework.
- We may have to occasionally step back and reevaluate, as we should have done after the Darfur Peace Agreeement, in order to avoid building our approach on a basis that is the wrong one.
- Each UN organization has its own board, with even the same governments saying different things in different organizations; we need to unify the UN approach under a single person who provides common transport, communications, intelligence and security.
- This requires that UN organizations delegate coordination to the field, where it is done best.
- The referendum decision in Sudan needs to be implemented peacefully, but we cannot allow Khartoum to sell Southern Sudan independence as a substitute for Darfur cooperation.
- The military efforts in Ivory Coast and Libya are important because they mean force is being used to protect civilians, but we need to think ahead, avoid collateral damage and put forward a political strategy that opens a back door for the “villains” to depart.
Former US Sudan Envoy Andrew Natsios offered 5:
- Southern Sudan will be able to gain independence because it has armed itself well, but the North will continue to try to destabilize the South. Darfur fighting has been fed by Libya, which is supporting the JEM.
- Two new states will emerge July 9: the North will be majority Arab, the South will be a state with a big army 150,000 strong.
- The government in Khartoum is weak and nervous, for good reasons. Turabi is still dangerous and the North faces continuing problems in Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Beja and Darfur. President Bashir is frightened even of his own army, which is largely kept out of Khartoum to prevent a coup (there are only 5000 soldiers in the capital). The secret police, not the army, sustains the regime.
- A unified approach among donors is obviously desirable, but difficult because of legal differences among the Europeans, Canadians and Americans.
- There is still a need for a political settlement concerning the 500,000-1,000,000 Southerners still in the North, but large-scale conflict is unlikely in July because both North and South know it would disrupt the oil flow and bankrupt both their governments, something neither can afford to see.
Rosalind Marsden, EU Representative for Sudan:
- The EU is trying to develop a comprehensive approach to Southern Sudan and is also looking at the North.
- EU assistance to the referendum commission, and monitoring of the referendum, was successful.
- There is a need to make arrangements still for the Southerners in the North and the Northerners in the South.
- President Mbeki’s African Union effort is looking at these issues and others, but the time is short before July 9.
- The positions on Abyei have hardened, agreements have not been implemented, half the population of Abyei town has left, and everyone is waiting for Mbeki’s proposals.
- There are also delays and difficulties with the popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, which are not likely to be completed before July 9.
- For Darfur, the main game is the Doha negotiations, where the stakeholders conference is the next important step, but Khartoum’s intention of holding a Darfur referendum has complicated matters.
- Insecurity is rising in Darfur, with the government conducting military operations and JEM under pressure from developments in Libya.
- The US and EU need to speak with one voice, as they did on the referendum. For this, a common assessment and agreement on benchmarks would help. The Southern Sudan 3-year development plan, now being worked in Juba, will be an enormous step forward.
Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator at AID, suggested:
- Good donor coordination and contingency planning helped avoid problems at the time of the referendum, with UN DPKO helping to focus international efforts as well as cooperation with both North and South.
- The big issues are still out there: oil revenue, citizenship, currency, borders are unsettled.
- The South is absorbing 320,000 returnees, many of whom are urbanized, into a society that is mostly rural, largely illiterate , lacking in infrastructure and with a high rate of infant mortality.
- AID is focused on mitigating conflict, combating corruption, promoting economic growth (mainly via agriculture) and building the capacity of the Southern Sudan government to provide essential services.
- The effort is shifting from relief to development, including urban planning, land distribution, small business and youth.
- The next big issues will come from governance.
It would be hard to be optimistic based on this event, but at least officials are thinking hard and ahead about the requirements. And it is comforting to know that there are such capable people still engaged.
But what they need in Juba is a stronger architecture for the international assistance effort, and stronger links to the host country’s own plans. As things stand, conditionalities are never met because the Southern Sudanese can always donor shop elsewhere. Nothing like the pillar structure in Kosovo or even the High Representative in Bosnia exists in Southern Sudan. Even the UN effort is fragmented. Donors need to get together on a common approach shared by the Southern Sudanese.