Month: April 2011
The Passover of Arab liberation
Tonight is the beginning of Passover, the holiday celebrating the founding narrative of the Jewish people, which is also regarded by many non-Jews as the archetypal liberation story.
This Passover is the first in my lifetime that we can truly cast Egypt in the liberation story not only as the oppressor but also as the people liberating themselves. I’ve watched and commented enthusiastically for months now on the events unfolding in North Africa and the Middle East. For those of us privileged to live in a relatively free and prosperous country, the courage and conviction of those demonstrating nonviolently for freedom in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria is thrilling. Unlike the ancient Jews, they are not trying to leave the countries that have kept them captive but instead are trying to revolutionize them, creating political systems that will allow far wider margins of freedom to speak, associate and choose their rulers than existed anywhere in the Arab world until now.
Jews of course worry about what the Arab revolutions of 2011 mean for world politics in general and Israel in particular. But my sense of the relatively liberal and secularized community in which I live and pray is that the revolutions have the benefit of doubt. Lots of us anticipate that a liberated Egypt will give greater support to the Palestinian cause, but we may also think that is a necessary ingredient in completing the Middle East peace process. As the Palestinian papers all too clearly reveal, Israel has been less than forthcoming and more than recalcitrant, passing up decent offers from the Palestinian Authority that might have opened the door to resolution.
Americans of all religions also worry about the implications of the revolutions for their interests in political stability, countering violent extremism and reliability of oil supplies. Most it seems to me have gradually tilted towards support for the demonstrators, as has the Obama Administration, even in Yemen. This is made relatively easy by the fact that the revolutions have not yet touched directly on U.S. oil interests: none of the countries so far involved is a major supplier. Where U.S. interests and values have been most at odds–in Bahrain because of the 5th Fleet presence and Saudi Arabia because of oil–the tilt has been in favor of interests. Washington has essentially supported the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies in their efforts to buy off and repress dissent, even if those same monarchies are angry at Washington for promoting revolution elsewhere.
Libya is a special case. There some of the demonstrators chose to respond to violence with violence. The international community has backed them against the Gaddafi regime, but so far at least the results are less than satisfactory. It can be very difficult to dislodge an autocrat with violence, as that is their preferred method. They can and do escalate. The Gaddafi regime will not win in Libya, but it has already created a mess that will be difficult to repair. While Tunisia and now Egypt seem headed down paths that will lead to more open and democratic societies, Libya will need a lot more help to find its way after its devastating experience under Gaddafi and the war that will end his rule.
The outcome in Syria is also in doubt. As I noted yesterday, Syrians need to decide what they really want: the promise of responsiveness from a still autocratic regime, or real choices about how they are governed. Liberation will not be easy, as Bashar al Assad is brutal, determined and marginally more “enlightened” than some of the other autocrats in the Middle East. The benign despotism he is offering may well attract some Syrians, especially those who thrive under the current regime.
My message for Bashar and for all the other leaders on this Passover of the Arab rebellions, is simple: let your people go!
Here they are, in Homs, Syria, today:
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What do Syrians want?
While the Arabist is certainly correct in noting the banality of President Bashar al Assad’s speech to his new council of ministers yesterday, I confess I read the whole thing on al-bab.com
What he presents is basically his reform program, which is offered in a more or less explicit trade for an end to the demonstrations. The major features of the reform program are these: citizenship for Syrian Kurds, lifting the state of emergency, a law regulating demonstrations (one that he anticipates will eliminate the need for organizing demonstrations!), possibly a law permitting political parties, a law on local administration and another on media, plus of course all the implementation required.
Like most political speeches, this one is most notable for what it omits: no freedom of speech or association, no free and fair elections, little consideration of corruption (none at the higher levels, but mention of bribes at the lower levels), and nothing to speak of on rule of law or an independent judiciary.
In fact, the concept of the state that Bashar puts forward would be inconsistent with these ingredients. He says at the opening:
What’s important at this stage is for us to reach a state of unity, unity between the government, state institutions and the people. We are supposed to be moving in parallel when we move in the same direction. In this case we maximize the outcome and the achievement. The more we distance ourselves from the Syrian population, the weaker our strength and the less our achievement.
And this appears towards the end:
What’s important is that we and the population are one party, not two parties. The citizen is our compass, and we get along with our citizens in the direction they identify. We are here to serve our citizens; and without this service there is no justification for the existence of any one of us. What is important is for the citizen to feel his or her citizenship in every sense of the word.
But clearly your citizenship does not allow for expressing your opinions freely, or having your disputes settled fairly by independent judges observing the rule of law, or voting freely. Rather your citizenship consists in state officials detecting your needs and responding to them.
This is an authoritarian concept of the state, perhaps even a totalitarian one. The question for Syrians is whether this is what they are demonstrating for, or whether they want a government that they choose freely rather than one provided by an allegedly benevolent Bashar. We’ll see in coming days whether the bargain Bashar offers–a state that is not created by its citizens but is purportedly responsive to them, in exchange for quiescence–is what Syrians want.
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Bosnia: fix thyself
Sead Numanovic of Dnevni Avaz, a Bosnian daily, has suggested I address the question I asked Friday about the Arab protests–how long can this go on?–about Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “it” I take to be President Milorad Dodik’s threats to take Republika Srpska (RS) in the direction of independence, whether by referendum or other efforts to assert that the Bosnian state and the international community have no say in how the RS is governed, denying in particular that jurisdiction of the Bosnia and Herzegovina judicial system extends to RS.
This has already gone on for a long time. Dodik has been unequivocal in his assertions of RS’s defiance of the High Representative–the international community’s designated guarantor of Dayton agreement implementation–for a couple of years now. He has made it absolutely clear that he rejects any constraints imposed by the High Rep or by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus asserting de facto independence of an entity that in the international community view gave up any chance of independence at Dayton, in return for international community acknowledgement of its existence and authority within the limits imposed by the Dayton constitution.
But the international community has foolishly disarmed itself and no longer possesses the tools required to enforce its decisions on the RS. It has become a paper tiger, and Dodik is calling its bluff.
So what are the remaining limits on Dodik’s push for RS independence? There are three: the presumably limited patience of the majority of Bosnians, the financial resources at the RS’s disposal, and the unwillingness of other states to recognize an independent RS.
I am no expert on either of the first two limits, but people who are tell me that the crunch is coming.
Republika Srpska got 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory at Dayton. This was a dramatic increase from the territory it actually controlled at the end of the war, which was down to 34 per cent and shrinking rapidly as Croat and Bosniak (aka Federation) forces advanced towards Banja Luka. The Federation forces gave up 15 per cent of the territory to RS at Dayton, in exchange for RS’s incorporation in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If RS is now trying to leave that state–whether de facto or de jure–I would expect a substantial number of people, especially in the Federation, to oppose its effort. It is clear enough to me that a majority of Bosnians want to continue to live in a single Bosnian state: best guesstimates put the percentage of Muslims and “others” in Bosnia and Herzegovina today at over 50 per cent. They favor a single Bosnian state by a wide margin. Substantial numbers of Croats in Central Bosnia and Serbs wherever they live in the Federation also favor a single Bosnian state, since partition would mean they would likely have to move.
If a majority of Bosnians favor a single state, some percentage of that number will be prepared to take up arms to oppose Dodik’s attempt to walk away with 49 per cent of the territory. Their focus will be Brcko, which links the two wings of the RS. So long as it is not in his hands, Dodik cannot hope for independence. That is why he is aiming to squeeze Brcko dry, hoping to preempt his opponents by ending the multiethnic administration there.
Before it gets to violence, RS may well run out of money. Its finances are far from transparent, but those who study them tell me they can’t last long. The belt-tightening measures instituted so far are unlikely to buy the RS much time. This is one reason why Dodik so aggressively pursues state and defense property, which he hopes to sell off to refill his coffers, as he has done previously with other state assets. We are talking here about no more than a year or so more before the RS faces the real prospect of going to Sarajevo for help. Obviously that help would come only if Dodik abandoned his push for independence.
The third limit is the one I know most about: the prospects for international recognition of the RS as an independent state. Here I can be unequivocal: unless there is a dramatic change whose cause I cannot imagine, few sovereign states will recognize an independent RS. While there are people in Belgrade egging on Dodik, including Foreign Minister Jeremic and sometimes President Tadic, even Serbia would have to think three times before recognizing the RS, as doing so would end Belgrade’s hopes for EU membership for the foreseeable future. Serbia absorbing the RS would have the same result.
So Dodik’s best bet is to achieve as much autonomy as possible, desisting from a formal move towards independence until the moment is ripe, while trying to raise the funds he needs to keep the RS going and stopping just short of provoking Bosnians committed to the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from taking up arms. That seems to me an accurate description of what he is up to. I can’t tell you how long the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina will put up with this, but they should not rely on the international community to take action. It figures there is no need, as it has the final say by withholding recognition.
If Bosnians want to save their state, they’ll need to do it for themselves, either by cutting a financial deal with Dodik or enforcing the bargain made at Dayton. Dodik is serious about seeking independence for RS. How serious is the rest of Bosnia about preserving the Dayton state? If it is, it will need to do something definitive within the next year.
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The countdown to referendum begins
Another of my Bosnia-watching friends (I’ve got many) offers the following:
On April 13th, RS President Milorad Dodik asked a special session of the RS National Assembly to hold a referendum on allegedly imposed laws and alleged human rights violations committed by the High Representatives. Dodik’s 50 minute speech to the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA) – both in tone and content – sounded troublingly similar to speeches given by ultra-nationalist politicians immediately prior to the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. The speech’s first paragraph mentioned chopped-off heads, concentration camps, mujahedeen, jihad, Al Qaeda and global terrorism. During the course of the speech, Dodik mentioned crossing the Rubicon three times. In this regard, the speech represented a political Rubicon for Dodik, in that he left himself no way to back down from this position. Later that same evening, the RSNA adopted conclusions that included a referendum measure.
Five additional conclusions proposed by other political parties were adopted. One conclusion said that the RSNA requests the RS Government, RS bodies and institutions to accept RS Supreme Court decisions as final in cases in which they are one of the parties. This is a de facto repudiation of the authority of the BiH Constitutional Court, an Annex 4 Dayton institution. In other conclusions, the RSNA deemed the High Representative’s suspension of the Central Election Commission ruling illegal and that therefore, the Federation government authorities are illegal, i.e. Republika Srpska will not recognize Federation authorities. It also voted to create a fund to support the families of war crimes’ indictees.
The referendum question the RSNA adopted is: “Do you support the laws imposed by the High Representative of the International Community in BiH, especially those pertaining to the Court of BiH and BiH Prosecutor’s Office, as well as their unconstitutional verification in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly”? As the reader may notice, the tendentious manner in which the referendum question is written tells the voter how to answer. The date of the referendum is in the first week following 45 days from the day that the decision takes effect, which is one day after publication in the RS Official Gazette. This could be delayed by weeks or even months, depending on whether the Bosniak Caucus in the RS Council of Peoples invokes the Vital National Interest provision and refers the matter to the RS Constitutional Court.
The referendum question relates to the State Judges and Prosecutors, as well as the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, all institutions that the international community went to great effort and expense to create. Among other things, these institutions are crucial to the ICTY war crimes strategy and international efforts to help the countries in the Western Balkans process war crimes cases in an effective manner. Two days after his speech, Dodik went on RTRS and outlined what he intended to do after the referendum: “After the people have voted in the RS, we will ask the National Assembly to reconvene to adopt new laws that will repeal all the anti-Dayton and unconstitutional decisions and laws which have been imposed by the High Representative”. This means Dodik clearly intends to undo everything that has been built up since 1996.
The special session was entitled A Discussion on the Consequences of the Anti-DPA and Unconstitutional Establishment of Judiciary at BiH Level and (Non)-Activity of the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and the Court of BiH in War Crimes. The first 23 conclusions accused the BiH Court and Prosecutor of selectivity in their work at the expense of Serbs and of generating ethnic hatred; challenged the retroactive application of the BiH Criminal Code to war crimes; argued that Republika Srpska did not agree to the transfer of competencies establishing the BiH Court and Prosecutor; rejected the authority of the BiH Parliament to adopt legislation on matters for the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement; rejected the authority of the High Representative to impose legislation outside the competencies of the Presidency and Council of Ministers; and demand that the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council be established at the entity level and the judicial and prosecutorial aspects be separated. Dodik called the special session on 31 March, after presenting a 61-page document relating primarily to the work of institutions involved in the search for the missing and prosecuting war crimes. In the intervening period, media close to the RS Government supported Dodik and reported extensively the document’s distorted accusations as fact. Dodik also sought – and received – the backing of the RS Senate, an appointed consultative body – for his initiative at a 12 April session.
PS: Today the Hague Tribunal convicted two Croatian generals of crimes against Serbs in 1995, once again giving the lie to Dodik’s frequent complaints that the Tribunal is biased against Serbs. Don’t expect Dodik to take notice.
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How long can this go on?
Big demos today Yemen and Syria. President Saleh has so far played rope-a-dope, pretending to negotiate but in fact ducking whenever the GCC or Saudis get close to a serious demand that he step down. The demonstrations in Syria are still focused mainly on regime abuses, especially the emergency law, rather than an end to the regime. No one seems fooled by the changes President Bashar has made in the cabinet, but somehow he manages to curry favor with both Syrians and the internationals.
In Libya, the military situation seems stalemated in a dynamic kind of way, but the Big 3 (US, France and UK) are making it clear that Gaddafi has to go. I trust this means they are working hard on it in clandestine ways. They are also admitting, as peacefare.net began suggesting in some depth on March 28, that a post-war reconstruction effort is necessary.
In Bahrain, the protesters’ cause seems lost for now. The Sunni monarchy there managed to reframe the whole affair as a sectarian conflict, which in a bizarre sort of logic justified the Saudi/UAE intervention and the crackdown on supposedly Iranian-inspired Shia. No doubt the protests will be back at some point, and likely with a far sharper sectarian edge. Torture and kill people for being Shia and they will no doubt seek recompense on that basis.
The main question now in Yemen and Syria is whether the demonstrators can maintain their momentum and continue to press for what they want. They are doing fairly well so far, but it is not easy to get people out every Friday, especially when there is serious risk involved. What happened in Libya should be ample warning that taking up arms is no quick or easy solution. Massive nonviolent protest is the way to go, and it won’t be easy to sustain.
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What good is the European Union?
Yesterday afternoon SAIS hosted a discussion of “Europe, Italy and the Libya” crisis to celebrate the publication of Federiga Bindi’s Italy and the European Union. I couldn’t stay the whole time–I had to go teach my post-conflict reconstruction seminar–but I’ll try to give a sense of the hour and a quarter of the proceedings that I was able to attend.
The question on my mind, and I suppose on the minds of many of the Americans in the room, was “what good is the European Union?” When we need help from it, can we get it? And to what extent does it even exist on an issue like Libya, where disarray has been more apparent than the Common European Security and Defense Policy? Will the EU be prepared to take over the post-conflict reconstruction once the war is over? No one will be surprised I trust that the answers are uniformly gloomy.
I confess that the three Italian presenters are people I know and respect, as is Marta Dassu’, who chaired. The gloom I felt should not really be blamed on them–they are more observers than participants.
Roberto Toscano, former Italian Ambassador in Tehran now at the Wilson Center, led off noting that the heady days when we were talking with abandon about “revolution” are already over. In Egypt, the Army and at least part of the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be conspiring to chill revolutionary fervor while in Libya we really don’t know who the rebels are. The outcomes there could be partition, or a failed state. Contradictions and double standards hound the intervention there. There are questions also about Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Our interests in these places often conflict with our principles. Maybe we went too far with humanitarian intervention in Libya, and also in Ivory Coast. Can we say we are protecting civilians and then use military means that necessarily kill some of them?
I was relieved when Roberto finally got around to mentioning the positive part: people who have been subjects are demanding their rights as citizens, things are beginning to change even if we are nowhere near the end of the transition process. And then the inevitable but obvious: the EU will find this a difficult challenge to meet and will require a major military, political and security effort.
Erik Jones of the SAIS center in Bologna, in response to a query from Marta, denied that the U.S. financial crunch would affect the American effort–after all, Defense is the one department of the government still getting an increase, and the Iraq and Afghanistan war expenditures are not included in the budget deal. U.S. leadership, he went on to note, will still be needed. There is a broad political consensus in the U.S. in support of U.S. global leadership, but President Obama has been wise to seek contributions from others. In focusing on that, though, he failed to do all that was needed to line up domestic support for the Libya operation.
The key issues for the U.S. have to do with the timing of when it gets involved, and when it gets out. It is now out of the direct combat operations but continues to provide unique capabilities like intelligence and refueling, even including close air support in some instances. One of the contradictions in U.S. policy is that it asks the Europeans not to duplicate U.S. capabilities, but then the U.S. is stuck doing things that the Europeans can’t do. The Americans really don’t care who does what among the allies, so long as someone picks up a good chunk of the burden. The Europeans though are preoccupied with who does what–whether it is the French or British, the EU or the member states.
The big problem now is when to declare victory. This is especially important to the Europeans, since what frightens them most is the prospect of emigration from North Africa. The longer the war goes on, the more likely that problem will grow. Maybe regime change isn’t necessary?
Federiga Bindi noted that the public discourse in Italy, which for many years shied away from discussion of the national interest because it was associated with the Fascists, now allows for the discussion, but without firm conclusions to date. Italy’s history in Libya is fraught with problems, from the time of the 1911 occupation, through the colonial period, to Gaddafi’s accession to power and expulsion of the Italians. Italy depends on Libya today for important slices of oil and gas supplies and would have preferred a negotiated solution. But that won’t work now, and the Foreign Minister at least (but perhaps not the Prime Minister) is betting on the Benghazi authorities, whom Rome has now recognized.
Italian interests are much more complex than French and British interests. Essentially Paris and London had nothing to lose by intervening, Federiga thought, while the EU has remained largely silent and Turkey is using this and other developments as a means of emerging as a regional power.
Francesco Olivieri, who now represents the Italian electrical company ENEL in Washington but is a thoroughly experienced Italian diplomat, doubted that oil and gas had much to do with the intervention. Libyan exports at 1.6 million barrels per day were not very important during the recession, the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear crisis has sharply reduced Japanese demand, and OPEC has increased production to make up in part for the shortfall. Whatever the outcome of the Libya crisis, its oil and gas will reach the market, as it did under Gaddafi.
One real issue, Francesco suggested, was what happens to the $60 billion dollars per year, more or less, that flows to Tripoli in payment for its oil and gas. This could be used for bad purposes if the wrong kind of regime ends up in power. A second big issue is the problem of refugees–so far the numbers are manageable, but the EU should recognize that it has a common purpose in making sure it stays that way.
European friends: I appeal to you to stop worrying about whether we should have intervened or not, about why the French went first and the British soon thereafter (with the Germans ducking out), about whether oil and gas were the real issue (or not), about Italy’s complicated relationship with Tripoli, about our interests and our values. This is all water under the bridge.
The issue now is to make this “humanitarian intervention” come out right. There are two things required for that: get Gaddafi and his family out of there (I suspect the Americans, as Hillary Clinton has been implying, are still taking the lead on that, likely with help from the Turks) and begin planning for the post-war stabilization and reconstruction. That is something the EU can really help with, as it has lots of experience in many difficult places.
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