Month: April 2011
When the going gets rough
While the Libya “contact group” is discussing funding for the rebels, NATO is defending itself from charges of not being sufficiently aggressive and the African Union is proposing a ceasefire, Gaddafi’s forces are trying to take Misrata, the third largest city in Libya.
The rebels have made it clear they won’t accept any deal that keeps Gaddafi in power, but the UN, Arab League, and EU are scheduled to meet anyway with the African Union, which has proposed just that, tomorrow in Cairo.
NATO Foreign Ministers meet Thursday and Friday in Berlin. It will be a difficult meeting for Secretary of State Clinton, who needs to encourage NATO allies to do more even as Defense Secretary Gates resists augmenting U.S. military efforts.
In short: things are going badly for the rebels and the international community, well for Gaddafi.
This does not mean he wins, however. At this point, it looks as if the best he can hope for is a stalemate, with the country divided east and west. Unfortunately, that is a very bad outcome for the international community, one that would burden it for a long time to come and open up all sorts of opportunities for “bad actors” to engage on one side or the other.
Capturing or getting Gaddafi and his family out of Libya has to be the priority, as that could allow Libya to be reunified and create a relatively benign environment in which the EU and Arab League could take the lead on reconstruction. I don’t see how a cease-fire, as Les Gelb proposes, would help that cause. To the contrary, it is doubtful Gaddafi would observe one or that the international community could enforce one. It would allow the two sides to regroup and rearm for the next round, which is not exactly a virtue in my book.
Ivory Coast, of all things, points in the right direction: with Laurent Gbagbo arrested (see video below), not killed, the country has an opportunity to go down a relatively peaceful post-war path. Those who wish Libya well will hope it gets a similar opportunity, soon.
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Why do they look for Bashar’s good side?
Shame on the International Crisis Group, which I generally admire, for Peter Harling’s “time is running out” nonsense published yesterday on foreignpolicy.com yesterday:
Time is running out as every new casualty makes the clock tick faster. To open the space required for a radical reform agenda to take hold, the regime’s top priority must be to ensure a period of relative calm. Prospects will look grim were the country to witness yet another bloody Friday.
How come time has not already run out? The country has seen at least two bloody Fridays already. The Syrian regime has spent the past couple of weeks beating and killing demonstrators.
Maybe Harling should re-read his own material. He wrote on March 30 about Bashar al Assad:
…his much-anticipated speech has failed to offer a credible alternative. There is now every likelihood that Syrians, their hopes dashed, will again take to the streets. The regime must pass this last test, which is to avoid more bloodshed. Repression could help it survive or it could be tantamount to suicide — but in either case, it would be an ignominious fate.
What is it about Bashar al Assad that makes Western commentators want to think the best of him? Why is it that after 12 days of failing a test Bashar is told he can still pass it? Hasn’t he made it clear enough that he is uninterested in any sort of reform that threatens his own hold on power, much less radical reform of any sort?
I’m puzzled by this need to imagine that somehow there is a positive side of the Syrian regime we just haven’t seen yet. Can there be any doubt that the regime will seek to stay in power, spending whatever resources it can assemble and sacrificing whatever ideology or political groups may stand in the way? Has there been the slightest sign of willingness to engage in genuine political reform?
The problem is not, as Harling supposes, lack of communication or interlocutors on either side. The problem is a regime that has shut the door on political competition, genuine economic reform and openness to much of the world. The solution lies with the Syrian people, who seem to me to be doing their best under difficult circumstances. I’d have expected more sympathy for their perspective from ICG. For a genuine cry for freedom, from Syrian writer and political activist Yassin al-Haj Saleh, see this from the New York Times. That is where ICG’s heart and head should be.
PS: Here is some of the latest on the Syrian crackdown. For more detail, see Syria Comment. Or try this, reporting that Syrian soldiers have been shot for refusing to fire on protesters. Imagine what we might find out if foreign journalists were allowed in!
PPS: Joshua Landis has published evidence that the allegation of Syrian soldiers having been shot for refusing to fire on protesters is untrue.
- Old City Damascus
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Is it time to negotiate with Qaddafi?
Theatlantic.com published this piece of mine this morning:
Apr 11 2011, 9:50 AM ET
It’s time to look for a way to end the war in Libya, but dealing with the regime won’t be easy
Louafi Larbi/Reuters
With self-appointed African Union mediators shuttling between Tripoli and Benghazi meetings with the Libyan government and rebel leaderships to try and end the war, the important question is whether the international community should be negotiating with the Qaddafis. The answer depends on what we are negotiating about and how well prepared we are to pursue our shared interests.
The subject of the negotiations must begin with the departure of Muammar Qaddafi and the rest of his family from Libya. Anything less than that would create a difficult fractious post-war situation in Libya, with a de facto division of territory between Qaddafi-held west and rebel-held east, and with Qaddafi continuing to control Tripoli. If, as former Congressman Curt Weldon proposed, Muammar were to step aside but his son Saif al Islam continued to play a role in the transitional structures, the probability of a successful transition would likewise be reduced to nearly zero.
The Qaddafi family will not give up power in Libya so long as it remains physically present. It has its own armed forces as well as security agents and controls the vast funds derived from Libyan oil exports over the past 42 years. Tens of billions squirreled away in U.S. banks have been frozen, but we can be certain more billions remain unfrozen elsewhere, or stowed in gold ingots in Tripoli. It is not even clear what “step aside” would mean for Muammar, since he has no official position in a Libyan state.
Since Qaddafi’s power does not depend on his position in the Libyan state, he and his sons could well maintain their military and political power even if they were to accept retirement to a desert tent. In any case, Saif al Islam, who was educated at the London School of Economics-educated and has spent much of his life enjoying Europe’s most luxurious hotel, would be unlikely to accept such a life out of power. Libya is quite unlike Egypt in this respect. Hosni Mubarak’s retirement to Sharm el Sheikh was acceptable to the protesters not only because Sharm is far from the maddening crowd but also because the army seemed prepared to guarantee the political transition. It was accepted by the protesters as loyal to the Egyptian state, not to Hosni Mubarak.
Even in Egypt, there are now profound doubts about what the army is up to. Mubarak’s return to the public sphere with a statement flatly denying corruption and the army’s harsh treatment of protesters in Tahrir square the last few days have left many wondering whether the counterrevolution is in full swing. But Libya has no army loyal to the Libyan state. This lack of institutional framework (no constitution, few ministries, no chief of state, not even a real rubber stamp parliament) would make the transition in Libya so problematic.
The ongoing violence contributes to this uncertainty as well. Under violent attack from security forces, the opponents of Qaddafi long ago gave up nonviolent protests for an ill-prepared military assault on his regime. Qaddafi has redoubled his efforts, ensuring that there will be many dead on both sides. Accountability for the violence will not come quickly, but it will probably not come at all if Qaddafi and family are allowed to remain in the country. Most Libyans simply won’t stop resisting if they remain.
So if we are negotiating about Qaddafi and his family departing from Libya, then how well prepared are we to pursue that objective?
Leverage in negotiations depends on what other options you have, should the negotiations fail. In this case, our best alternative to a negotiated solution appears to be to continue fighting. That is not a very good option. NATO will have increased difficulty finding legitimate targets, as Qaddafi’s forces park their heavy armor near schools and mosques and disguise their remaining vehicles to look as much like rebel vehicles as possible. Enthusiasm for the continued military effort is likely to fade. Neither the French nor the British — the leading forces striking Libya — will want to go on ad infinitum, and some of the others participating will likely want to quit even earlier.
Qaddafi knows all this. Like us, his best alternative is also to continue fighting. No one should be fooled by Saif al Islam’s London School of Economics degree or his smooth talk about transition to democracy. Qaddafi and his family give every indication of wanting to preserve their own power. It is hard to know for how long they can go on without running out of money, troops, or cronies, several of whom have already defected. But we can be certain that Muammar regards the issue as one of life or death and will therefore fight on until he finds a way out that enables him and his family to survive.
That is what we may very well need to put on offer: a way out, but one that will only be available if Qaddafi and family to take advantage of it soon. That is what the five AU “mediators” could usefully offer: a comfortable retirement, available only for a short time, in Mauritania, Mali, Congo, Uganda or South Africa. Of these, only Mauritania is not a state party to the International Criminal Court, which may eventually want to prosecute. Venezuela is another possibility, but it is also a state party to the ICC, and the Americans are unlikely to welcome Qaddafi as a resident of the Western Hemisphere. For those who worry that the ICC might never get hold of Qaddafi, remember Charles Taylor, who was allowed to retire to Nigeria only to later be captured and put on trial.
It appears doubtful that the AU delegation will take the kind of hard line required to get Qaddafi to leave Libya. It is much more likely that it will come back with a vague, wishy-washy offer from Qaddafi that sounds good on paper but enables him and his sons to remain in Tripoli making all sorts of trouble and preventing transition to a new, more representative regime. We should not be tempted. Compromised conclusions to NATO air wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo have proven frighteningly difficult and expensive to implement. Nor should we be tempted to put boots on the ground, as we know from Iraq and Afghanistan how painful that can be.
A satisfactory outcome in Libya will be one that vindicates Responsibility to Protect and allows the Americans to stand aside from the post-war reconstruction and leave it to the Europeans, whose energy interests give them motive and means to be helpful to the New Libya.
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Sudan on the eve of divorce, velvet or not
The Middle East Institute and the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique are cosponsoring a conference today on “Protracted Displacement Challenges Facing Sudan: What Scope for EU-US Cooperation.” They wisely ignored their title for the first session and focused instead on the broader political and military dimensions of the situation a few months before Southern Sudan becomes a separate state on July 9. I’ll try to give a quick summary of a rich set of presentations.
Jan Pronk, former Dutch Minister for International Assistance and former UN Envoy to Sudan, offered 10 lessons from his experience:
- Humanitarian assistance and military intervention are not sufficient; a political strategy is needed to prevent conflict.
- The political strategy needs to be timely, early enough in the game to avoid escalation and establishment of facts on the ground that will be impossible to reverse.
- The international community needs the political capacity to intervene early based on a UN Security Council mandate, but without having to go through UNSC procedures each time–this would mean a committee mandated by the UNSC but under the authority of the Secretary General.
- Nothing works unless there is a common approach based on consensus that allows joint action, avoids sending conflicting signals and eliminates the possibility of divisive tactics used by the host country.
- Such a comprehensive approach may have to be implemented step by step, but within an overall political framework.
- We may have to occasionally step back and reevaluate, as we should have done after the Darfur Peace Agreeement, in order to avoid building our approach on a basis that is the wrong one.
- Each UN organization has its own board, with even the same governments saying different things in different organizations; we need to unify the UN approach under a single person who provides common transport, communications, intelligence and security.
- This requires that UN organizations delegate coordination to the field, where it is done best.
- The referendum decision in Sudan needs to be implemented peacefully, but we cannot allow Khartoum to sell Southern Sudan independence as a substitute for Darfur cooperation.
- The military efforts in Ivory Coast and Libya are important because they mean force is being used to protect civilians, but we need to think ahead, avoid collateral damage and put forward a political strategy that opens a back door for the “villains” to depart.
Former US Sudan Envoy Andrew Natsios offered 5:
- Southern Sudan will be able to gain independence because it has armed itself well, but the North will continue to try to destabilize the South. Darfur fighting has been fed by Libya, which is supporting the JEM.
- Two new states will emerge July 9: the North will be majority Arab, the South will be a state with a big army 150,000 strong.
- The government in Khartoum is weak and nervous, for good reasons. Turabi is still dangerous and the North faces continuing problems in Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Beja and Darfur. President Bashir is frightened even of his own army, which is largely kept out of Khartoum to prevent a coup (there are only 5000 soldiers in the capital). The secret police, not the army, sustains the regime.
- A unified approach among donors is obviously desirable, but difficult because of legal differences among the Europeans, Canadians and Americans.
- There is still a need for a political settlement concerning the 500,000-1,000,000 Southerners still in the North, but large-scale conflict is unlikely in July because both North and South know it would disrupt the oil flow and bankrupt both their governments, something neither can afford to see.
Rosalind Marsden, EU Representative for Sudan:
- The EU is trying to develop a comprehensive approach to Southern Sudan and is also looking at the North.
- EU assistance to the referendum commission, and monitoring of the referendum, was successful.
- There is a need to make arrangements still for the Southerners in the North and the Northerners in the South.
- President Mbeki’s African Union effort is looking at these issues and others, but the time is short before July 9.
- The positions on Abyei have hardened, agreements have not been implemented, half the population of Abyei town has left, and everyone is waiting for Mbeki’s proposals.
- There are also delays and difficulties with the popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, which are not likely to be completed before July 9.
- For Darfur, the main game is the Doha negotiations, where the stakeholders conference is the next important step, but Khartoum’s intention of holding a Darfur referendum has complicated matters.
- Insecurity is rising in Darfur, with the government conducting military operations and JEM under pressure from developments in Libya.
- The US and EU need to speak with one voice, as they did on the referendum. For this, a common assessment and agreement on benchmarks would help. The Southern Sudan 3-year development plan, now being worked in Juba, will be an enormous step forward.
Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator at AID, suggested:
- Good donor coordination and contingency planning helped avoid problems at the time of the referendum, with UN DPKO helping to focus international efforts as well as cooperation with both North and South.
- The big issues are still out there: oil revenue, citizenship, currency, borders are unsettled.
- The South is absorbing 320,000 returnees, many of whom are urbanized, into a society that is mostly rural, largely illiterate , lacking in infrastructure and with a high rate of infant mortality.
- AID is focused on mitigating conflict, combating corruption, promoting economic growth (mainly via agriculture) and building the capacity of the Southern Sudan government to provide essential services.
- The effort is shifting from relief to development, including urban planning, land distribution, small business and youth.
- The next big issues will come from governance.
It would be hard to be optimistic based on this event, but at least officials are thinking hard and ahead about the requirements. And it is comforting to know that there are such capable people still engaged.
But what they need in Juba is a stronger architecture for the international assistance effort, and stronger links to the host country’s own plans. As things stand, conditionalities are never met because the Southern Sudanese can always donor shop elsewhere. Nothing like the pillar structure in Kosovo or even the High Representative in Bosnia exists in Southern Sudan. Even the UN effort is fragmented. Donors need to get together on a common approach shared by the Southern Sudanese.
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Riyadh and Washington try to get it together
With King Abdullah back in the saddle throne since late February, after months abroad for medical treatment, it seems to me that Saudi diplomacy has gone into relative overdrive. Their biggest move was troops into Bahrain, to free up the Bahraini security forces to beat up demonstrators, but now they appear to be taking an active role in arranging for the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from his post, if not from the country. I imagine they’ve decided now he is more liability than asset, something most Yemenis seem to have concluded weeks ago.
The Americans are also in overdrive, with Defense Secretary Gates and National Security Adviser Donilon wearing out the flying carpet to Riyadh. This is likely in part damage limitation–the Saudis aren’t happy to see the Americans plumping for transition in the democratic direction in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain. It must be difficult to convince them that somehow we’ll manage to stop the process before it gets to the Kingdom, which has largely pacified its own population and cracks down hard when soft power fails to do the job.
But it looks as if there may be more on the agenda: the Iranian challenge looms large for both Washington and Riyadh, and both have taken to implying that the Iranians are up to no good in Bahrain, though there is little evidence that the protests were fueled by Tehran. This I suppose is where the Saudis would like the Americans to draw the line: democracy is good, but not if it threatens to bring a Shia majority into power (as it did of course in Iraq, and the Saudis were not pleased).
This leaves Libya and Syria. I see no real unhappiness coming from the Saudis about what is going on in Libya, and it is difficult to imagine that the United Arab Emirates would lend its air force to the cause if the Saudis were not prepared to go along. Gaddafi is not a Saudi kind of guy, and of course there is no Shia threat there. Syria is harder to read: are the Saudis backing Bashar al Assad, who runs an Alawi (sort of Shia) regime, or not? Riyadh and Damascus have in the past competed with him for influence in Lebanon. Would the Saudis prefer a Sunni regime in Damascus? Or does the preference for stability prevail? So far, the latter.
Saudi influence is likely one of the reasons the Americans haven’t been as welcoming of the protesters in Syria as might have been expected. Both Washington and Riyadh are worried about chaos in Syria, and how that might affect Iraq and Jordan. This is odd, of course, since Damascus is allied with Tehran and Bashar al Assad has not hesitated to make trouble for the Americans in both Iraq and Lebanon. I wonder if things started really coming apart in Damascus whether the Saudis would reconsider.
Now if you’ve got a headache from all this diplomatic mumbo jumbo, I’m not surprised. But the world really is complicated, the Middle East more than most other regions. And if something happens in Saudi Arabia to disrupt its giant oil production and exports, that $4 gasoline is going to start looking cheap.
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Counterrevolution, again
With the U.S. Government immobilized by its own self-generated problems–a kind of self-licking ice cream cone phenomenon–dictators are resurgent in the Middle East again. They are doing what they know to do best: killing their own citizens, hoping that will make the popular protests against their interminable rule go away.
In Syria, the demonstrations were once again widespread yesterday, if not gigantic. The killing seems to have focused on the southern town of Deraa, where Bashar al Assad seems to be wanting to demonstrate how really dangerous it is to protest persistently. In Yemen, yesterday’s killing focused on Taiz, a southern town that President Ali Saleh sees as the leading edge of separatism. In Egypt, Tahrir square was cleared in the early morning hours by an army riot. In Libya, Gaddafi continues to make mincemeat of rebel forces, which have also been bombed unintentionally by NATO. Negotiations with the Gaddafi family are ongoing, but Washington seems to be holding a hard line on getting them all out of Libya. In Bahrain, the monarchy continues with a hard line on the demonstrations, which it increasingly paints with a sectarian brush.
It is surprising to me that the dictators think this will work, but they know their own people better than I do. Alistair Crooke published yesterday on foreignpolicy.com a piece on “Syrian exceptionalism” that essentially says Bashar knows best and will win his bet. There will surely be people in the U.S. administration who are also hoping now to stem the tide and save a few really important autocratic regimes (Bahrain and Saudi Arabia foremost) for future use, while arranging soft landings for others (Yemen in particular). Secretary of Defense Gates has been running up his frequent flyer miles with visits to key stalwarts and Gulf states worried about the situation.
That said, President Obama has issued strong statements on Syria and Yemen in recent days. He seems much more inclined to emphasize the legitimate aspirations of the people than to help preserve Bashar and Bashir.
It is nowhere written that counterrevolution will fail, and in fact it has often succeeded. Regime principals and their oligarchs are clever about using their remaining power and money to divide the opposition, crack down on the weaker but more militant portion, and preserve at least some vestige of their own privilege and control. We should expect no less from them.
Those who want to complete their revolutions and emerge as free societies with more or less representative governments will somehow need to keep the pressure on. But they will also have to stay united, and plan carefully for where and when to confront their respective regimes nonviolently. The consequences of violent rebellion should by now be obvious to everyone who follows events in Libya–it isn’t pretty, and it may not end well.
PS: Just to complete the picture, in Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo’s forces are reportedly today attacking the hotel where Alassane is headquartered, as well as the French Embassy. You have to wonder when Paris will see fit to take decisive action.
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