Month: April 2011
Zimbabwe between fear and worse
I don’t pretend to be an expert on all things, but I do like to try to keep myself well-informed (if not always up to date). Inspired by hearing Michael Bratton of Michigan State (he is in DC at USIP this year) speak the other day, I decided to poke around a bit and found two things worth recommending on Zimbabwe: his paper with Eldred Masunungure on “The Anatomy of Political Predation” and this interview with Peter Godwin, author of The Fear.
Bottom line: Zimbabwe may well get worse before it gets better. The powersharing government it is suffering under now is doing little to extract it from its misery. Finding ways of ameliorating the situation without helping bad people will be difficult, but Bratton and Masunungure offer some interesting ideas as well as caveats:
• Insist on evidence of good faith by all parties to implement the terms of the Global Political Agreement as the main precondition for fulsome donor reengagement with the Government of Zimbabwe.
• In the meantime, continue to offer “humanitarian plus” aid programs that help improve the conditions of life of the Zimbabwean people. For the moment, international agencies (such as the African Development Bank, which manages a Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund) or non-governmental agencies should be charged with implementing these programs.
• While acknowledging that Morgan Tsvangirai is the most popular politician in Zimbabwe, resist the temptation to back particular leaders or leadership coalitions. Instead of trying to pick winners, international actors should instead encourage the construction of durable rules, procedures and institutions. In particular, they should offer support to those civil society organizations, independent media, and democratic political parties that can help ensure that the next national elections are administered freely and fairly. Such assistance may require helping to build the organizational, professional, analytical, diplomatic and advocacy skills and potentials of non-governmental entities.
• Recognize that the immediate goal of international assistance is to facilitate a legal transfer of political power. The mere convocation of yet one more flawed election or the second-best compromise of another power-sharing arrangement is not enough. Instead, international actors should stand firm in insisting that Zimbabwe’s next government reflects the electoral will of the people.
• The present political settlement lacks economic and military dimensions. Another round of elite pact-making will therefore be necessary, perhaps by including token moderates from the old regime in any future democratic government. A successful transfer of power must also provide assurances to potential political spoilers: that is, those who have committed abuses under ZANU-PF rule or who have benefited from the ill-gotten gains of state patronage. Distasteful as it may seem, offers of future financial and physical security may have to be made selectively to key members of the ruling party and security apparatus in order to ease them out of power.
• This having been said, the West should not be party to any final transition settlement that rules out the prosecution of leaders who have ordered gross abuses of human rights. Responsibility for the culture of impunity in Zimbabwe is broadly shared. It can be traced to blanket amnesties granted over the years by the Rhodesian regime, the British governor at independence, and by the president of Zimbabwe. This cycle must now be broken.
• Despite the ambiguity of its stance as an honest broker, SADC remains key to a resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis. The international community should support and encourage the new SADC contact group – South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia – to engage the ZANU-PF elite and to move them towards peaceful acceptance of the results of a free and fair election. But the precise terms of any permanent settlement are best determined by domestic leadership coalitions rather than by outsiders.
• Western agencies should strategically and skillfully deploy their only real instruments of leverage – policies on international sanctions and promises of future assistance – in support of the above results. Any fruitful approach must involve considering carefully the appropriate time to relax, suspend, or remove sanctions once the Zimbabwe government has sufficiently complied with the SADC roadmap for political progress toward a genuinely democratic settlement.
I would only add the possibility of supporting the MDC-controlled municipal governments. This may be inconsistent with not picking winners, but it seems to me important if MDC politicians are to gain both experience of governing and support among citizens. I know of only one such effort–in Serbia during the Milosevic regime the Europeans provided “energy for democracy” to opposition-controlled municipalities. While I haven’t seen a serious study of the impact, at the time it was regarded as a useful enterprise, one that gave the opposition some valuable experience in governing as well as strong ties to helpful people in the international community.
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What is Afghanistan good for?
Americans, weary of the war in Afghanistan, are doubting that anything good can come of it, and wondering if it will ever be over. Two recent reports reminded me of what Afghanistan is good for.
The first is “Afghanistan’s Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy” from the Afghanistan Analysts’ Network (AAN). The second, “Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building” from the Silk Road Studies Program here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, is about the importance of transit routes across Afghanistan and their potential to contribute to building peace there.
Like it or not, Afghanistan is remarkably good for the production of opium poppy. The AAN report is interesting on the political economy of the drug trade, which implicates President Karzai and other “political upperworld” figures in protecting and profiting from it. But it is remarkably tame in its recommendations. Twenty or thirty years will be required, it says, for its “holistic” approach to work. The initial steps recommended are modest adjustments of current policies: eradication should be applied to all poppy fields in a given district, interdiction should target bigger traders, and alternative livelihoods should encompass rural development in general and not just crop substitution. I suppose any long journey starts with just a few steps, but it is hard for me to picture that these recommendations will really carry us through several decades.
More interesting is S. Frederick Starr’s enthusiastic endorsement of transportation as the key to economic development in Afghanistan:
The reopening [of] all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millenium. It was unintended, unrecognized, and, by most Americans, unacknowledged, even thought they paid for it with the lives of loved ones and with hard-earned tax money. Nonetheless, this development offers the most promising solution to the U.S.’ present strategic dilemma and the key to possible success in Afghanistan and the region….Whatever its larger geopolitical significance, the reopening of continental transport and trade to, from, and across Afghanistan is the single most important determinant of the future of Afghanistan itself….This is not a scheme devised by GS-12 bureaucrats in Foggy Bottom for some generic distant land. It is the logic of Afghanistan itself and has been validated by the experience of 3000 years.
So who stands in opposition to 3000 years of experience? According to Starr,
At a series of meetings held throughout the autumn of 2010 representatives of the State Department were, to say the least, reserved about a strategy based on the opening of transport corridors, presumably out of concern that it might be taken as an alternative to the development of agriculture or the exploitation of mineral resources rather than the essential and unavoidable measure for achieving them.
Starr goes on to suggest that resistance is softening, and there is enthusiasm in military and some other circles. But the high-level support he sought has not yet emerged. That is what is needed to drive what Starr suggests: a regional Coordinating Council on Continental Transport and Trade to pursue the strategy of reopening the corridors of transport and trade that war has done much to clog in recent decades.
Of course when it comes to cross-border trade, nothing moves more expeditiously than drugs. That is the trick here: helping the Afghans to create a border regime that will allow legitimate trade and block the illegitimate version. It will not be easy–in fact, it requires just the kind of state Afghanistan lacks, and that the AAN report suggests will be difficult to construct because of the interaction of the drug economy with top levels of the Karzai government. We’d all like to avoid the daunting task of state-building in Afghanistan, but few good things can happen if we don’t embrace the requirement.
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Damage limitation won’t work, so fix it
Here is the final installment of a several day exchange on Bosnia issues, in which Kurt Bassuener responds again to Matthew Parish (to get the full exchange on peacefare.net, just click on the “Balkans” category over on the right:
Most of Matthew Parish’s response questions the very idea of enforceable peace implementation and then goes to posit the myriad flaws he sees with its execution over the past 15 years. The underlying argument that the European Stability Initiative has long been making, now with the International Crisis Group in tow: if the international actors – particularly the OHR – got out of the way, Bosnian politicians would find their own equilibrium, and Bosnia would self-propel into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream.
This is no longer a theoretical exercise, since it’s effectively been tested since 2006. It has failed. Nobody can credibly claim that a tyrannical OHR has stomped like Godzilla over domestic political actors crippling their ability to be responsible since then. If that ever were the case – and this is myth, in my view – it certainly isn’t now.
What’s since become clear is the incentives in the Dayton system make the default setting, absent external guardrails, a drift toward partition. On that Mr. Parish and I agree. I am just far more convinced than he that this will lead to major violence if left unchecked.
Yet I posit that the international community’s failing wasn’t that it went too far. Rather, it’s that it didn’t go far enough toward changing the incentive structure. This is a constitutional and structural problem. The problem isn’t that political actors are “immature” – they operate rationally within a system designed to cater to their needs as warlords and signatories to a peace agreement, not designed to promote democratic accountability. So they inhabit a happy hunting ground of unaccountability unrivalled in Europe; no “carrots” are more appealing than the perquisites of power they already have.
The prevailing idea of the two High Representatives who actively engaged in state-building (albeit with different styles), Wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy Ashdown, can be summed up as “if you build it, they will come.” The country’s politicians were encouraged, and in some cases compelled, to create the institutions and mechanisms to enable the country to move toward the EU and NATO. It was assumed that “the pull of Brussels” would be strong enough for the political leaders who resisted or unenthusiastically accepted these to ultimately embrace them for the greater good.
If they actually cared for the popular good, that would be the case. But they have little incentive to, able to turn to the political comfort food of patronage and fear to get them through repeated election cycles despite popular frustration at their protracted lack of delivery. While there is undeniably a background level of nationalism in Bosnia – there is in every country – it is impossible to get a baseline reading, since the system acts as an amplifier.
I’m actually quite confident that a modus vivendi could be found among BiH’s citizens, if the country’s politicians were disarmed by taking their ability to leverage fear away. But the international community always hamstrung itself on this, the biggest value added it could have, by constantly telegraphing its lack of staying power.
But so much for our respective opinions on how we got here. As I wrote in my original reply to Matthew Parish’s article in Balkan Insight (which launched this exchange), his proposal is for international management of state dissolution, which is what I assume he means by “damage limitation.”
Practically speaking, that’s just not feasible, for the reasons I wrote about in my article. The split would not – and cannot – be consensual between the entities. It would engender violent resistance. The correlation of forces that prevailed in the war does not hold now – the RS is in a much weaker position. Any attempt to create a third entity in the Federation would also be fraught. The idea that an international community that doesn’t have the stamina to keep the EUFOR mission of 2000 troops fully staffed (it’s at about 1500 now) would summon the fortitude to contend with the inherent dangers of managing partition – which would mean overseeing ethnic re-cleansing of numerous locales – beggars belief.
What is so dangerous about what Mr. Parish counsels is that the likely impact that promoting the idea of inevitability of state failure will find willing ears in the EU and beyond, since it is the bureaucratic path of least resistance. That is clearly the intent. There is already pronounced desire on the part of most continental European PIC members (Germany, France, Italy and the EU institutions), plus Russia to dispense with the executive mandates of the High Representative, a Chapter 7-mandated EUFOR, and a Brcko Supervisor. For Russia, the incentive is clear. For the EU, it seems simply driven by bureaucratic inertia, wishful thinking, and actuarial policymaking. This is myopia bordering on blindness, since it would be left to deal with the results without any ability to respond – at least not with “soft power” or with the imprimatur of the UN Security Council. With these mandates, there is a legal platform to at least react, given the bathetic lack of will to deter (which would be far more effective). The prevailing policy direction in the EU is to irreversibly limit its own options.
Those who have counted on the international community to preserve the state’s integrity will draw the logical conclusion that they will have to do this themselves. Some already have made this deduction. I don’t think this is the kind of “ownership” the EU has in mind…
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Why it’s time to negotiate with the Taliban
This went up on theatlantic.com this morning:
By Daniel Serwer
Apr 7 2011, 7:00 AM ET
Peace talks won’t be easy, and may be likely to fail, but they’re worth the risk
Delegates of an Afghan peace jirga in Kabul discuss negotiating with the Taliban. By Ahmad Masood / Reuters
News that the U.S. may negotiate with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan raises many questions, the most important of which is, should we, or shouldn’t we? That question has generated a small cyberspace library of its own in recent weeks, with the consensus so far in favor. It is widely believed that there are at least informal official talks about talks going on behind closed doors. But should we harbor any continuing doubts? And what can we expect from negotiations?
The arguments in favor are often based on the explicit proposition that there is no military solution in Afghanistan, with the implicit understanding that the U.S. will want to get out as soon after 2014 — the date fixed by NATO for turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghan government — as possible. If we really believe there is no military solution, why bother fighting to what conflict management experts call a “mutually hurting stalemate,” a condition in which neither side can improve its position by further military effort? If we want to get out, why not make the arrangements now rather than waiting for what we believe to be inevitable? Much blood and treasure can be saved and little of value lost.
This line of thinking has been bolstered recently by research suggesting that at least some of the Taliban can be divided from Al Qaeda. The Taliban is an Afghan movement with national ambitions to establish an Islamic state. Al Qaeda has much broader international goals that go far beyond Afghanistan, to recreating a supra-national caliphate encompassing the entire Muslim world, in some interpretations the entire globe. These two objectives are not only different; they are incompatible. Maybe we can keep Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, even if we agree to let the Taliban back in.
<blockquote> A skilled negotiator will discover more in two days of conversation with an adversary than all the intelligence we’ve collected so far in ten years of war</blockquote>
However, the Taliban have now been fighting for a generation without serious signs of fatigue, at least until recently, and may believe they can get what they want by fighting on. If the Taliban feel they are winning, they will have little incentive to negotiate. They may also doubt that the U.S. is really prepared to leave Afghanistan to the Afghans, at least with respect to Al Qaeda. President Karzai’s talk about permanent U.S. bases will have given them doubts as well.
There are other points of potentially irreducible contention. The Taliban, who are not experienced democrats and lack confidence in democratic processes, would naturally expect a guarantee of a share in political power, both at the local level and in Kabul. Many Afghan women, who were not even allowed to go to school under their rule, could suffer dearly under a strong Taliban role in governance. Nor would the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and other minorities who fought against and defeated the Taliban be likely to welcome their return.
Many advocates of negotiations therefore want to make the talks “inclusive” — bringing in not only top government officials but also civil society (especially women’s organizations) as well as local leaders. After all, the Karzai government has little real control of rural areas, and many of the more contentious issues involve local disputes that will need to be settled by local leaders if the Taliban are going to reintegrate peacefully. As one advocate put it, negotiations must be run “by, with and through the Afghan people” in order to work.
But is forging a peace deal “by, with and through” Afghan leaders really possible? A multi-faceted, multi-level peace process that includes women and minorities may be far more than the Karzai government is able to manage. Most Kabul officials lack the capability even to identify, much less understand or work to solve, local problems. If they did, they might have already won the war. And how much concern has Karzai shown for the plight of Afghan women? He has only appointed a sprinkling of women and civil society types in the High Peace Council, assigned to deal with the Taliban. Most of the members are male, with a heavy representation of warlords. If Karzai and company are beyond redemption, negotiations are unlikely to save them.
Even though a successful deal remains unlikely, negotiations may still be worthwhile. The Pentagon plans to spend about $120 billion on the war in 2011 alone. If there is only a tiny chance — let’s say one in a thousand — that negotiations would eliminate that expenditure, a rational gambler would say it is worth spending $120 million on negotiations. There is no way negotiations will cost a fraction of that sum. The largest possible expense would be the Afghan government providing housing and jobs for defected Taliban.
What you find out about the enemy can be well worth whatever commitment is required in negotiations. In my experience, there is nothing like staring a military commander in the face, asking him what his war objective is, and discussing alternative means to achieve it.
I asked the commander of the Bosnian Army that question in 1995, having been told by both the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community that his objective was to conquer 100 percent of the country’s territory, at the time two-thirds occupied by the Bosnian Serb Army. He responded that his president had told him to fight until all the refugees and displaced people could go home. This was significantly different from the consensus understanding in Washington. His objective was achieved in principle at the Dayton peace talks later the same year by negotiation.
A skilled negotiator will discover more in two days of conversation with an adversary than all the intelligence we’ve collected so far in ten years of war. Of course the effect is mutual: the enemy will also discover how committed and unified the Afghan government and the coalition are or are not, and what we might be willing to trade off to achieve early withdrawal.
Such mutual discovery does not always improve matters. I once asked a presidential advisor in Kabul whether it would help relations with Pakistan if Afghanistan were to recognize the de facto border — the Durand Line — as the legal boundary between the two countries. He responded that he would not want to close off options for future generations. I can’t imagine that people in Islamabad react positively when they hear this suggestion that Afghanistan may have designs on Pakistani territory.
Bottom line, negotiations are a good bet even if they don’t end in a deal. But Afghan political leaders are unlikely to be able to lead a complicated process and may be more likely to cut a deal behind closed doors, without the involvement of women or anything resembling civil society. Such a deal would not resolve underlying drivers of conflict and would require — like the deals Washington cut behind closed doors on Bosnia and Kosovo — a massive international implementation effort. Even though peace talks are certainly worthwhile, there are no easy solutions to these dilemmas. Negotiations may be a good idea, but they are not a short cut out of Afghanistan.
PS: Peter Bergen comes to similar conclusions, six weeks later.
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The problem with wikileaks is they don’t lie
I am the first to admit that I read wikileaks cables (and advise my students to do so, provided they don’t mind the risk of never getting a job with the US government). But anyone who doubts the damage leaking them will do need only contemplate the recent spate of minor revelations, which have caused the American ambassador in Mexico City to leave and the one in Ecuador to be declared persona non grata (that’s PNG in diplomatese). Both were guilty of essentially the same sin: telling the truth about criminality and corruption in their host governments.
Then today there are the non-revelations about the former Prime Minister, now President, of Republika Srpska, the Serb 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The cables from the US embassy in Sarajevo illustrate clearly that Milorad Dodik is serious about secession of his genocidally created fiefdom from Bosnia, a move that could precipitate another war there. This will not surprise readers of www.peacefare.net, where we have regularly noted that Dodik is serious.
So what’s wrong with our ambassadors reporting criminality, corruption and threats to peace and security? Nothing of course. But they won’t be able to do it much longer if confidentiality cannot be maintained. I am comforted to know that Chuck English, our ambassador in Sarajevo during the period the cables were sent, clearly understood the seriousness of Dodik’s threat to Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But how free will his successor feel to report the truth if he runs the risk of being PNGed for it?
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The devil in the details is named Saif
Former Republican Congressman Curt Weldon says in the New York Times this morning that he is in Libya to get Muammar Gaddafi to step aside. He also argues that the United States should have developed a much deeper relationship with the Libyan people and civil society since the Colonel gave up his nuclear ambitions in 2004, a perspective I can certainly share.
Reading more carefully, it appears that “step aside” does not mean “leave Libya,” and Weldon also says
Colonel Qaddafi’s son Saif, a powerful businessman and politician, could play a constructive role as a member of the committee to devise a new government structure or Constitution. The younger Mr. Qaddafi, who has made belligerent comments about the rebels, has his detractors. But he also pushed his government to accept responsibility for the bombings of a Pan Am flight over Scotland and a disco in Germany, and to provide compensation for victims’ families. He also led the effort to free a group of Bulgarian nurses in Libya who had twice been sentenced to death.
Here is where I part company with Mr. Weldon. I don’t think we owe Saif anything for his past efforts, all of which were amply rewarded at the time. Keeping him–or any other member of the Gaddafi family–in the process now will only complicate the post-war arrangements and make it difficult to satisfy the 98 per cent of the Libyan population that has not benefited from the last 42 years of the Colonel’s idiosyncratic and impovershing rule.
Weldon will be serving a useful purpose on his visit to Tripoli if he convinces the Gaddafis that they all need to depart, post haste. Anything less than that will prolong Libya’s pain, and U.S. involvement.
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