I am reluctant to turn www.peacefare.net into a boxing ring, with International Crisis Group (ICG) in one corner and an anonymous Bosnia-watcher in the other. But ICG is influential in the Balkans and has in the past published a great deal of fine analytical work on the conflicts there. Reasonable people should at least be able to agree on the facts. That seems not to be possible in Bosnia these days, so the best I can do is offer an alternative perspective on the facts that seems to me well-grounded (but I hasten to clarify that I did not write this material, much as I agree with it). So here goes, on four more points from page one of the most recent ICG report.
“State institutions are under attack by all sides”.
This is factually incorrect. State institutions are under attack from certain Croat and Serb political parties. The Bosniaks are not attacking them and not all Serb and Croat political parties are attacking them.
“The authorities of the larger of the entities, the Federation, were formed controversially – a main state institution said illegally – in March and are disputed by Croats, who have created a parallel Croat National Assembly”.
This consists of one factual error and several half-truths:
— The reference to a “parallel Croat National Assembly” is factually incorrect. There is only one Croat National Assembly, and it is not “parallel” in any sense of the word. Rather, it is completely legal.
— The HDZs had the opportunity to challenge both the “illegal” election of the Federation Presidency, and the nomination of the Federation government before the Federation Constitutional Court. They filed appeals, but then inexplicably withdrew them when it became clear the court would probably rule against the HDZs. Therefore, the HDZs have not mounted a court challenge to either the Federation Presidency or Government, even though such legal remedies are available.
— The same legal criteria were used in 2011 by the Federation House of Peoples’ to elect the Federation Presidency as were used to elect the Presidency of the old government in early 2007, i.e., the House of People’s was formed when sufficient members for a quorum had been chosen, but before they were certified by the Central Election Commission. Thus, if the election of the current Presidency was illegal, then so too was the election of the former Presidency. By extension, this would render illegal all laws and acts passed in the Federation since 2007.
“The two HDZs and the biggest winners of the October 2010 elections, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), all rejected reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposals”.
This is factually incorrect. Only one side – the HDZs – turned down the offer. The OHR – with the full support of the Ambassadors of the PIC Steering Board and the EU, conducted mediation between the two camps. Both camps agreed on general principles for a government platform. The mediation broke down over maximalist demands from both sides regarding allocation of posts. The OHR then consulted with the Steering Board Ambassadors and the EU and split the two positions down the middle, giving each side half of what it wanted. It then presented this to the two sides in a take-it-or-leave-it package. After much grumbling, the SDP accepted the offer. The HDZs refused. Thus, only one side – the HDZs — rejected the proposal.
“The SDP then formed a Federation government in violation of the entity constitution and against the advice of the state-level Central Election Commission (CEC)”.
This is factually incorrect. At no point did the formation of the Federation government violate the Federation Constitution. So too, the Central Election Commission never reviewed the matter of government formation in the Federation, as this does not fall within its mandate. Had the Federation government formation been problematic, the HDZs would in all likelihood have challenged it before the Federation Constitutional Court. As noted earlier, the HDZs launched two appeals, but then withdrew them.
Al Sharaa won't be able to decide, but his decisions will influence the outcome. Let's…
Transparently assembling all the material and technology needed for nuclear weapons might serve Iran well…
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part:…
Good luck and timing are important factors in diplomacy. It's possible Grenell will not fail…
There are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to…
HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation…