Tangible progress meets lack of capacity

The April “1230” Department of Defense progress report on Security and Stability in Afghanistan summarizes its findings this way:

…International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made tangible progress, arresting the insurgents’ momentum in much of the country and reversing it in a number of important areas. The coalition’s efforts have wrested major safe havens from the insurgents’ control, disrupted their leadership networks, and removed many of the weapons caches and tactical supplies they left behind at the end of the previous fighting season. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to increase in quantity, quality, and capability, and have taken an ever-increasing role in security operations. Progress in governance and development was slower than security gains in this reporting period, but there were notable improvements nonetheless, particularly in the south and southwest. Overall, the progress across Afghanistan remains fragile and reversible, but the momentum generated over the last six months has established the necessary conditions for the commencement of the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas this summer.

Can we trust this qualified optimism? Or should we join veteran Afghanistan watchers like Joshua Foust in thinking this is “insane wishful thinking”?

This what ISAF portrays as tangible progress that is breaking the momentum of the insurgency. Their own data says the exact opposite. Whether you think this is deliberately misleading on their part—basically, whether you think they’re lying—or just insane, legitimately insane wishful thinking, is up to you. I’ll be up front say I can’t tell which I think, and which I find more worrying.

I confess I lean towards scepticism, but for reasons different from those Foust gives. He notes that the violence figures are higher than ever before and that insurgent ops tempo has not declined. I imagine he would point to the ongoing Taliban offensive in Kandahar over the weekend as further evidence that their momentum has not been broken.

This angle of criticism I find unconvincing.  The 1230 report is correct in thinking that increased efforts by the Coalition will necessarily increase violence temporarily, as it did in Iraq during the “surge.”   The deeper critique of the 1230 report lies in its own indications of the difficulties the Afghanistan campaign is facing beyond the immediate realm of “safe and secure environment.”

The problem here starts with the President, who has made it clear that he wants to “defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and U.S. Allies in the future.”  But he has not made clear how Afghanistan is to be governed, or even what kind of government would be capable of preventing al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan and threatening vital U.S. interests.  Like all post-Cold War presidents before him, Mr. Obama is trying to avoid what George W. Bush pejoratively called “nationbuilding,” which would better be termed “state-building.”

The trouble is that it can’t be avoided if we want to get out of Afghanistan with even a modest degree of confidence that it won’t in the future again become a haven again for al Qaeda.  Digging deeper into the 1230 report, it becomes quickly apparent that the governance dimension is presenting serious difficulties.  The Ministry of Defense is making progress, but the Ministry of Interior (which controls the police) is not.  Here is a hint of the depth of the problems (p. 20):  “Literacy training is now mandatory in every initial entry training course, with the goal to graduate each new trainee at a 1st grade level.”  And further on:  it is estimated “the 1st grade literacy level of enlisted soldiers and policemen will rise from 14 percent to over 50 percent in the next ten months.”  In other words, 86 per cent of enlisted soldiers and police are currently no more than literate at the first grade level.

No wonder they are having problems.  And there is competition out there:

The Taliban developed a code of conduct in 2009 to serve as a guide for insurgents in Afghanistan, particularly in areas of strong government influence, in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the population. Insurgents have been setting up local commissions to collect taxes and attempt to provide more attractive governance options, such as providing conflict resolution via shadow governors and judges trained in sharia law. In spite of this guidance, ISAF and ANSF security gains and operational tempo have forced the insurgency to change its approach by shifting to more intimidation and assassination tactics. Insurgents employ these tactics to create the perception of deteriorating security and to demonstrate to local residents, as well as the media, that the Afghan Government and ISAF are incapable of providing security.

Somehow I doubt that forcing the Taliban to shift to intimidation and assassination is seen by the locals as bringing credit to the Coalition.  The fact is that Afghan government capacity to deliver services at the local level or to provide justice or conflict resolution is still small to nonexistent.  “Slow” and “measured” is the kind of progress reported on these issues.

Therein lies the problem as I see it.  I am willing to believe that the Coalition has arrested the insurgents’ fighting momentum.  But “build” has to follow “clear” and “hold.”  There is ample indication in the 1230 report that “build” is lagging, even that it is falling farther behind as the military side of this campaign makes some “tangible progress.”  But what good is that if we and the Afghan government lack capacity to take advantage of progress to establish the kind of governance that will keep al Qaeda out?