Sometimes at odds, sometimes not

I owe a debt of gratitude for this piece to Dennis Kux, author of The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, a retired State Department South Asia specialist, and currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He writes:

Osama bin Laden died in a fashion that could not have been better from the American standpoint or worse for Pakistan. For Americans, the end to the man who organized 9/11 and other deadly, if less bloody, Al Qaeda operations was like the script of a Hollywood movie. The good guys–the Navy Seals–swoop out of the sky, get their man, suffer no casualties, and return to base. The only hitch, the loss of a helicopter, provides suspense, but is not a game stopper since there is fortunately a back-up chopper available.

The episode brought a sense of closure over the horrors of 9/11. In a victory lap, President Obama symbolically visited Ground Zero in New York City and then flew to Fort Bragg, Kentucky to salute the Navy Seals who performed so flawlessly. The US admittedly carried out the operation inside Pakistan without the knowledge, let alone permission, of the government of Pakistan. Indeed, as CIA Director Leon Panetta told the media, informing the Pakistanis in advance would have risked operational security.

So it was a great day for Uncle Sam. Osama is no more. The master terrorist has gotten his just reward. Furthermore, the present occupant of the White House revealed himself a cool and decisive Clint Eastwood not, as many previously thought, a distant intellectual who had trouble making up his mind.

For Pakistan, the episode was a major disaster. Even Pakistani liberals who applauded the death of bin Laden were embarrassed by way it happened. They were irate that the al Qaeda leader could have been hiding almost next door to their country’s West Point in a city full of military installations and supposedly tight security. If Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the ISI, did not know that bin Laden had been in Abbottabad for five years, it was woefully incompetent. If ISI knew who lived in the high-walled compound, it was guilty of hiding the world’s most wanted terrorist.

Either way, it was enormously embarrassing. This observer is skeptical that something as conspicuously different as the bin Laden compound from the rest of the neighborhood would not have attracted the attention of the omnipresent ISI, especially over half a decade. In turn, Pakistan’s security establishment, and a large section of the public, were infuriated by the US’s blatant disregard for their country’s sovereignty and were red-faced that the Americans were able to fly across more than a hundred miles of Pakistani territory undetected by the vaunted air defense system.

Thus, while there was enormous satisfaction and pride in the US, for Pakistan, the response was very conflicted. This was reflected in the stark contrast between President Zardari’s op ed in the May 2 Washington Post applauding the US action and the querulous statement issued the same day by the Foreign Ministry. The latter mentioned bin Laden’s death almost in passing, waxed indignant about the violation of Pakistani sovereignty, and said menacingly that any repetition would shake the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. The Pakistan military leadership issued a similar warning after a meeting of the powerful corps commanders and the army chief General Kayani. The army leadership further announced that US military personnel in Pakistan would be reduced to the “bare minimum.”

Many Pakistanis, while unhappy about the unilateral US action and the violation of sovereignty, directed their ire against the security establishment, alleging that the army and the ISI were guilty of either incompetence or complicity. To counter these charges, pro-military media outlets tried to place the blame on the wobbling civilian government, generally regarded as having little say in national security matters. The opposition Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) predictably joined in the chorus of voices calling for the president and prime minister to resign.

On Monday, Prime Minister Gilani, speaking in the National Assembly, stoutly defended Pakistan’s record. He said that many intelligence agencies failed, not just Pakistan’s, blamed the US for allowing bin Laden to flee into Pakistan, warned that any attack on the countries “strategic assets” (i.e. its nukes) would be answered with a robust riposte, and stated that Lt. General Iqbal (an officer supposedly close to Kayani) would lead an inquiry into the episode. Gilani announced that parliament would meet in camera on May 13 to consider the report. At the same time, the prime minister also stressed the importance of good relations with the US. Someone obviously less concerned about US-Pak ties leaked the name of the CIA station chief to an English-language newspaper considered close to the ISI.

So how will this all play out for the US-Pak partnership against terrorism? In Washington, the Obama administration has made clear its belief that a cooperative relationship with Pakistan is important for a satisfactory outcome in the war in Afghanistan. The president chose his words carefully in his lengthy interview with 60 Minutes last Sunday. While not blaming the Pakistani authorities, he pressed for answers regarding the support network that helped bin Laden during his lengthy stay in Abbottabad. Irate Congressmen have called for slashing US aid to Pakistan, but administration supporters have argued that this would hurt, not help, US interests in the region. Washington hopes that a chastened Pakistan will prove more, rather than less, cooperative in the days ahead.

It remains unclear how events will play out in Pakistan. Possibly, the military’s embarrassment will lead to a stronger civilian voice over national security matters. Although the military is more vulnerable now than in many years, it is very uncertain that the wobbly civilian leadership will be able to take advantage of the situation. The jury is also out whether Pakistan will agree to crack down on the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network (seen as useful proxies to defend Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan) and the Lashkar-i-Toiba and related groups that have in the past served as proxies against India. Public pressure by US officials will not sway the Pakistanis, but perhaps private persuasion may prove more effective in the post bin Laden era. Reportedly, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry will be on his way in a few days to try his hand.

Until such a change occurs, the basic contradiction in the US-Pak relationship will continue: specifically that while Pakistan and the US see the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a common foe, only the US considers the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-i-Toiba as enemies. To Islamabad, these groups remain potentially useful instruments to promote Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan and against India. This kind of strategic disconnect has periodically undermined US-Pakistan alliance relations ever since Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the mutual security agreement with Pakistan in 1954. In 2011, as in the past, US and Pakistani interests and policies in part coincide and in part conflict.