Day: May 13, 2011
A really bad idea
I imagine in Brussels they are congratulating themselves today for Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik agreeing to postpone the referendum he was threatening, in exchange for “structured talks” with the European Union on the future of judicial institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Why is this a bad idea? Let me count the ways:
- Postponement leaves the threat of the referendum hanging, providing continued leverage to Dodik from a proposition that clearly violates letter and spirit of the Dayton agreements.
- Agreeing to discuss Bosnia’s judicial system with the RS undermines the authority of the prosecutors and judges at what Bosnians call the “state” level (national to Americans, but that means something else in Bosnia).
- Using the enlargement commissioner of the EU to conduct these talks could open the door to de facto negotiations on implementation of the EU’s acquis communitaire with the RS.
To make matters worse, the EU’s top foreign policy official, Catherine Ashton, is reported to have said, “We consider that any legitimate issues require an adequate response.” And to seal the EU’s groveling, she added, “We welcome your leadership, Mister President.”
Why wasn’t Dodik told to go discuss the issues he is raising with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo? Why wasn’t any EU discussion of judicial reform undertaken a the state level? Of course, that would have required that Dodik also be told to get on with government formation (it has been 7 months since elections under a caretaker government). EU use of its leverage to that end would have been a very good idea. Allowing Brussels to become an instrument of Dodik’s campaign to enhance the autonomy of RS and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Sarajevo government is a really bad idea.
Another good idea
This good idea is to improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan: a Kabul statement acknowledging that it regards Afghanistan’s borders as fixed and not to be changed.
What good would that do, you might ask?
Here’s the story: the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is known as the Durand line. The more than 1600-mile boundary was fixed in 1893 by agreement between Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India, and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Islamabad has accepted the Durand line as the international border with Afghanistan, based on the colonial antecedent. Kabul has not.
When I was in Kabul a few years ago calling on a key aide to President Karzai, I suggested that Afghanistan might accept the Durand line as a way of improving relations with Pakistan. His answer was telling: he would not want, he said, to “foreclose options for future generations.” This is not a declaration of war, but it is a statement that suggests Afghanistan has ambitions to control the part of Pakistani territory where ethnic Pashtuns live. Pashtuns are the plurality ethnic group in Afghanistan; they live on both sides of the Durand line.
Pakistanis will often say they need a degree of control over Afghanistan to provide “strategic depth” in their conflict with India. India’s friendly relations with President Karzai were on display this week as the Indian prime minister signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Kabul. This unnerves Pakistanis, who regard the conflict with India as their major national security threat. It is an important reason for Islamabad’s now evident reluctance to do as much to counter the Taliban and Al Qaeda as Washington would like.
I don’t know two countries whose border is subject to disagreement that have good relations (please let me know if you do–I’m looking for an exception to this rule). Without an agreed (and physically demarcated) border and with a single ethnic group dominant on both sides, there is the real possibility of irredentist activity that threatens a neighboring state’s territorial integrity. Pakistani fears about Afghanistan would be significantly reduced if Kabul were to signal its acceptance of the Durand line.
So that is why it would be a good idea for Afghanistan to accept the Durand line, improving its relations with Pakistan and acquiring, as quid pro quo, stronger action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Washington should be working hard to this end.