Month: May 2011
Compare these
Here is an excerpt from Monday’s statement by Serbia at the UN Security Council debate on Bosnia:
We consider that the announced referendum of the citizens of Republika Srpska on the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina has nothing to do with the territorial integrity of the country and is not in contravention of Dayton Peace Accords. Without any intention to interfere into the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we consider that legislative initiative belongs only to competent assemblies formed by the legitimately elected representatives of citizens and that there are no powers on the basis of which it could be taken over by other governmental organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina or by the international presence.
Here is an excerpt from the statement by Croatia on the same occasion:
In this respect, we echo previous speakers who have expressed serious concern regarding the unilateral decision by Republika Srpska to hold a referendum on challenging the authority of state judicial institutions and rejecting the authority and past decisions of the High Representative. We believe this decision should be reversed, as it undermines the constitutional structure of the country and could undo the positive developments achieved since the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. If the referendum moves forward, it may foster new tensions in the country and the region. Croatia underscores that all Parties should respect the Dayton Peace Agreement and acts of the High Representative taken with the approval of the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
I was originally tempted to comment on this contrast, but I think I’ll leave it to readers to judge which one is sincere and which is disingenuous.
PS: A hint to non-Balkan watchers: the first statement would justify secession from the Union by South Carolina.
PPS: For the record, the referendum question in the RS reads as follows:
Do you support the laws imposed by the High Representative of the International Community in BiH, especially those pertaining to the Court of BiH and BiH Prosecutor’s Office, as well as their unconstitutional verification in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly?
Take a guess as to which way those who wrote the question want you to vote!
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How to save Bosnia and Herzegovina
John Menzies, post-war U.S. ambassador in Sarajevo in 1996 and war-time Charge’ d’affaires in 1995, writes:
Background
The U.S. has made an enormous investment in Bosnia; billions of dollars, thousands of man-years, and actual blood. The Dayton system is unraveling due to the depredations of hard-line nationalist elements. We cannot afford the success of these elements. It is time to act quickly and effectively to reverse the current trend toward fragmentation and dissolution of the Bosnian state.
Current systems seem unable to address the urgency of the moment. Here are a few simple suggestions for correcting the current course.
Moving Forward
1. Name a Special Envoy to Bosnia; provide high level political support.
2. Create a new “Friends of Bosnia” group to meet on the margins of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This group would include the U.S., the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey. Membership should be open to those who genuinely want to make the peace work. No other venue serves the purpose of the NAC. Turkey can participate as a NATO member, and the NAC can discuss much tougher approaches than can the EU or any other umbrella.
3. Reinvigorate (if at all possible) the OHR. As unlikely as it sounds, it is worth trying; it is an institution already in place. This does not substitute for a U.S. Special Envoy. The Special Envoy will add resolve and strength to the OHR, and can extend the Envoy’s own mandate by supporting the OHR.
4. Press for a new Dayton-like process to correct the flaws of the original. The new effort should have an open mandate, but only to make Bosnia work. It should be clear from the outset that there will be no multi-state solutions.
We have invested far too much to allow Bosnia to fail. Heightened resolve is the key to finding solutions.
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An aging peacehawk
Not everyone will like this interview with Israeli President Shimon Peres, but I find it remarkable. He declares Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas still a partner for peace, despite the unity agreement with Hamas. He says President Obama is a friend of Israel, in particular for vetoing a UNSC resolution on settlements that accorded with Obama’s views, something I wish the United States had not done (but I’m glad Obama at least gets credit from someone for it). And he says apropos of the Arab Spring:
“Either [the Arab world] will return to tribalism and poverty, or the Arab world will enter the 21st century. There’s no middle option.” Israel’s interest, he declared, was that “they should enter the 21st century, of course. We’re not idiots. All of Judaism is built on the basis that all men are created in the image of God. Our values must be stronger even than our policies.”
This would be enough for me to take back “Israelis are from Chelm,” if more of them agreed with their president.
That said, Peres is no pushover when it comes to Israeli security. An architect of Israel’s nuclear weapons program, he says:
There are two components: a Palestinian state and Israel’s security needs. If we only talk about Israel’s security needs, that’s only half of it. If they only talk about a Palestinian state, that would only be half of it. And if only half the work is done, that will mean a continuation of the conflict.
It is hard to believe a Palestinian state necessarily threatens Israel’s security more than the mess in Gaza and the West Bank today. More likely, today’s situation is far more perilous.
Of course Peres is only the president. Prime Minister Netanyahu holds Israel’s cards, which he’ll reveal in a May 23 speech to Congress. Michael Omer-Man suggests he announce an initiative at the UN in favor of a Palestinian state, security arrangements and borders to be settled later. This may be a bridge too far, but I hope Netanyahu is at least wise enough to listen to his aging peacehawk president.
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Red card
The High Representative for Dayton peace agreement implementation in Bosnia has submitted two reports to the Secretary General, one more a routine update and the other finding that one of the two entities constituting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srspska (RS), is in breach of the Dayton agreements. HiRep Valentin Inzko adds:
The recent decisions taken by the RS authorities represent the most serious violation of the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] since it was signed more than 15 years ago.
This is the more or less the equivalent of giving Republika Srpska a red card. The problem of course is that RS’s sin is refusing to recognize the authority of the referee, by calling a referendum that will reject his decisions and those of Bosnia’s state court.
This puts Inzko, and the international community, in a difficult spot. What would a soccer ref do if a player refused to leave the field? What if the player suspected the referee did not have sufficient force or sanctions to make it happen? And the player knew half the stadium was full of people ready to back him up, while the other half would not want to fight?
The issue was raised at my discussion this afternoon at the Woodrow Wilson Center with Jim O’Brien and Gerald Knaus, two experienced Bosnia hands for whom I have a great deal of respect. Nida Gelazis was in the chair.
Gerald argued that Inzko is playing into Dodik’s hands by making a big deal about the referendum. We should oppose it in a more low key way, saying that it violates Dayton and would only delay progress on the EU accession project. Inzko should not try to stop it, since he doesn’t have the power, but he should make it clear we will not respect its results.
Jim O’Brien wisely suggested that we make clear to Belgrade that its path to the EU will be encumbered if Dodik crosses whatever the international community decides is its red line. He also suggested we should focus on the consequences of Dodik’s move, which will hurt prospects for trade and investment. We should continue to build consensus on technical issues to recreate the positive dynamic evident in the case of visa liberalization policy.
I imagine that the internationals will find a way to muddle through this one, yielding a bit more ground to RS while trying to reassure the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims to the American press) that it really doesn’t make much difference. That is basically what we’ve been doing for years–accommodating Serb and Croat nationalists while soothing those among more Dayton-friendly forces who might want to stand up and object. In my view, this is taking us down a path to state dissolution, which is the RS’s stated objective.
The real problem will come the day the Bosniaks decide to engage rather than yield. I have no idea when that will be.
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Obama laps to the wrong side of history
While he is wisely not spiking the football, President Obama is still taking a few victory laps. The problem is that there are other races still going on in the stadium. He is supposed to be competing in those as well: the autocrats in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria should not be left to win their competitions. How do we think they will behave if they are successful in their current efforts to repress the demonstrations?
The picture is different in each of these countries. Obama has made it clear enough that Gaddafi must leave Libya, but the NATO military effort seems to be falling short and the diplomatic maneuvering hasn’t yet produced the desired result. In Yemen, the slippery president has refused to sign an agreement negotiated with the Gulf Cooperation Council to step down and has returned to beating up on demonstrators. King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa in Bahrain is busy bulldozing Shia mosques, as if that will make the 70% Shia population go away. In Syria the supposed reformer Bashar al Assad has killed hundreds, rounded up thousands and subdued towns one by one using grossly excessive military force against civilians.
We are not hearing much from either President Obama or Secretary of State Clinton about these developments. I would argue that the outcome of the still ongoing rebellions in the Arab world are more important to U.S. vital interests than the killing of Osama bin Laden, who wasn’t living much better in Abbottabad than he would have in Guantanamo (though he was clearly in better communication with his network). Yemen is already a weak state where terrorists hide and Syria provides support to Hizbollah and Hamas. Libya has undertaken state-sponsored terrorism in the past and may well revert in the future. Bahrain? How does the Sunni king expect his Shia majority population to react once he is finished depriving it of its political rights as well as many houses of worship?
I won’t propose a full package of solutions. What it seems to me is needed is simpler than that: a Presidential decision to make the cause of democracy in the region his own, and a tasking to the State Department to come up with the (non-military) propositions that will make it real. Failing that, Obama risks lapsing to the wrong side of history.
PS: Jackson Diehl treats the Syrian case well in this morning’s Washington Post, as does Brian Whitaker in The Guardian.
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Tangible progress meets lack of capacity
The April “1230” Department of Defense progress report on Security and Stability in Afghanistan summarizes its findings this way:
…International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made tangible progress, arresting the insurgents’ momentum in much of the country and reversing it in a number of important areas. The coalition’s efforts have wrested major safe havens from the insurgents’ control, disrupted their leadership networks, and removed many of the weapons caches and tactical supplies they left behind at the end of the previous fighting season. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to increase in quantity, quality, and capability, and have taken an ever-increasing role in security operations. Progress in governance and development was slower than security gains in this reporting period, but there were notable improvements nonetheless, particularly in the south and southwest. Overall, the progress across Afghanistan remains fragile and reversible, but the momentum generated over the last six months has established the necessary conditions for the commencement of the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas this summer.
Can we trust this qualified optimism? Or should we join veteran Afghanistan watchers like Joshua Foust in thinking this is “insane wishful thinking”?
This what ISAF portrays as tangible progress that is breaking the momentum of the insurgency. Their own data says the exact opposite. Whether you think this is deliberately misleading on their part—basically, whether you think they’re lying—or just insane, legitimately insane wishful thinking, is up to you. I’ll be up front say I can’t tell which I think, and which I find more worrying.
I confess I lean towards scepticism, but for reasons different from those Foust gives. He notes that the violence figures are higher than ever before and that insurgent ops tempo has not declined. I imagine he would point to the ongoing Taliban offensive in Kandahar over the weekend as further evidence that their momentum has not been broken.
This angle of criticism I find unconvincing. The 1230 report is correct in thinking that increased efforts by the Coalition will necessarily increase violence temporarily, as it did in Iraq during the “surge.” The deeper critique of the 1230 report lies in its own indications of the difficulties the Afghanistan campaign is facing beyond the immediate realm of “safe and secure environment.”
The problem here starts with the President, who has made it clear that he wants to “defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and U.S. Allies in the future.” But he has not made clear how Afghanistan is to be governed, or even what kind of government would be capable of preventing al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan and threatening vital U.S. interests. Like all post-Cold War presidents before him, Mr. Obama is trying to avoid what George W. Bush pejoratively called “nationbuilding,” which would better be termed “state-building.”
The trouble is that it can’t be avoided if we want to get out of Afghanistan with even a modest degree of confidence that it won’t in the future again become a haven again for al Qaeda. Digging deeper into the 1230 report, it becomes quickly apparent that the governance dimension is presenting serious difficulties. The Ministry of Defense is making progress, but the Ministry of Interior (which controls the police) is not. Here is a hint of the depth of the problems (p. 20): “Literacy training is now mandatory in every initial entry training course, with the goal to graduate each new trainee at a 1st grade level.” And further on: it is estimated “the 1st grade literacy level of enlisted soldiers and policemen will rise from 14 percent to over 50 percent in the next ten months.” In other words, 86 per cent of enlisted soldiers and police are currently no more than literate at the first grade level.
No wonder they are having problems. And there is competition out there:
The Taliban developed a code of conduct in 2009 to serve as a guide for insurgents in Afghanistan, particularly in areas of strong government influence, in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the population. Insurgents have been setting up local commissions to collect taxes and attempt to provide more attractive governance options, such as providing conflict resolution via shadow governors and judges trained in sharia law. In spite of this guidance, ISAF and ANSF security gains and operational tempo have forced the insurgency to change its approach by shifting to more intimidation and assassination tactics. Insurgents employ these tactics to create the perception of deteriorating security and to demonstrate to local residents, as well as the media, that the Afghan Government and ISAF are incapable of providing security.
Somehow I doubt that forcing the Taliban to shift to intimidation and assassination is seen by the locals as bringing credit to the Coalition. The fact is that Afghan government capacity to deliver services at the local level or to provide justice or conflict resolution is still small to nonexistent. “Slow” and “measured” is the kind of progress reported on these issues.
Therein lies the problem as I see it. I am willing to believe that the Coalition has arrested the insurgents’ fighting momentum. But “build” has to follow “clear” and “hold.” There is ample indication in the 1230 report that “build” is lagging, even that it is falling farther behind as the military side of this campaign makes some “tangible progress.” But what good is that if we and the Afghan government lack capacity to take advantage of progress to establish the kind of governance that will keep al Qaeda out?
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