Month: May 2011
Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong
I am reluctant to turn www.peacefare.net into a boxing ring, with International Crisis Group (ICG) in one corner and an anonymous Bosnia-watcher in the other. But ICG is influential in the Balkans and has in the past published a great deal of fine analytical work on the conflicts there. Reasonable people should at least be able to agree on the facts. That seems not to be possible in Bosnia these days, so the best I can do is offer an alternative perspective on the facts that seems to me well-grounded (but I hasten to clarify that I did not write this material, much as I agree with it). So here goes, on four more points from page one of the most recent ICG report.
“State institutions are under attack by all sides”.
This is factually incorrect. State institutions are under attack from certain Croat and Serb political parties. The Bosniaks are not attacking them and not all Serb and Croat political parties are attacking them.
“The authorities of the larger of the entities, the Federation, were formed controversially – a main state institution said illegally – in March and are disputed by Croats, who have created a parallel Croat National Assembly”.
This consists of one factual error and several half-truths:
— The reference to a “parallel Croat National Assembly” is factually incorrect. There is only one Croat National Assembly, and it is not “parallel” in any sense of the word. Rather, it is completely legal.
— The HDZs had the opportunity to challenge both the “illegal” election of the Federation Presidency, and the nomination of the Federation government before the Federation Constitutional Court. They filed appeals, but then inexplicably withdrew them when it became clear the court would probably rule against the HDZs. Therefore, the HDZs have not mounted a court challenge to either the Federation Presidency or Government, even though such legal remedies are available.
— The same legal criteria were used in 2011 by the Federation House of Peoples’ to elect the Federation Presidency as were used to elect the Presidency of the old government in early 2007, i.e., the House of People’s was formed when sufficient members for a quorum had been chosen, but before they were certified by the Central Election Commission. Thus, if the election of the current Presidency was illegal, then so too was the election of the former Presidency. By extension, this would render illegal all laws and acts passed in the Federation since 2007.
“The two HDZs and the biggest winners of the October 2010 elections, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), all rejected reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposals”.
This is factually incorrect. Only one side – the HDZs – turned down the offer. The OHR – with the full support of the Ambassadors of the PIC Steering Board and the EU, conducted mediation between the two camps. Both camps agreed on general principles for a government platform. The mediation broke down over maximalist demands from both sides regarding allocation of posts. The OHR then consulted with the Steering Board Ambassadors and the EU and split the two positions down the middle, giving each side half of what it wanted. It then presented this to the two sides in a take-it-or-leave-it package. After much grumbling, the SDP accepted the offer. The HDZs refused. Thus, only one side – the HDZs — rejected the proposal.
“The SDP then formed a Federation government in violation of the entity constitution and against the advice of the state-level Central Election Commission (CEC)”.
This is factually incorrect. At no point did the formation of the Federation government violate the Federation Constitution. So too, the Central Election Commission never reviewed the matter of government formation in the Federation, as this does not fall within its mandate. Had the Federation government formation been problematic, the HDZs would in all likelihood have challenged it before the Federation Constitutional Court. As noted earlier, the HDZs launched two appeals, but then withdrew them.
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Two state shuffle
Following on the signing of a “unity” agreement between Fatah (which controls the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza), Hamas leader Khaled Meshal said in Cairo yesterday that his organization is now committed to seeking a two-state solution for (Israel and Palestine). According to the New York Times, he said he was prepared to accept a common Palestinian platform that includes:
a Palestinian state in the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as its capital, without any settlements or settlers, not an inch of land swaps and respecting the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel itself.
At the same time, Ziad abu Zayyad, editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, was at the Middle East Institute in Washington at an event presided over by Ambassador Phil Wilcox, now president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. Abu Zayyad claimed that Hamas has evolved away from its own political platform, as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did. Hamas today is acting as “frontier guards” for Israel, preventing more radical groups from launching rocket attacks and other unproductive forms of resistance. Hamas accepts a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank with its capital in East Jerusalem.
Abu Zayyad was at pains to recall that the “unity” agreement was originally an Egyptian proposal accepted by Fatah in 2009, when Hamas rejected it. Saying that its earlier rejection was due to people influenced by Israel and the United States [sic], Hamas has now accepted it without changes (abu Zayyad did not mention annexes added by Hamas, according to the New York Times). The agreement lacks programmatic details, in particular a clear agreement on security forces. It is not clear what will happen on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza, but at least there will be a joint mechanism in which issues can be discussed and resolved. Hamas has come around now because of the Arab spring, which has increased Egyptian pressure and made Hamas uncertain of continued Syrian support and anxious for international legitimacy. The demonstrations in Gaza he thought of relatively minor importance.
The agreement is important, abu Zayyad thought, because it enables the Palestinians to offer a partner for peace, which Israel has complained is lacking. Israel has exploited the period of Palestinian division to intensify settlement activity without facing serious international pushback. It continues to focus on occupying more land, which is making a two-state solution more difficult. Unity will be helpful in the Palestinian effort to gain UN membership in September. If that effort fails, the Palestinians will be better off because neither Hamas nor Fatah will be able to blame the other. Unity will help to make Israel pay a higher cost for continued occupation.
Asked if the U.S. should put forward a detailed proposal, abu Zayyad said the Palestinians no longer trust Washington, because of its veto of a recent UN Security Council resolution on settlements that was consistent with U.S. policy.
Let’s not get our hopes up: Meshal’s version of the two-state solution is far from what Israel would want, both on land swaps and refugee returns, and even in abu Zayyad’s milder version there was no indication that Hamas would give up violence or opposition in principle to the Jewish state. But something does seem to be shifting within Hamas. Let’s hope Israel can also find ways to shift in the direction of a two state solution.
PS: While I was at abu Zayyad’s talk, he did not address the statement of Gaza (Hamas) Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, who said the operation to kill Osama bin Laden was “the continuation of the American oppression and shedding of blood of Muslims and Arabs.” He did claim that Hamas is anxious to distinguish itself from the extreme religious “salafis,” which Haniyeh’s statement definitely did not do. I understand that after I left abu Zayyad expressed his own amazement at Haniyeh’s statement.
PS: Apologies for an earlier version of this post, which misspelled abu Zayyad’s name.
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Better to jaw-jaw than to war-war
This could be said of many places of course, but it occurred to me today after a discussion with Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) negotiators Abdullahi Osman el Tom, Mahmoud Abbeker Suleiman and Tahir el Faki over at the now well-located offices of the Public International Law and Policy Group. I’ve often accused the head of that distinguished organization, American University law professor Paul Williams, of never having seen a territory so small he didn’t want to help it gain independence.
That would not be fair in this instance. The JEM folks made it clear that they prefer a negotiated political solution that would leave Darfur within Sudan. But failing that, they were also clear that they would seek independence by military means and confederation with Southern Sudan, which will become independent in July, hoping eventually that Southern Sudan would itself join Khartoum in a confederation (fat chance of that). There was no sign that they had the military capability to achieve independence, but they thought they could prevent Khartoum from winning a decisive military victory. Sudanese soldiers, they thought, had no reason to fight vigorously for President Bashir.
The problem is that the mediation in Doha, conducted by the African Union, is not going well. The JEM negotiators have been given 10 days to react to a proposal they say was prepared without their participation and falls far short of what they would need in order to sign. They are spending their time at PILPG preparing a markup of the mediator’s proposal, one that would make it more specific, enable displaced people to return safely to their homes, provide for return of property and accountability for crimes, and ensure that assistance money (Qatar has promised $2 billion) is spent to benefit Darfurians. This would require a much more comprehensive and detailed agreement, subject to extensive verification, than the one the mediator has proposed. They have nonetheless been told that failure to come to agreement by May 23 would lead to an end to the mediation.
That would trigger Khartoum’s “domestication” plan, which the JEM folks see as an effort to eradicate their movement (and other rebels), push the internationals out of Darfur, force repatriation of displaced people whether conditions are adequate or not, and impose Khartoum’s authority. It would also divide Darfur along ethnic lines, something they oppose, and it would allow janjaweed, the army and intelligence forces free rein, leaving the drivers of conflict unresolved.
What are those? In the view of the JEM people, the drivers of conflict are national, not Darfurian. President Bashir has made it clear that with Southern Sudan’s secession he will govern what remains as an Arab and Islamic state, further marginalizing the peripheral regions. JEM does not define itself in ethnic and religious terms, and most of its adherents are neither Arab nor Muslim. They want a secular, democratic state, the New Sudan of John Garang being their ideal. They welcomed the Arab spring but underlined that nonviolence would not work in Sudan and that they are committed to keeping their military option open.
JEM would like the other Darfurian rebels to join in a united negotiating front, but that seems unlikely. They would like the U.S. to make an effort to unify the rebels, but blamed the international community for “recognizing” different groups and thereby promoting fragmentation.
I have my doubts that the May 23 deadline is really a firm one. If there are signs of progress, I’d be surprised if the Qataris and Khartoum did not want to continue the effort. It really is better, as Winston Churchill said, to jaw-jaw rather than to war-war.
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ICG gets it wrong
Another of my Balkans friends has sent me a long missive about a recent ICG letter to the EU’s Political and Security Committee. Happily, I am told the letter did not have the desired effect, as the committee was deeply unsympathetic with the views put forward. As always, comments are welcome, so long as they address the issues and avoid personal invective:
On 2 May International Crisis Group (ICG) President Louis Arbour sent a three page letter to the ambassadors of the European Union’s Political and Security Committee in advance of their May 3 meeting. The letter contained ICG’s version of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as policy recommendations.
The ICG letter contains a number of factually inaccurate claims. These claims not only paint a false picture of events on the ground, but are also used as the basis for subsequent recommendations. Here are some of the blatant inaccuracies in the text:
- The letter claims that the Republika Srspska (RS) referendum “does not purport to have legal effect”. This statement is factually incorrect: the RS Law on Referendum and Citizens’ Initiative clearly states that referendum results are legally binding. The referendum decision adopted by the RS National Assembly is a legally binding act and it entered into force upon publication in the RS Official Gazette.
- “The government of the…Federation was formed illegally”. This statement has no legal basis under BiH domestic law or international law. This contradicts not only Bosnia’s domestic legal framework, but also the views of the OHR and the wider international community. The Ambassadors of the Peace Implementation Council’s Steering Board (Canada, EU Delegation, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, Turkey, UK and US) along with OHR and other representatives of the international community (UNHCR, EUFOR, EUPM, OSCE, NATO) consider the current Federation government legitimate.
- The letter implies that the RS referendum decision was triggered by the High Representative’s decision of March 27. This claim has no basis in fact, as these actions were clearly part of a longstanding RS policy to push for state dissolution and is in no way linked with the High Representative’s intervention in the Federation. The RS passed similar conclusions in May 2009, which the High Representative was forced to annul at that time. The RS’ intention to hold a referendum was announced long before the High Representative’s March 27 Decision, as both the RS Government and RS National Assembly passed official acts on this matter in December 2009. To link the March 27 Decision and RS referendum implies a non-existent causality.
- The letter claims that the High Representative’s March 27 Decision suspending a decision of the Central Election Commission (CEC) annulling the “formation of the FBiH (Federation) government” and “the consequent interference with the right to appeal that ruling, have undermined state bodies and the rule of law”. In fact, the CEC never annulled the formation of the FBiH government and the High Representative’s Decision left open the door to authorized officials to challenge and clarify the constitutionality of the formation of the FBiH government before the FBiH Constitutional Court. Croat parties did submit several appeals to the FBiH Constitutional Court, but then inexplicably withdrew their appeals before the Court issued a ruling. Domestic legal remedies still do exist for aggrieved parties in this matter, and the High Representative’s Decision in no way circumscribed the use or application of these remedies.
Unfortunately, the ICG letter follows the ideological path of several recent ICG Bosnia reports, in that it resorts to false claims and factually inaccurate information to push a policy line that repeats nearly verbatim the official propaganda emanating from Republika Srpska. The letter could have been written in Banja Luka. This ICG line – which has consistently parroted RS policy since early 2009 – is causing tremendous damage to BiH at a time when the country can ill afford it.
Perhaps an even more significant problem than the things that ICG writes, are the things it omits. None of the ICG reports of the last two and a half years has mentioned Milorad Dodik’s high profile push towards state dissolution, nor have they attempted to analyze his motives for obstructing and dismantling state institutions. They have failed to discuss the tendentious, provocative and highly combative nature of statements by RS officials. ICG gives scant shrift to RS’ constant denials of genocide, even though the ICTY and ICJ confirmed that genocide had occurred in several rulings. ICG fails to mention that RS is disputing the Final Award of the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal and has attempted to dismantle state institutions mandated by the Dayton agreement. ICG doesn’t mention the state capture of media inside the RS or the RS government’s heavy-handed bullying tactics against opposition figures and missing persons groups. ICG also fails to mention that the current media atmosphere inside RS is similar in tone to the wartime years, a sharp contrast to the Federation media.
RS media gave unusually prominent positive coverage to the ICG letter, as they have to all ICG reports published recently. At a time when Bosnia is headed on a downward trajectory, ICG’s work is playing an active role in undermining relations within the country, while sowing dissent within the international community.
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While we weren’t watching
I admit it is hard to shift attention away from the consequences of Osama bin Laden’s death. America and Pakistan have embarked on a great debate. Sticking with the claim that they knew nothing about either OBL’s whereabouts or about the American operation to kill him, Pakistan’s government now has to explain its apparent incompetence. The Obama Administration has to explain why we should provide billions in assistance to a country that incompetent, or worse, one that harbored OBL.
These debates will go on for some time but is unlikely to change much. Congress will fulminate, but President Obama will not want to reduce aid, for fear of making the situation worse, and he will stick to his drawdown schedule in Afghanistan, starting small. Maybe in Pakistan the debate will have a broader impact: its military and intelligence services deserve a thorough airing out, though they are likely to survive with their prerequisites intact.
More interesting for the long term are the things that were, and were not, happening in the Arab world while we weren’t watching.
In Syria, the crackdown is proceeding, with hundreds more arrested in apparently indiscriminate security sweeps of major provincial centers of unrest. Bashar al Assad shows every sign of continuing. Aleppo and Damascus, Syria’s two biggest cities, remain relatively quiet. Friday will tell us whether the repression is succeeding.
In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has managed to slip out of an agreement negotiated with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia plus other oil-rich gulfies) to step down in 30 days. It is unclear whether the GCC, the political opposition or the protesters can do much at this point to resurrect the agreement, so it is likely both demonstrations and repression will continue.
In Libya, a kind of tottering stalemate has developed, with Gaddafi continuing to pound the western town of Misrata and to hold off the rebels in the east. Turkey has turned against the Colonel, but it is unclear whether that will make much difference. For all the much-vaunted rise of Turkey as a regional player, Ankara seems to have trouble making its weight felt with either Bashar al Assad or Muammar Gaddafi.
In Bahrain, repression is also in full swing, with the Americans seeming to bend to Saudi pressure not to object too strenuously. The regime there, in the past one of the milder ones, has been arresting doctors and nurses who provided medical treatment to protesters.
So it looks as if counter-revolution is succeeding for the moment across the region. It would be ironic if OBL’s death were to coincide with failure of the protests that showed promise of harnessing the discontents that used to be channeled into terrorism. Mr. Obama, where was that right side of history last time we saw it?
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Slippery slope, moral hazard and tall order
The big questions for me in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death are how it will affect America’s relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as the Arab Spring. I leave it to others to consider the impact on Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the terrorist enterprise in general, but I have to assume that the already weakened enterprise will suffer some further fragmentation and demoralization, even as it tries (and occasionally succeeds) to exact revenge.
Pakistan has got some explaining to do. It seems likely someone in the Pakistani government knew that Osama bin Laden was hiding out in a garrison town not far from Islamabad. There is no sign they tipped off the Americans, their putative allies. How come? How many other Al Qaeda principles harbored in Pakistan? And if no one in the Pakistani government knew that OBL was there, that would suggest true incompetence, no? So too would failure of the Pakistani government to intervene to block the American operation, if the Americans are telling the truth about not having informed the Pakistanis.
My best guess is that some Pakistanis (army? intelligence service?) knew where bin Laden was hiding. They likely also knew about the American operation, or at least knew something was “going down.” So they both hid him and allowed him to be captured. That sounds like the kind of duplicity we’ve witnessed for years, practiced to our detriment. Glad it was at someone else’s expense this time. The unexcited and even congratulatory reaction of official Pakistan to the news suggests this was the case.
So what do we do now? Is it business as usual with the Pakistanis? Or is it time for a shift toward a more demanding stance? Should we make military assistance conditional on greater cooperation? Surely someone in the Congress will push that idea. The problem is we would then have to be prepared carry out the threat, which would surely reduce military and intelligence cooperation further. That’s a slippery slope. Are we really reduced, as Madeleine Albright suggested on the PBS Newshour this evening, to “working with” the Pakistanis?
Maybe. With OBL out of the way, Al Qaeda is a lot less interesting to the Pakistanis, whose purposes inside Afghanistan might just as well be served by the Taliban without all the international complications OBL necessarily engendered. Besides, they’ve now got lots of homegrown jihadis to throw against India when the need arises. OBL wasn’t so good in that direction anyway.
What about Afghanistan? President Karzai, in his usual uncharitable mood, took the occasion of OBL’s death to suggest that the Americans and their allies have been wasting a lot of time and Afghan lives looking for him inside Afghanistan. Meanwhile, American senators were suggesting that OBL’s death might make it possible to draw down American troops in Afghanistan faster than currently contemplated, leaving Karzai to his fate. Of course the two ideas are compatible: Karzai would like less U.S. military effort, and so would the Americans.
This “beggar thy ally” approach on both sides does not bode well for continuing anything like the current level of effort in Afghanistan, where the Taliban are proving resilient and resurgent. I confess to temptation: maybe we should try withdrawing faster than had been anticipated, making it clear to Karzai that we are in part responding to his pressure. He pushes us out because he has been pretty sure we wouldn’t take him up on it. If he thought we might, he would be getting his act together faster.
This is what is called “moral hazard.” Leon Panetta, about to become Defense Secretary, was big on the idea of giving the Iraqis a quick time line for U.S. withdrawal when he served on the Iraq Study Group (I’m not breaking confidence–he said so publicly on many occasions). I wonder if he might adopt the same posture on Afghanistan. Of course David Petraeus, whether in his current job or his future one, is likely to be on the other side of that argument.
As for the Arab Spring, it seems to me that OBL’s death should reduce the fear some have of Al Qaeda exploitation of the demonstrations and weaken the argument that we need autocrats to repress international terrorists. Those arguments have not gained much traction with me these past few months, but I hope those who believe them will reexamine the situation and come to the obvious conclusion: the faster we can help get something like democratic regimes up and running in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria the better off we will be. I wish I could say the same about Bahrain, but it seems to have fallen hostage to the regional sectarian standoff. We’ve already got what most would consider a tall order.
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