No Belgrade, but here is what I would say
Here is an interview I’ve done for Snezana Congradin and Matja Stojanovic, published by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade (also in Serbian). I won’t be going there on my current trip to the Balkans, but here is what I would say if I did have the pleasure of walking on Knez Mihailova:
1. In your opinion, the EU should not help Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party win the next elections, due soon. You also said that the EU should take a firmer stance, continue its policy of conditionality and insist on meeting the criteria, no matter who ruled in Serbia. Does this mean that the policies of the current President Boris Tadic and his party do not make much of a difference, compared to other Serbian parties?
DPS: No, not at all. That is an erroneous conclusion. Tadic and the Democratic Party are clearly making a big effort to qualify Serbia for the EU as quickly as possible. I doubt any other party would do as well. But the bar should not be lowered for them—if you want to join a club, you need to qualify.
2. What is the reputation of President Boris Tadic in the international community? One can hear conflicting views. One the one hand, for example, the international community is praising the arrest and transfer of Ratko Mladic to the Hague, while pointing out, on the other, that Serbia has been hiding the fugitive, for almost a decade. And most of that time, Boris Tadic held top positions in the government, or ruled as The President of The State (seven years of that time, now).
DPS: You’ve described the international community’s ambivalence well. President Tadic is greatly appreciated in the international community not only for the arrest of Mladic but for the clarity with which he has pursued democracy and EU membership. But at the same time he appears not to been fully effective at countering nationalist forces within Serbia that protected Mladic (and others) and continue to pursue territorial ambitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo. His failure to turn up at the recent regional meeting in Poland—because the president of Kosovo was going to be there and treated equally—will have disappointed many of his fans in Europe and the U.S.
3. Messages that the government of Kosovo has been sending to it’s Serb community are similiar to those addressed by the central government in BiH to the citizens of RS – that, respectively, Pristina and Sarajevo should be perceived as their capital cities. Are those special links that are being kept between Belgrade and Banja Luka, as well as the demands for division of Kosovo, showing that Serbia still has territorial claims towards RS and the north of Kosovo? What do You think, is the Greater Serbia project dead? If not, is it implemented in any way by Boris Tadic too?
DPS: The Greater Serbia project is not dead, but it is pursued now by peaceful means in both Bosnia and Kosovo—that makes a big difference. The problem with Belgrade’s links to Banja Luka and to northern Kosovo are that they are chains holding Serbia back from the EU (even if some of the connections are legitimate and should be preserved). Serbia has to be liberated from those attachments that are illegitimate in order to become a serious EU candidate. You should ask President Tadic how he feels about that. I wouldn’t want to speak for him.
4. You have said that Serbia will have to recognize Kosovo’s independence once it gets to the point of entering the EU, and that it should unambiguously prepare it’s citizens for that fact. Is that recognition possible before the genuine reconciliation between the two sides, that would have to include Serbia expressing regret for the ethnic cleansing, expulsions and the most serious crimes (that all led to Kosovo declaring independence)?
DPS: I think recognition is possible any day Belgrade wants to do it. I would not want to make apologies a precondition, much as I would like to see Serbia acknowledge unequivocally the ethnic cleansing, expulsions and crimes. I would also like to see Kosovo take responsibility for crimes committed on its side of the war.
Even before formal diplomatic recognition, I would like to see Serbia acknowledge that the authorities in Pristina are the legitimate, democratically selected government, no matter what Kosovo’s status. This is already implicit in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. I’d like to see it made more explicit in a meeting between the two presidents.
5. Do You think that the international community must have been aware that Serbia would impose the idea of divison of Kosovo between the two sides, at the very begining of the dialogue?
DPS: Yes, it has been clear for a long time that Serbia was seeking partition of Kosovo, but it cannot impose that idea. It can only ask. The Pristina authorities will say “no,” because they have no way of preventing partition of Kosovo from raising irredentist expectations in Presevo, Macedonia and Bosnia.
6. Albin Kurti, Kosovar opposition party leader recently said that the option that Kosovo will, one day, unite with Albania is not ruled out and that the issue should, in that case, be resolved on a referendum. At the same time there are voices that there should be a referendum in RS, too. Could that mean that, in the end, the old ideas of the Greater Albania and the Greater Serbia would help resolve the Balkans issue?
DPS: I don’t think so. These are ideas whose time will never come. I am virtually certain that a referendum in all of Bosnia on whether that country should remain united and become a member of the European Union would win. There is no reason a decision on an issue of that sort would be made only in RS. Likewise I am virtually certain that a referendum in Albania and in Kosovo on whether the two states should unite and move their capital to Pristina (the historically correct capital for Greater Albania), giving up hopes to enter the European Union, would lose. Those are the real choices: Bosnians get into the European Union only if they remain in a single country; Albanians get into the European Union only if they remain in two separate countries.
7. So far, the international community did not send a clear public message to Ivica Dacic, Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, that divison of Kosovo is an impossible solution. What do You think, why is that so?
DPS: You’ll have to ask those who fail to send the message, but I can imagine there are some in the international community who don’t understand the perils of Kosovo partition, just as Dacic doesn’t appear to understand that whatever Serbia gets in northern Kosovo, the Kosovars will expect to get the equivalent in southern Serbia. Is he prepared to make that deal?
8. You have criticized Catherine Ashton for making a deal with Milorad Dodik, that postponed (not cancelled) the referendum in RS. Why does the EU not take more decisive steps in resolving problems in Bosnia, or even impose sanctions on RS President?
DPS: Again, you’ll have to ask those responsible. I think too many Europeans think they can “manage” Dodik. More likely, he will manage them. He is a smart and wily politician who sees his future secured in a Republika Srpska that is at the very least entirely autonomous, if not independent.
9. Boris Tadic’s BiH policy could be seen as double-faced and hypocritical. At the same, we don’t hear any of the officials from the international community criticize Tadic publicly about it. What do you think why is that, and what is, in your opinion, the ultimate goal of Boris Tadic’s policy towards Bosnia?
DPS: You’ve got to ask the President that question. It seems to me what Serbia is doing is advocating “One Bosnia,” but it is a Dayton Bosnia they want that cannot qualify for EU membership. I’d like to see a Bosnia that can qualify for EU membership, which means amending the Dayton constitution.
10. What do You think, to what extent is Dodik independent from the Serbian Government, when decision making is concerned? How far is his government from being practically the Serbian Government’s division?
DPS: I think he has a fairly wide margin of freedom to govern as he sees fit inside Bosnia, but Serbia will stop him short of declaring RS independent because that would put Belgrade in an impossible position: recognize Banja Luka and give up hope for EU membership or not recognize and lose political support inside Serbia.
11. Do You find interlocutors in Belgrade, when people from the government structures are concerned, and why is that while You are about to visit Pristina and Sarajevo, You will not come to Belgrade, too?
DPS: The honest answer is that I’ve been invited to Pristina and Sarajevo and not to Belgrade, where I have a lot of friends both inside and outside the government. I had hoped to stop there as well, but it will have to be on another occasion.
I hope it is well remembered in Serbia that I was an early and vocal supporter of Otpor, Cesid and the nonviolent rebellion against Milosevic—so much so that three deputy prime ministers of Serbia went on RTS one night during the evening news to claim that they had uncovered a top secret CIA plot to overthrow Milosevic. The paper they brandished turned out to be public testimony I had given in Congress weeks earlier, which they had downloaded from the internet.
No one should mistake honest differences on issues for lack of rapport and friendship. Serbia has made great progress these last 10 years. I hope to see it make a lot more in the next 10 years, but for that I believe Belgrade will have to establish “good neighborly relations” with Kosovo and make sure Bosnia stays a single country on track for EU membership. Neither will be easy, but both are necessary for Serbia to become an EU member.
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It seems to me wrongheaded to consider the EU as a “club” that a country should measure up to before joining. Indeed, this was never a real standard as the EU came out of an effort to help stabilize Europe. Was Greece, for an early example, ever up to German standards?
I’m in Macedonia just now and heard Foreign Minister Antonio Milošoski say just last evening that the EU should move quickly to bring down the barriers for all the Balkans countries as a way to ease the tensions across the region. EU membership should be seen in this light, as contributing to the process of democratic transition and achieving economic sustainability across the region and not as a reward.