Day: June 23, 2011
Oil stock draw is not a good idea
President Obama today decided to draw down 30 million barrels of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the White House claims in response to disruption of oil supplies from Libya.
For those of us who developed the policies governing coordinated stock drawdown more than 25 years ago (I was the U.S. representative to the emergency committee of the International Energy Agency from 1984 to 1987), this is an odd decision, even if it is allegedly paired with drawdown of an additional 30 million barrels by other members of the IEA and an apparent Saudi decision earlier this month to increase production. Having others contribute is nice, but only if they contribute to a good cause.
The oil market is not in crisis–in fact the price has generally declined for the past month, and supplies are ample. To some, the decision seems aimed to lower prices and deter speculators (with corresponding political benefits) rather than to respond to an emergency.
Internationally coordinated drawdowns have occurred previously in response to the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Those seem far more appropriate occasions than the present to use “the nation’s first line of defense against an interruption in petroleum supplies.” The onset of the summer driving season seems to have precipitated this decision rather than any emergency in the oil market. If it was not a good idea to use the SPR in March, it is not a good idea now, when oil market conditions are calmer.
None of us like to pay more for gasoline. But the plain fact is that Americans pay relatively little, because we tax gas far less than most other developed countries. That would be fine, except for the real costs of using gasoline and other oil products that are not paid by consumers. Oil supplies are a major reason we have all those bases around the world and aircraft carriers in every major ocean. Who pays for American efforts to protect oil supplies? The general taxpayer, not the gasoline consumer. The price is on the order of $1 per barrel, which is essentially a subsidy to oil consumption.
Lowering the price of gasoline encourages consumption, increases the costs of ensuring security of supply and discourages domestic production (which I hasten to add is not a short-term solution anyway). Not the right direction. American politics don’t allow any of our elected leaders to say what they all know is true: the right long-term direction for oil prices is up, with the additional “rent” captured by taxes that return to the Federal budget the costs of protecting oil supplies worldwide. That way the price increase doesn’t go to our adversaries (or our already well-compensated friends).
It’s a good thing I’m not planning to run for office.
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Part 1: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. I’ll post it here over the next couple of days. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper today. Here are the first two parts: strengths and weaknesses:
Getting to Denmark
By
Daniel Serwer
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Iraq is already a proto-democracy. Relatively free and fair elections chose its current parliament, 80 per cent of which are newly elected members. It has in theory an independent judiciary that is supposed to decide issues based on the law. It has lively media that are not entirely government-controlled and a vibrant civil society, including a multitude of political parties and nonprofit associations. Until the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Iraq was arguably the most democratic Arab state. Even today it likely still merits that appellation.
But “the most democratic Arab state” is not saying much. Iraq is still far from Denmark and likely never will meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. What will it take to move it farther in that direction and prevent Iraq from slipping back into autocracy?
1. Strengths
Iraq has a state, established in accordance with a constitution adopted by referendum in October 2005. It is an Islamic federal republic, “in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic.” The state is asymmetrically federal, providing a wide degree of autonomy to Kurdistan and somewhat lesser degrees to the 15 non-Kurdish governorates. The state came close to total collapse in 2003 and again in 2006-7 but has slowly recovered since. Today it manages a budget of $82.6 billion, produces oil at a rate of about 2.2 or more million barrels per day, sometimes makes a minimal basket of food available to virtually every Iraqi and produces 8000 MW of electricity.
The Council of Representatives is the supreme legislative body, and there are also provincial, municipal and district councils as well as a Kurdistan parliament. The Council of Representatives has been elected twice under the current constitution, and it has twice chosen the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic as well as approving the Prime Minister and his government.
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by Article 87 of the Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court is established pursuant to Articles 92 and 94 of the Constitution.
In short, Iraq has the right institutions on paper. Its weaknesses lie elsewhere.
2. Weaknesses
Iraq has little history of democratic governance. While the monarchy was in principle a constitutional one, little of liberal democratic culture survived 45 years of autocracy. The Ba’athist regime led Iraq into three catastrophic wars (with Iran and with two different U.S.-led coalitions) and established a standard for brutality that has rarely been exceeded. It will not be easy to turn the Republic of Fear into the Republic of Hope.
The current Iraqi system of governance is complex. It requires for its effective operation a high degree of cooperation and coordination among different levels of government, and among entities at each level of government. Good governance would not be easy even under ideal conditions.
Conditions are far from ideal. While violence is dramatically down from its peak in 2006/7, it has ticked up recently, as a wave of assassinations has struck security officials and politicians even as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices continue more indiscriminate killing. The government response is not always respectful of the rule of law, and pressures to crack down hard to repress the violence are strong.
The current government, formed in December 2010, is far from cohesive. It is a broad coalition that includes all the major political coalitions and commands in theory a big majority in the Council of Representatives. But the political coalitions dictated the choice of its members, the prime minister has not named key security ministers so retains those portfolios himself, and political tension is high between Prime Minister Maliki and Iyad Allawi, who head the most key partners in the coalition.
Despite the formation of this “national partnership” coalition with participation from the major Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political groups, sectarian and ethnic tensions continue to plague the government. There is little sign of programmatic coherence in its deliberations, beyond general avowals of support for democracy and human rights. With some exceptions, the ministers seem more committed to protecting their own party, sectarian and ethnic interests than to providing Iraq’s citizens with the kind of good governance many of them would like.
The relationship between Iraqi citizens and their government is in fact tenuous. More than 90% of the government’s revenue comes directly from oil, not taxes. This makes Iraq an oil rentier state with no need to convince citizens of the value of the services it provides in order to obtain revenue. While Revenue Watch has ranked Iraq ahead of other Middle Eastern oil producers in revenue transparency, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index used foreigners’ perceptions to rank Iraq towards the bottom end in “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
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