Part 2: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?

Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options.  If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper yesterday.  I posted strengths and weaknesses yesterday.  Here is the second installment:  opportunities and threats.

3. Opportunities

Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has moved a long way.  Its constitution is now broadly accepted by all but a relative handful of Sunni insurgents.  Its politics, while still organized mainly around sect and ethnicity, have developed in directions that often cross ethnic and sectarian boundaries at the national, provincial and local levels.  There have been moments when it appeared that major politicians like Allawi—a secular Shiite who leads a virtually all-Sunni political coalition—or even Maliki might successfully form a more coherent, cross-sectarian national political movement.

The Arab Spring brought to Iraq a significant increase in citizen demands for improved services and a fuller realization of democratic ideals. Prime Minister Maliki announced he would not seek a third mandate even before the protests hit Iraq.  Maliki also set a 100-day deadline, which expired June 9, for improved performance by his ministers.  Little progress in either word or deed was evident, pro-government thugs and security forces have attacked pro-democracy demonstrators, and the government seems to have missed the opportunity to use discontent to accelerate its efforts to improve performance in service delivery and reduce corruption and other abuses.

The handling of its oil revenue is a critical issue for Iraq’s future as a democratic state.  Oil production is expanding now that the government has entered into agreements with international oil companies.  If oil prices remain around $100 per barrel, the Iraqi state will be collecting far more revenue than its current spending plans, or any reasonable future ones, require.  Baghdad has many choices, but the fundamental one is this:  will all the new revenue go to the state, to dispose of as politicians decide, or will at least some of it go to the Iraqi people, to use as they see fit?

If the latter, one can envisage an Iraq where the state has to meet the burden of convincing citizens to provide revenue, political parties consequently begin to organize around issues rather than sectarian or ethnic protection, civil society continues to develop even with reduced international support, and media become more independent.  This would be a polycentric Iraq, one more closely resembling modern Western democracies and likely to align itself with the West against autocracy and Iranian efforts to establish hegemony in the Middle East.

Even if the Iraqi government holds on to the lion’s share of oil revenue, there remains the question of how wisely it is used and whether there will be transparency and accountability, not only for revenue but also for expenditures.  The importance of reining in corruption is generally acknowledged in Iraq today.  If Iraq can reduce the well-known abuses that plague its public sector, the country would become a far more attractive place for non-oil investment.

Iraq is geographically advantaged when it comes to exporting oil and gas.  In the past, the lion’s share of oil has been exported through the Gulf.  But some oil produced in Kurdistan is already exported to the north, and it is not beyond Iraq’s means to greatly expand its capacity to export economically to both the north and west, through Turkey, Syria or Jordan.  Iraqi gas, still mostly undeveloped, could also go in these directions.

4. Threats

The most immediate threat to Iraq’s democratic development is resurgent violence that causes the state to crack down hard and in doing so returns the country to arbitrary and potentially autocratic rule.  While it is difficult to imagine the restoration of the Republic of Fear, it is relatively easy to imagine de facto autocrats, or more likely small groups of kleptocrats, gaining control over their own ethnic or sectarian groups.  This is already apparent in Kurdistan, and Maliki is gradually gaining hegemonic control over large parts of the Shia south.  No single hegemon has yet emerged in Sunni-majority areas.

Prime Minister Maliki, who currently holds the defense, interior and national security portfolios, has done a great deal to strengthen his position over the past five years.  He seems willing to go farther in this direction.  He has assembled strong, extra-constitutional counter-terrorism and intelligence forces that report directly to him, he has installed army commanders on an interim basis without parliamentary approval, he has obtained a decision from the Supreme Court giving the executive branch some power over the central bank and election commission, and the Supreme Court has also ruled that only the executive can initiate “legislative projects.”   This concentration of power generates fear that democratic development may be blocked.

Arab/Kurdish tensions could cause serious problems as well.  Kurdish claims to the so-called “disputed territories” are being met with strong Arab resistance.  While there are rational—even easy—solutions to many of the problems, Kirkuk city and province represent a seemingly intractable quandary.  While there is a great deal to be gained economically from maintaining the peace, it is not yet clear that after American withdrawal at the end of the year Arabs and Kurds will be willing and able to maintain stability there as they work towards a settlement.  Even if intentions are good, miscalculation is possible.  Control over oil production and revenue are also sources of Kurdish/Arab tension, but they are increasingly viewed as parts of the solution as well.

Intra-Kurdish tensions have generated demonstrations and violence in recent months in Kurdistan, where a third party threatens the traditional duopoly.  While the crackdown there would not appear to threaten Iraq, it could threaten the development of a more open and democratic Kurdistan.

Iran will seek to expand its influence as the Americans draw down.  While they would have many legitimate ways of doing this in a democratic Iraq, they may prefer to avoid that paradigm on their borders.  They may also want, once Ayatollah Sistani is out of the way, to see Iraq turn in a theocratic, or at least a more Islamist, direction.  Iran will use Sadrist and other political and militia groups to counter Saudi and U.S. influence, encourage maximum U.S. withdrawal and ensure that Islamist Shiites remain dominant in Iraq.

Risks exist from other neighbors as well.  The Syrian Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi one never got on well, but Damascus will not want a successful democracy on its borders.  It may continue to allow the export of at least a minimal flow of insurgents into Iraq, especially if Iraq is less than fully supportive of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations.  Saudi Arabia will seek to ensure that a democratic Iraq is one in which Sunnis have a voice larger than their numbers in the population.

Turkey will want to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan does its best to limit haven for the PKK or other insurgent Kurds, something it has achieved in recent years by establishing excellent economic and political relations with Erbil.  But if Turkey were to return to military incursions into Iraq, that could undermine the development of a more democratic Kurdistan.

Kuwait has several outstanding issues with Baghdad:  payment of reparations and the maritime border are among the most important.  While there are reasons to expect these to be settled peacefully, politicians in Baghdad have a notable temptation to demagoguery when discussing Kuwait that could strengthen undemocratic forces in Iraq.