Part 3: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?
Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options. If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper last week. I posted strengths and weaknesses here on Thursday and opportunities and threats yesterday. Here is the third installment: U.S. policy options and conclusions.
5. U.S. policy options
It is in the U.S. interest that Iraq remain on a democratic path and continue to move, even if slowly, in the democratic direction. Anything else would endanger Iraq’s unity and likely make at least a part of it into an Iranian satellite. How can the U.S. support democracy in Iraq?
A limited U.S. contingent, for training and counterterrorism, may remain in Iraq after the end of 2011. Whether the contingent is 10,000 or 20,000 does not make an enormous difference to maintenance of Iraq’s democracy (it may however make a big difference to the military balance with Iran). What really counts for democracy is that the U.S. continue to have a good rapport with the Iraqi officer corps, whose training in U.S. military schools is vital to maintaining the kind of professionalism and civilian oversight that will permit democratic evolution to continue.
Just as important will be continuing American rapport with the Iraqi people in general, with civil society organizations, and with key institutions of the Iraqi government, including not only the executive branch but also the Council of Representatives and the judiciary. This is normal diplomatic work, encouraged by the Strategic Framework agreement, but it needs to be on steroids in Iraq, where we will be trying to counterbalance not only the weight of Iraqi history and the weakness of its institutions but also the considerable weight of its non-democratic neighbors in order to protect an enormous American investment of lives and money.
Let me offer a couple of examples. I have been involved for years in supporting a dialogue among Iraq parliamentarians concerned with national reconciliation. They have now decided to institutionalize their efforts in a parliamentary caucus. We could walk away at the end of the year and say it is now all in Iraqi hands. But I hope we will continue to support this and other comparable efforts aimed at overcoming sectarian and ethnic divides.
Likewise, I hope we will continue to provide support to the Iraqi judicial system, especially the Supreme Court, as well as the election commission. The Court has played a critical role in strengthening the prime minister’s powers and will have to play an equally critical role if those powers are to be limited in meaningful ways. Likewise the election commission is a vital piece of democratic machinery that should not be left to fend for itself. Nor should we abandon women’s advocacy organizations.
Another example is the “disputed” territories. We could walk away at year’s end, saying it is time for the Iraqis to take over and maintain whatever confidence building measures are needed to keep the peace, especially in Kirkuk. Or we can remain engaged, along with the UN, to support the Iraqis in ensuring that they do not come to blows.
A fourth example concerns the role of religion in Iraq. We should be supporting those who are prepared to defend pluralism, which requires at least some distance between religion and the state. Increased protection of Christian and other minorities is important if Iraq is to remain democratic.
A fifth but important example arises from Iraq’s oil exports. Today the bulk leaves Iraq through the Gulf, where it runs an Iranian gauntlet. Only a small amount is exported to Turkey from Kurdistan. Fixing the “strategic” pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq, would enable Iraq to export even oil produced in the south through the north. Getting the Iraqis to do this should be a top priority for the U.S. So, too, should be development of Iraqi gas for transport to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline.
Last but not least, automatic distribution of at least some oil revenue on a per capita basis would give citizens a more direct stake in Iraq’s success. This would begin to change the relationship between the citizen and the state, empowering the former and giving the latter more incentive to provide improved services. Current levels of state revenue are sufficient to provide payments to citizens, which would require a strict system of accountability and transparency.
None of these ideas in and of themselves will directly create a serious democratic opposition, which Iraq admittedly lacks and only Iraqis can form. But the following would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:
- support to the parliament, constitutional court, elections commission and related civil society organizations, including for women’s issues;
- assistance to protection of religious and other minorities;
- continued U.S. military education and training;
- beefed up UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
- encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
- cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.
6. Conclusion
Ultimately, whether Iraq continues to develop as a democracy or lapses into something more like its unfortunate past depends on the Iraqis themselves. They seem ambivalent. Some of them, at least on some days, appreciate the freedom they enjoy today, which far exceeds the norm in the Middle East as well as Iraq’s own past. They want more democracy, not less, as recent street protests have demonstrated.
Others, or maybe the same people on other days, are impatient with democratic processes and cry out for “action”—someone who will fix all that ails the country without bothering to consult, legislate or show respect for human rights. Any serious effort to restore autocracy in the whole country would be met with dramatic opposition, most likely organized on an ethnic or sectarian basis.
My guess is that the appreciation of democracy will prevail over the hope for a quick fix. We should certainly do what we can to try to help ensure that outcome.
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