An Arabic student and Middle East scholar

The Middle East Institute, where I studied Arabic through several levels to little avail, has kindly taken me on as one its scholars and this week published an interview covering my career and views on several ongoing conflicts.  Here is what they published:

Q: Tell me a bit about your early career. What led you to government service?  How did you become involved with peace-building initiatives and mediation?

A: It was all the girl’s fault. I first worked in international affairs at the United Nations, hired by the father of someone I dated in college.  I had a scientific background through a Master’s degree in physical chemistry. He needed someone to deal with environmental issues — this was 1970 and we were really just beginning to think about such things.  After I finished my doctorate at Princeton, the State Department hired me as a science and technology specialist, dealing mainly with nuclear and missile proliferation issues in Rome and Brasilia. I later worked energy issues and became Economic Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge’ d’affaires at the US Embassy in Rome.

I did not really get involved in peace-building and mediation until the Bosnian war, when I landed in Sarajevo in November 1994 in a plane hit by small arms fire during the landing. It’s been peace-building all the time since then.

Q: You are currently teaching at George Washington University, Georgetown University, and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. After careers devoted to both government service and peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives, why did you turn to teaching?

A: It was always my intention to teach, and over the years I have enjoyed lecturing in many different settings. It was about time that I taught my own courses. I just got my student evaluations from last term — both gratifying and humbling. The classroom is an intellectual feast and challenge.

Q: On your blog (www.peacfare.net), you have written that the US must remember that “Afghanistan matters” and the country’s fate and success lies in what the US leaves behind. What is your vision of the Afghanistan that the United States needs to leave behind and how might the US reach this goal?

A: I said in the Washington Post last July that the [US] President [Barack Obama] should specify an end state and suggested: “an Afghanistan that provides no safe haven to terrorists, ensures equal rights to all its citizens and maintains its sovereignty with international help but without foreign troops on its territory.” He seems inclined, however, to stick with only the “no safe havens” part. I think that is hard to achieve without the other pieces.

Q: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said that Afghans are starting to view NATO as an occupying force, warning that NATO air strikes could lead to a national uprising in Afghanistan. In your opinion, is there potential for a large movement within the country? If so, what might this look like and what implications would this have for US-Pakistani relations?

A: I guess even Karzai is inspired by the Arab Spring, but he should remember that the protests are against local leaders, not against the US.

That said, he is an elected president who clearly is at the limit of what he can tolerate, even if you discount some of what he says as political cover. Of course, there already is a movement against the US presence — we call it the Taliban. Fortunately, most Afghans don’t like it any better than they like our presence. The way to square this circle is with more capable Afghan forces doing most of the heavy lifting.

US-Pakistani relations raise their own complex set of issues, on which I confess I am a neophyte and hesitate to comment. I would just note that whatever we think we’ve been doing does not seem to be improving the situation.

Q: With regard to the situation in Iraq, you wrote on your blog that “the US, UN and Iraqis need to get their heads together sooner rather than later on how to handle Arab-Kurdish disputes, especially as resistance to a continuing US troop presence after the end of this year seems to be strengthening.” What are the core concerns in this debate?

A: Kurds want to extend the territory of Kurdistan to include areas that they claim are historically Kurdish (especially Kirkuk Governorate), guarantee themselves a substantial percentage of Iraq’s national oil revenue, and govern themselves with minimal reference to Baghdad, especially in exploration for and production of new oil discoveries. Arabs want to ensure that Iraq is not divided, either de facto or de jure, and that oil exploration
and production is planned and operated in accordance with a national framework. The Americans don’t want Arabs and Kurds to come to blows, something that seems less likely as they are making a lot more money by cooperating than they would otherwise. I think the UN can help them find a way of untying these knots.

Q: In a March Washington Post article, you discussed the possibility of the United States earning returns on the “enormous investment” in Iraq if it becomes a “reliable, high-volume supplier of oil to world markets” and “can defend itself with only a modicum of U.S. support,” while also holding “relatively free and fair elections that put in power people who reflect the wide diversity of the population and feel real pressure to deliver services efficiently.” What can the US and Iraq do to ensure that Iraq moves toward this ideal state of affairs?

A: I’ve just finished a short brief on this subject. Here are its conclusions:

The following US assistance would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:

• support to the Parliament, constitutional court, elections commission, and related civil society organizations, especially for women;
• continued military education and training;
• UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
• encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
• assistance for protection of religious and other minorities;
• cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.

Q: In spite of reports of a tentative agreement between northern and southern Sudan, many people are skeptical about the efficacy of negotiations and the implementation of the established terms, especially with the recent seizure of Abyei.  Do you believe that peaceful solutions are possible in this situation, or do you think we will see continued violence in the area, especially as we approach the proposed July 9 date for southern independence?

A: At this point I think the South is so concerned with maintaining peace and stability in advance of independence that it will do its best to avoid further problems up to and even past July 9. Diplomatic recognition will be much easier if independence does not lead to war.  Of course the North may not cooperate fully, but I do expect restraint from the South. That said, the seizure of Abyei is likely to cause serious problems in the future,
if there is no negotiated solution.

Q: Given your use of blogs, Twitter, and other social media outlets, what are your thoughts on the significance of Internet activism in the “Arab Spring”? Do you believe that social media sites can and/or will play a part in state-building projects and the “end game” in these national movements, or are they simply useful for the initial stages?

A: Social media seem a lot better suited to organizing a demonstration than establishing a supreme court. That said, I don’t think we’ve reached the limit of human ingenuity, and social media may well prove useful in overcoming the obvious democracy gap in many post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. But we should also note that media only enable you to do things you want to do — the movements generating change
use the media, not, I hope, the other way around.

Q: On your blog, you indicated that with regard to the current situations in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, it should be US policy “to listen to the locals, and follow their lead if we can figure out what it is” and support their efforts. How can the US support these protestors in their effort to promote democratic ideals, and not make the mistake of settling for a government for government’s sake and the perhaps false promise of stability?

A: It’s difficult. Embassies are not places that interface easily with 18-year-old protestors. And when they do, they may get in hot water with the host government.  Many years ago in Italy, I wanted to invite a bright young activist to a meeting on alternative energy technologies.  A name check turned up indications that he was a member of what the Italian government regarded as an extreme-left, vaguely anarchist political group. I somehow managed to convince the Embassy that it would be okay. He went on to study and work in the US and is today the distinguished head of an important industry association in Italy. Those are the risks you need to take if you really believe in democratic ideals.

I like the model we’ve developed: NGOs out hunting for talent and providing training, visits to the US, projects run by local people, without too much “Chief of Mission” control. You may not, however, find a lot of State Department officials who agree with me.