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Part 3: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?

Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options.  If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper last week.  I posted strengths and weaknesses here on Thursday and opportunities and threats yesterday.  Here is the third installment:  U.S. policy options and conclusions.

5. U.S. policy options

It is in the U.S. interest that Iraq remain on a democratic path and continue to move, even if slowly, in the democratic direction.  Anything else would endanger Iraq’s unity and likely make at least a part of it into an Iranian satellite.  How can the U.S. support democracy in Iraq?

A limited U.S. contingent, for training and counterterrorism, may remain in Iraq after the end of 2011.  Whether the contingent is 10,000 or 20,000 does not make an enormous difference to maintenance of Iraq’s democracy (it may however make a big difference to the military balance with Iran).  What really counts for democracy is that the U.S. continue to have a good rapport with the Iraqi officer corps, whose training in U.S. military schools is vital to maintaining the kind of professionalism and civilian oversight that will permit democratic evolution to continue.

Just as important will be continuing American rapport with the Iraqi people in general, with civil society organizations, and with key institutions of the Iraqi government, including not only the executive branch but also the Council of Representatives and the judiciary.  This is normal diplomatic work, encouraged by the Strategic Framework agreement, but it needs to be on steroids in Iraq, where we will be trying to counterbalance not only the weight of Iraqi history and the weakness of its institutions but also the considerable weight of its non-democratic neighbors in order to protect an enormous American investment of lives and money.

Let me offer a couple of examples.  I have been involved for years in supporting a dialogue among Iraq parliamentarians concerned with national reconciliation.  They have now decided to institutionalize their efforts in a parliamentary caucus.  We could walk away at the end of the year and say it is now all in Iraqi hands.  But I hope we will continue to support this and other comparable efforts aimed at overcoming sectarian and ethnic divides.

Likewise, I hope we will continue to provide support to the Iraqi judicial system, especially the Supreme Court, as well as the election commission.  The Court has played a critical role in strengthening the prime minister’s powers and will have to play an equally critical role if those powers are to be limited in meaningful ways.  Likewise the election commission is a vital piece of democratic machinery that should not be left to fend for itself.  Nor should we abandon women’s advocacy organizations.

Another example is the “disputed” territories.  We could walk away at year’s end, saying it is time for the Iraqis to take over and maintain whatever confidence building measures are needed to keep the peace, especially in Kirkuk.  Or we can remain engaged, along with the UN, to support the Iraqis in ensuring that they do not come to blows.

A fourth example concerns the role of religion in Iraq.  We should be supporting those who are prepared to defend pluralism, which requires at least some distance between religion and the state.  Increased protection of Christian and other minorities is important if Iraq is to remain democratic.

A fifth but important example arises from Iraq’s oil exports.  Today the bulk leaves Iraq through the Gulf, where it runs an Iranian gauntlet.  Only a small amount is exported to Turkey from Kurdistan.  Fixing the “strategic” pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq, would enable Iraq to export even oil produced in the south through the north.  Getting the Iraqis to do this should be a top priority for the U.S.  So, too, should be development of Iraqi gas for transport to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline.

Last but not least, automatic distribution of at least some oil revenue on a per capita basis would give citizens a more direct stake in Iraq’s success.  This would begin to change the relationship between the citizen and the state, empowering the former and giving the latter more incentive to provide improved services.  Current levels of state revenue are sufficient to provide payments to citizens, which would require a strict system of accountability and transparency.

None of these ideas in and of themselves will directly create a serious democratic opposition, which Iraq admittedly lacks and only Iraqis can form.  But the following would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:

• support to the parliament, constitutional court, elections commission and related civil society organizations, including for women’s issues;
• assistance to protection of religious and other minorities;
• continued U.S. military education and training;
• beefed up UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
• encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
• cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.

6. Conclusion

Ultimately, whether Iraq continues to develop as a democracy or lapses into something more like its unfortunate past depends on the Iraqis themselves.  They seem ambivalent.  Some of them, at least on some days, appreciate the freedom they enjoy today, which far exceeds the norm in the Middle East as well as Iraq’s own past.  They want more democracy, not less, as recent street protests have demonstrated.

Others, or maybe the same people on other days, are impatient with democratic processes and cry out for “action”—someone who will fix all that ails the country without bothering to consult, legislate or show respect for human rights.  Any serious effort to restore autocracy in the whole country would be met with dramatic opposition, most likely organized on an ethnic or sectarian basis.

My guess is that the appreciation of democracy will prevail over the hope for a quick fix.  We should certainly do what we can to try to help ensure that outcome.

Part 2: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?

Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options.  If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper yesterday.  I posted strengths and weaknesses yesterday.  Here is the second installment:  opportunities and threats.

3. Opportunities

Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has moved a long way.  Its constitution is now broadly accepted by all but a relative handful of Sunni insurgents.  Its politics, while still organized mainly around sect and ethnicity, have developed in directions that often cross ethnic and sectarian boundaries at the national, provincial and local levels.  There have been moments when it appeared that major politicians like Allawi—a secular Shiite who leads a virtually all-Sunni political coalition—or even Maliki might successfully form a more coherent, cross-sectarian national political movement.

The Arab Spring brought to Iraq a significant increase in citizen demands for improved services and a fuller realization of democratic ideals. Prime Minister Maliki announced he would not seek a third mandate even before the protests hit Iraq.  Maliki also set a 100-day deadline, which expired June 9, for improved performance by his ministers.  Little progress in either word or deed was evident, pro-government thugs and security forces have attacked pro-democracy demonstrators, and the government seems to have missed the opportunity to use discontent to accelerate its efforts to improve performance in service delivery and reduce corruption and other abuses.

The handling of its oil revenue is a critical issue for Iraq’s future as a democratic state.  Oil production is expanding now that the government has entered into agreements with international oil companies.  If oil prices remain around $100 per barrel, the Iraqi state will be collecting far more revenue than its current spending plans, or any reasonable future ones, require.  Baghdad has many choices, but the fundamental one is this:  will all the new revenue go to the state, to dispose of as politicians decide, or will at least some of it go to the Iraqi people, to use as they see fit?

If the latter, one can envisage an Iraq where the state has to meet the burden of convincing citizens to provide revenue, political parties consequently begin to organize around issues rather than sectarian or ethnic protection, civil society continues to develop even with reduced international support, and media become more independent.  This would be a polycentric Iraq, one more closely resembling modern Western democracies and likely to align itself with the West against autocracy and Iranian efforts to establish hegemony in the Middle East.

Even if the Iraqi government holds on to the lion’s share of oil revenue, there remains the question of how wisely it is used and whether there will be transparency and accountability, not only for revenue but also for expenditures.  The importance of reining in corruption is generally acknowledged in Iraq today.  If Iraq can reduce the well-known abuses that plague its public sector, the country would become a far more attractive place for non-oil investment.

Iraq is geographically advantaged when it comes to exporting oil and gas.  In the past, the lion’s share of oil has been exported through the Gulf.  But some oil produced in Kurdistan is already exported to the north, and it is not beyond Iraq’s means to greatly expand its capacity to export economically to both the north and west, through Turkey, Syria or Jordan.  Iraqi gas, still mostly undeveloped, could also go in these directions.

4. Threats

The most immediate threat to Iraq’s democratic development is resurgent violence that causes the state to crack down hard and in doing so returns the country to arbitrary and potentially autocratic rule.  While it is difficult to imagine the restoration of the Republic of Fear, it is relatively easy to imagine de facto autocrats, or more likely small groups of kleptocrats, gaining control over their own ethnic or sectarian groups.  This is already apparent in Kurdistan, and Maliki is gradually gaining hegemonic control over large parts of the Shia south.  No single hegemon has yet emerged in Sunni-majority areas.

Prime Minister Maliki, who currently holds the defense, interior and national security portfolios, has done a great deal to strengthen his position over the past five years.  He seems willing to go farther in this direction.  He has assembled strong, extra-constitutional counter-terrorism and intelligence forces that report directly to him, he has installed army commanders on an interim basis without parliamentary approval, he has obtained a decision from the Supreme Court giving the executive branch some power over the central bank and election commission, and the Supreme Court has also ruled that only the executive can initiate “legislative projects.”   This concentration of power generates fear that democratic development may be blocked.

Arab/Kurdish tensions could cause serious problems as well.  Kurdish claims to the so-called “disputed territories” are being met with strong Arab resistance.  While there are rational—even easy—solutions to many of the problems, Kirkuk city and province represent a seemingly intractable quandary.  While there is a great deal to be gained economically from maintaining the peace, it is not yet clear that after American withdrawal at the end of the year Arabs and Kurds will be willing and able to maintain stability there as they work towards a settlement.  Even if intentions are good, miscalculation is possible.  Control over oil production and revenue are also sources of Kurdish/Arab tension, but they are increasingly viewed as parts of the solution as well.

Intra-Kurdish tensions have generated demonstrations and violence in recent months in Kurdistan, where a third party threatens the traditional duopoly.  While the crackdown there would not appear to threaten Iraq, it could threaten the development of a more open and democratic Kurdistan.

Iran will seek to expand its influence as the Americans draw down.  While they would have many legitimate ways of doing this in a democratic Iraq, they may prefer to avoid that paradigm on their borders.  They may also want, once Ayatollah Sistani is out of the way, to see Iraq turn in a theocratic, or at least a more Islamist, direction.  Iran will use Sadrist and other political and militia groups to counter Saudi and U.S. influence, encourage maximum U.S. withdrawal and ensure that Islamist Shiites remain dominant in Iraq.

Risks exist from other neighbors as well.  The Syrian Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi one never got on well, but Damascus will not want a successful democracy on its borders.  It may continue to allow the export of at least a minimal flow of insurgents into Iraq, especially if Iraq is less than fully supportive of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations.  Saudi Arabia will seek to ensure that a democratic Iraq is one in which Sunnis have a voice larger than their numbers in the population.

Turkey will want to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan does its best to limit haven for the PKK or other insurgent Kurds, something it has achieved in recent years by establishing excellent economic and political relations with Erbil.  But if Turkey were to return to military incursions into Iraq, that could undermine the development of a more democratic Kurdistan.

Kuwait has several outstanding issues with Baghdad:  payment of reparations and the maritime border are among the most important.  While there are reasons to expect these to be settled peacefully, politicians in Baghdad have a notable temptation to demagoguery when discussing Kuwait that could strengthen undemocratic forces in Iraq.

Part 1: can Iraq become and remain a democracy?

Invited to speak to the U.S. intelligence community about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, I prepared a paper that treats strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as policy options.  I’ll post it here over the next couple of days.  If you prefer to read it all at once, please visit Al Arabiya, which published the full paper today.  Here are the first two parts:  strengths and weaknesses:

Getting to Denmark

By

Daniel Serwer

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Iraq is already a proto-democracy.  Relatively free and fair elections chose its current parliament, 80 per cent of which are newly elected members.  It has in theory an independent judiciary that is supposed to decide issues based on the law.  It has lively media that are not entirely government-controlled and a vibrant civil society, including a multitude of political parties and nonprofit associations.  Until the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Iraq was arguably the most democratic Arab state.  Even today it likely still merits that appellation.

But “the most democratic Arab state” is not saying much.  Iraq is still far from Denmark and likely never will meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria.  What will it take to move it farther in that direction and prevent Iraq from slipping back into autocracy?

1. Strengths

Iraq has a state, established in accordance with a constitution adopted by referendum in October 2005.  It is an Islamic federal republic, “in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic.” The state is asymmetrically federal, providing a wide degree of autonomy to Kurdistan and somewhat lesser degrees to the 15 non-Kurdish governorates.  The state came close to total collapse in 2003 and again in 2006-7 but has slowly recovered since.  Today it manages a budget of $82.6 billion, produces oil at a rate of about 2.2 or more million barrels per day, sometimes makes a minimal basket of food available to virtually every Iraqi and produces 8000 MW of electricity.

The Council of Representatives is the supreme legislative body, and there are also provincial, municipal and district councils as well as a Kurdistan parliament.  The Council of Representatives has been elected twice under the current constitution, and it has twice chosen the President and Vice Presidents of the Republic as well as approving the Prime Minister and his government.

The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by Article 87 of the Constitution.  The Federal Supreme Court is established pursuant to Articles 92 and 94 of the Constitution.

In short, Iraq has the right institutions on paper.  Its weaknesses lie elsewhere.

2. Weaknesses

Iraq has little history of democratic governance.  While the monarchy was in principle a constitutional one, little of liberal democratic culture survived 45 years of autocracy.  The Ba’athist regime led Iraq into three catastrophic wars (with Iran and with two different U.S.-led coalitions) and established a standard for brutality that has rarely been exceeded.  It will not be easy to turn the Republic of Fear into the Republic of Hope.

The current Iraqi system of governance is complex.  It requires for its effective operation a high degree of cooperation and coordination among different levels of government, and among entities at each level of government.  Good governance would not be easy even under ideal conditions.

Conditions are far from ideal.  While violence is dramatically down from its peak in 2006/7, it has ticked up recently, as a wave of assassinations has struck security officials and politicians even as suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices continue more indiscriminate killing.  The government response is not always respectful of the rule of law, and pressures to crack down hard to repress the violence are strong.

The current government, formed in December 2010, is far from cohesive.  It is a broad coalition that includes all the major political coalitions and commands in theory a big majority in the Council of Representatives.  But the political coalitions dictated the choice of its members, the prime minister has not named key security ministers so retains those portfolios himself, and political tension is high between Prime Minister Maliki and Iyad Allawi, who head the most key partners in the coalition.

Despite the formation of this “national partnership” coalition with participation from the major Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political groups, sectarian and ethnic tensions continue to plague the government.  There is little sign of programmatic coherence in its deliberations, beyond general avowals of support for democracy and human rights.  With some exceptions, the ministers seem more committed to protecting their own party, sectarian and ethnic interests than to providing Iraq’s citizens with the kind of good governance many of them would like.

The relationship between Iraqi citizens and their government is in fact tenuous.  More than 90% of the government’s revenue comes directly from oil, not taxes.  This makes Iraq an oil rentier state with no need to convince citizens of the value of the services it provides in order to obtain revenue.  While Revenue Watch has ranked Iraq ahead of other Middle Eastern oil producers in revenue transparency, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index used foreigners’ perceptions to rank Iraq towards the bottom end in “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”