Month: June 2011
It’s the mission, smarty
Foreign policy eyes and ears will be on the President’s Afghanistan speech tonight. But I fear the President will focus where the press points: on the size of the troop drawdown. Important though it may be, that is not the fundamental issue. The key thing is defining the mission end-state, as I and others have already pointed out.
Why is this so important? Because it is the mission that determines the number of troops (and civilians). If you only want to kill Al Qaeda, you don’t need many civilians and the troops you need are not regular infantry but rather special forces. If you want to stabilize Afghanistan and build up the state there so that it can continue to keep Al Qaeda out, that is an entirely different mission requiring lots of civilians and substantial numbers of regular army and marines to “clear, hold and build.” And many years.
The President has been consistently ambiguous on the counter-insurgency mission. His emphasis is always on counter-terrorism (killing Al Qaeda), with the occasional coda mentioning stability but without clarity about the end-state. This is not a small issue. It is the heart of the matter, as it determines how much personpower, years, blood and treasure we will have to invest. And that in turn determines the “opportunity costs,” that is what we’ll have to give up in order to achieve our goals in Afghanistan.
President Obama is no dummy. He understands perfectly well that the mission defines the requirements. If I had to bet, he would keep the focus tonight mainly on counter-terrorism, mentioning counter-insurgency in the context of ensuring regional stability. After all, the main problem with leaving Afghanistan before it can defend itself is that militants will begin to use it to attack Pakistan, a big and important country with a substantial nuclear arsenal.
He’ll say yes, Osama bin Laden is dead, but our job is not done. We need to ensure that Al Qaeda cannot return to Afghanistan and that the region is stable, so that never again will extremists harbored there attack the United States. Enabling Afghanistan to defend itself is in the U.S. interest, he’ll argue.
My colleagues in the Twittersphere will snigger and say that it is our very presence in Afghanistan that attracts extremists and enables their recruiting. That is not an argument that can win in a world still governed by Bacevich’s Washington Rules.
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Confusing, and disturbing
Colum Lynch reports yesterday that Sudan seems to be pursuing peace in one province even as it opts for war in another. Khartoum has agreed to the deployment of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the disputed border region of Abyei, where the Sudanese army, provoked by an attack on a convoy by South Sudanese forces last month, has displaced something like 100,000 people. Now, in Southern Kordofan, a province in the North, the Sudanese forces have started attacking forces loyal to South Sudan, apparently fearing that they might seek to secede from the North to join the South.
This has roused the American organizations that follow Sudan to issue a manifesto calling for a tough response to what they regard as primarily the North’s provocations. The list of challenges they cite is impressive:
1. A peaceful and principled resolution to the crisis on the North-South border, including Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile
2. Peaceful resolution of other outstanding separation issues that could lead to a resumption of North-South war, including border demarcation, oil wealth sharing, and citizenship status
3. An end to the crisis in Darfur and a comprehensive peace agreed to by all parties
4. Security for all people in the Republic of South Sudan, including protection from militia violence, and responsible and accountable Southern security services
5. Tangible and measurable steps toward democratic governance in the North and the South
6. Accountability for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide
The solutions suggested mainly involve ratcheting up pressure on the Khartoum, by removing “carrots” and brandishing new “sticks,” as well as helping Juba (the capital of South Sudan) stabilize its territory.
None of that is objectionable, as Khartoum has repeatedly demonstrated bad faith and Juba unquestionably needs help, but you’ve got to wonder whether it is going to work. The problem is that there are too many problems. Virtually none of those described here in January have been solved. When everything is a priority nothing is a priority.
In practice, the urgent prevails over the important. Khartoum is making the border issues urgent, perhaps even with a view to using them as an excuse not to recognize newly independent South Sudan when July 9 comes. It could get a lot worse if southerners start being expelled from around Khartoum, where several million took refuge during the civil war, or if the North cuts off export of the South’s oil. While a full-scale resumption of the civil war seems unlikely–the North has no intention of risking its army once again in the far reaches of the South–independence day may well not be peaceful.
What can be done about all this? Not a whole lot, if you think only military instruments will work. But UN-appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying diplomacy, with support from the Americans, Norwegians, British and other interested internationals. Khartoum seems determined: not to prevent the South’s independence, but to reassert its authority over territory in the North where there are southern sympathizers and to claim as much of Abyei, which produces oil, as possible. The South has been correctly focused on making independence as smooth as possible, though it seems to be having trouble ensuring that its troops and militias don’t provoke the North.
The agreement on Abyei is a positive development, as is South Sudan’s impending independence. But a lot of what is going on in Sudan today is confusing, and disturbing.
PS: A U.S. Institute of Peace paper argues for a more comprehensive, holistic approach focused on reform in the North. I’m afraid the North’s armed forces may be answering that appeal in Southern Kordofan. Not much room for reform when you are killing and displacing your own population.
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Assad is sane but not secure
The headline writers are suggesting that Syria’s Bashar al Assad has lost his mind, and others that his speech today at Damascus University betrays weakness, but I take him seriously. Bashar is determined to stay in power, offering ill-defined amnesty and national dialogue with 100 regime-picked reformers while cracking down on “vandals” and “saboteurs,” who he claims are part of a conspiracy ensconced among the street protesters. The result is regime murder on a scale that dwarfs what happened in Egypt and Yemen, though it is still far from Gaddafi’s homicidal intentions in Benghazi or his siege of Misrata and other Libyan towns.
While many are appalled at what is going on, the international community has so far done little to stop it. The military option is clearly out, not only because of Syria’s problematic topology but also because the Russians–offended by the NATO effort against Libya–are not going to allow a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the necessary means to pass. In fact, they haven’t allowed any resolution to pass, not even one that simply condemns the regime’s violence, because they are afraid of again sanctioning NATO action. They should relax: there is no stomach in Washington and European capitals for another military intervention.
Bashar’s vulnerabilities lie in two areas: arms and money. It appears he has all the weapons he requires, but the loyalty of a substantial portion of the army is in doubt. Its Alawi leadership will stick with the regime, because it has no alternative, but sporadic indications of dissent among the Sunni officers and rank and file offer some hope that the army has its limits. Look for it to show those limits in the provinces first, not in Damascus or Aleppo.
As for money, the Syrian economy is certainly on the ropes, but I imagine Iran will do its damndest to keep Bashar financially afloat. He is an important link to Lebanon’s Hizbollah, which is Iran’s surrogate on the front line with Israel. It is hard to believe that Tehran would let Bashar fall for lack of hard cash.
Tougher international sanctions targeted on the regime’s financial transfers might make some difference, as might a credible threat of an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment. The ICC though won’t be allowed into the country to collect evidence. It was able to move against Gaddafi only because the rebels welcomed the court into the Libyan territory they control. I hope however that the ICC investigators are interviewing refugees in Turkey and Lebanon.
Would a clear statement from President Obama calling for Bashar to step down make a difference? I think not, and it would put American credibility at risk. We are already taking a beating from Gaddafi’s persistence in power in Libya, as well as Saleh’s in Yemen. Better it seems to me to lean on the Turks, who have influence and have begun to pressure Bashar.
He is unlikely to leave easily or soon, though like any decision by a single person timing is unpredictable. It is clear however that the foundations of his regime are shaken. His promise of amending the constitution to allow a multiparty political system would spell the end of the Ba’athist autocracy. He may try to renege of course, but Syrians show no sign of willingness to accept restoration of the status quo ante. One way or the other, we are witnessing the end of the Assad regime.
PS: Andrew Sullivan quoted this piece at The Dish, apparently having picked it up from Al Jazeera English. Regulars read it here first!
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Afghanistan decision time, again
Douglas Ollivant at foreignpolicy.com is asking the right questions:
What are our national interests in Afghanistan? Which of those are vital?
How much are we willing to pay for them (money, blood, institutional focus)?
What other costs does our policy in Afghanistan incur (e.g., reduced leverage in Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan due to reliance on supply lines through their territory)?
What are the opportunity costs? How might our goals be accomplished in other ways?
Is our policy sustainable to some sort of completion?
And what — if anything — do we owe to the people of Afghanistan who have sided with the NATO effort?
None of these questions is about numbers of troops or about the timeline for withdrawal, which is what the press focuses most attention on. But the troop decision depends on the answers to these prior questions: what do you want them to do, how much will it cost (important to include the opportunity costs, as Ollivant does), and how long will it take?
The New York Times offers at least some insight into possible answers to the first question. If, as President Obama has said many times, our primary objective in Afghanistan is to rid it of al Qaeda, then the mission we need to continue is a counter-terrorism one (find them and kill them) that likely requires relatively few troops. Vice President Biden and a goodly number of members of Congress will line up on that side.
The problem is “gone today, back tomorrow.” If we leave Afghanistan a weak state unable to control its territory, there is every reason to think that al Qaeda will come back. That’s why there has long been a state-building, counter-insurgency component to the mission, though the President has never made it clear what end-state he is seeking to achieve when it comes to governance in Afghanistan. That’s not surprising considering the challenges, currently epitomized by failure of the country’s largest bank. But we could just as easily make reference to the country’s thriving drug trade and endemic corruption. If we stay, and if building the Afghan state is part of the mission, we are going to need to get more precise about what we are trying to accomplish.
Why should we care how Afghanistan is governed? The one-word answer is “Pakistan.” If al Qaeda or other extremists re-establish themselves in Afghanistan, there is every reason to expect them to attack Pakistan, an already fragile state with a large and growing nuclear arsenal. As Trudy Rubin explains in the Philadelphia Inquirer, this is a major reason for continuing the counter-insurgency and statebuilding effort in Afghanistan and presumably explains why outgoing Secretary of Defense Gates seems confident that the President will resist domestic political pressure to reduce troops rapidly.
None of this makes staying in Afghanistan look attractive. As the American ambassador has made clear, President Karzai’s harsh criticism of the American and NATO efforts in his country is taking a toll, as are the mounting costs of the war. I find it hard to fault people who would prefer to get out quickly (my wife has been on that side of the argument for a couple of years now), even if my brain tells me having to return to Afghanistan would be worse than staying.
The one thing I would ask is this: if we are going to stay to stabilize Afghanistan and build its state to the point that it can fight al Qaeda and other militants on its own, we need to be honest about how long it is going to take and how much it is going to cost. The projected date for turning over security in the whole country to the Afghans, 2014, is looking far too soon, even if Washington remains willing to pay Kabul’s security bills. I’ve seen something of “stabilization” in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and I’ve studied it elsewhere. My guess is that we’ll be there at least 10 more years in significant numbers if we want to get a half-decent job done. That’s another trillion dollars, more or less. Even among friends, that’s a lot of money, and a lot of other opportunities foregone.
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The lemonade gambit
Regular readers of www.peacefare.net will know that I don’t usually refer to Tom Friedman, who often strikes me as more facile and glib than profound. But his What To Do With Lemons in yesterday’s New York Times seems to me right on: there is going to have to be a UN General Assembly resolution on Palestine this fall, so why not make it one that says something useful and gets the peace process restarted?
His proposed resolution would read:
This body reaffirms that the area of historic Palestine should be divided into two homes for two peoples — a Palestinian Arab state and a Jewish state. The dividing line should be based on the 1967 borders — with mutually agreed border adjustments and security arrangements for both sides. This body recognizes the Palestinian state as a member of the General Assembly and urges both sides to enter into negotiations to resolve all the other outstanding issues.
Friedman suggests this be passed not in the General Assembly, where resolutions are like pre-season football games (sometimes well played but they don’t count in the standings), but instead in the Security Council.
What are the tradeoffs here? The Palestinians get General Assembly membership (Friedman’s wording on this point needs some work though) and reference to the 1967 borders as the basis for any adjustments as well as reference to security arrangements. Security is generally regarded as an “Israel” issue, but there are many ways in which it applies also to Palestine. Israel gets recognition as a Jewish state, something Friedman notes was mentioned explicitly in the original 1947 UN partition resolution.
I’d have some concern that the specific wording Friedman suggests could be abused by Jewish extremists, some of whom would like Arabs to leave Israel and go to the newly independent Palestine, but that could be fixed. New population displacement would be an unwelcome development.
More important: Friedman’s suggestion does nothing to guide resolution of two other critical questions: return of refugees and Jerusalem. I imagine he would say these issues should be resolved in the subsequent negotiations. But the temptation of the parties to want any new resolution to tilt in their favor will make it difficult to leave these issues out.
The important thing here is not the specific wording: it is the idea of getting a resolution, whether through the General Assembly or the Security Council, that makes a positive contribution. That would be far better than a one-sided resolution that isolates Israel and the United States in the General Assembly, or is vetoed by the United States in the Security Council.
Something similar was achieved last fall, when a Serbian demand for General Assembly resolution on Kosovo was turned into a generally acceptable appeal for Belgrade/Pristina talks on practical issues that are reportedly now close to reaching some modest conclusions. The Middle East diplomatic challenge is orders of magnitude greater, but the Friedman gambit–to turn lemons into lemonade–might still work.
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Zbogom Balkan
My discussion last night with stalwarts of the Foreign Policy Initiative in Sarajevo suggested one important elaboration on yesterday’s post–an implicit assumption that I should have made explicit. In addition, I’d like to discuss one or two additional options.
The assumption is this: my implicit goal is preservation of a single Bosnia governed democratically and consistent with the rule of law, with authority devolved to appropriate levels. Regular readers will understand that I have no interest in partitioning Bosnia or in making it a “unitary” state, i.e. one governed exclusively by a strong central government in Sarajevo. The options I outlined yesterday were aimed at that goal.
The additional option, perhaps more realistic than any I discussed yesterday, is a new deal, that is a bargain between President Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska (RS) and Zlatko Lagumdžija, who heads the Social Democratic Party that gained the largest number of votes in the last election. This is an odd couple, as Dodik has taken on a strong Serb nationalist tinge while Lagumdžija lays claim to being the secular champion of multiethnic Bosnia. They are the leading political forces in their respective strongholds. Why can’t they reach a deal?
Maybe they can, but only time and concerted pressure will make it happen. The RS is running out of money and concocting bizarre Chinese and Russian loans to fill the gap. The Federation (the Croat/Muslim entity that occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is also in fiscal trouble, but a newly formed government there claims to be cutting back. Lagumdžija insists on a government for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole that aims seriously for NATO and EU membership, which means a government with the authority to carry out the relevant responsibilities. Dodik resists. Some think an American as the High Representative in Bosnia (a position so far always held by a European) could help resolve this and other problems, which adds an option to the ones I outlined yesterday.
Dodik in particular will resist NATO membership, which I should also have mentioned as an option yesterday. It is generally believed in Bosnia, with good reason I think, that entrance into NATO will end any discussion of partition or other changes to Bosnia’s borders. Dodik of course understands this perfectly well and has pressed a maximalist position on RS’s claims to the defense property of the Bosnian state, thinking other political forces in the country will give in because resolution of the claims is a condition for Bosnia to begin the NATO membership process. The maximalist defense property claims would also help to stoke, though not fill, RS’s treasury.
The political stalemate in Bosnia, which has already lasted eight months, can go on a while longer. It is leaving my Foreign Policy Initiative audience, which was multiethnic but secularist, extremely frustrated, some even verbally ready to go for the war option (and others declaring that they’ll get out quickly if war returns). I’ve found the Islamist Bosniaks (Muslims) far less irritated. They believe time is on their side and that in due course Serbia and RS will give up on their partitionist intentions. While some rail against Dodik, they don’t really think a solution is near.
I hope they are wrong. My own impatience is born of the feeling that this is a dangerous neighborhood in which to allow issues to fester. Not to mention that there are a lot of other things to do in the world besides worry about Bosnia’s decades-old post-Communist conflicts.
I’ll be traveling tomorrow and likely not posting. Sunday I’ll try to turn my attention to the Arab spring, which is lingering far too long, and to Afghanistan, which threatens never to go away. Then later next week I’ll have a multi-part (and multi-day) post on the prospects for democracy in Iraq, where at least something has changed over the past eight years.
The Balkans notoriously produces more history than it can consume, and less future than it needs. This two-week interlude has been great, but it is time to bid Zbogom Balkan and turn to America’s higher priority issues.
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