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Bosnia options

I think of myself not as an optimist or pessimist, but as a realist, albeit an occasionally imaginative (hopefully not delusionary) one.  What does that mean in Bosnia and Herzegovina today?

I am finding wide agreement among the internationals on at least one thing:  the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, should be taken seriously when he advocates maximum autonomy for his Serb entity, with a view to gaining independence.  Where they differ is on the remedy:  some think none is needed, since the day when independence is possible will never arrive, while others think it necessary to react, one way or the other, to his threats.

Ignoring Dodik is certainly one option.  Those who advocate doing so think it was a mistake for the European Union’s High Representative, Catherine Ashton, to cut a deal with Dodik to postpone his proposed referendum on the role of the international community in enforcing the Dayton agreements and on the Bosnian judicial system.  They think it would also have been a mistake for the international community to annul the referendum law, which was the intention before Ashton cut her deal.  The EU and US might have done better, some would argue, just to ignore the referendum, thus minimizing its political significance.

Another option would be to challenge Dodik when he crosses well-defined red lines. One clear red line is independence for RS, or anything that leads irreversibly in that direction.  Neither Europe nor the U.S.–not even Serbia–would allow a referendum on independence, and the other High Representative (Valentin Inzko, who represents not only the U.S. and EU but also the Russians, Turks and other members of the international community) was poised to cancel Dodik’s proposed referendum on grounds that it would have led irreversibly in the direction of independence.  Had Ashton not acted, Inzko would have.

What else can be done?

Some argue in favor of an early Bosnian application for EU membership. This they say would put Bosnia into a process that will require it to have a more functional central government and reduce the temptation of the EU to do what Ashton did, i.e. deal directly with Republika Srpska. It will also reduce the significance of Dodik’s independence talk and force him to deal with the central government, which will be responsible for most of the reforms EU membership requires.

It can also be argued that the right response to Dodik’s campaign for maximum autonomy for the RS is maximum effort in the Federation (the other 51% of Bosnia) to become more functional and effective. This would set up a competition between the two halves of the country and accelerate progress to towards the EU, as well as convergence between the two administrations, which will have to meet the same EU requirements.  Given the current difficulty of forming a government–Bosnia has been unable to do so since elections eight months ago–this to some is an appealing way of turning the current situation to advantage.

Another possibility is a referendum in all of Bosnia on whether its population wants a government that can fulfill the requirements of EU membership. This would answer the question many people pose:  do Bosnians want to live in the same state?  Dodik has made a lot of political hay among Serbs with his referendum proposals.  But there is no reason why the fate of Bosnia should be decided exclusively in the RS, with only one quarter the country’s population voting.  A referendum in the whole country would likely pass handily and end Dodik’s referendum bravado.

Some would like to see a new Dayton conference. While in the past the people who advocated this were mainly those who wanted to partition Bosnia along ethnic lines, today some of those who would like to hold it together believe that a new grand bargain is necessary.  Dayton has become in Dodik’s hands an instrument for maximizing RS autonomy.  Some of those who would prefer a stronger central government think that they could get more of what they want from a renegotiated agreement.

If Dodik goes ahead with his referendum at some point, the country’s majority could react in several ways. What if a million Bosnians walked into the RS and sat down in polling places?  What if the constitutional court intervened?  What if the EU and U.S. pulled their ambassadors and levied sanctions against Dodik and his close advisors?

And finally:  there is the war option. Let me be clear about this:  I am not advocating it, just posing it as one among a number of other possibilities.  Among those who fought for a single Bosnia in the 1992-95 war, there are at least some who took their guns home with them and would be prepared to fight again if the unity of the country were threatened.

The only scenario for this I can realistically imagine is a lightening quick Muslim lunge for Brcko, the linchpin of the two parts of RS that lies only a short distance from Federation territory.  Once split, the western portion of RS (where Banja Luka lies) would fall quickly.  Eastern Bosnia, where the terrain is difficult and the population heavily Serb since the war, would likely require negotiation.

It is admittedly difficult to imagine this last option in a Sarajevo bathed in sunshine and teeming with Bosnians eating ice cream and drinking the many different types of coffee that remain as a symbol of the country’s one-time role as a crossroads of civilizations.  Who would want to give up a job in one of the five (yes, count them:  district, municipal, cantonal, entity and central) governments headquartered here for a bug-challenged tromp through the mountains and across the Posavina corridor?

The answer is someone feeling threatened by ethnic nationalist rhetoric and other reminders of a war that took about 100,000 lives and close to four years of depradations of the civilian population.  Or maybe someone in the Muslim community feeling as emboldened as Milorad Dodik, as he plunks for maximum autonomy, challenging and manipulating the Americans and Europeans into partitioning Bosnia.

I know too well that America has many problems that come before Bosnia in the current hierarchy of priorities.  But let’s be clear:  a radicalized Islamic state in central Bosnia would be no more welcome today than 15 years ago.  There are lots of options.  Bosnians and Europeans should tend to the problem before the Americans feel they need to.

Too clever by half

As I have been attending a conference in Sarajevo for the past two days, it is more than time that I write about Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that is physically and economically recovering from war but still bears deep psychological and political scars.

The good news is not hard to find:  the old market of Baščaršija, the rebuilt Europe hotel, the shiny facade of the reconstructed parliament building, the public parks where cemeteries used to be–wherever you look there are signs of recovery in this beautiful city, surrounded by mountains and dotted with minarets (and more sparsely with churches).  There are still a few buildings showing the scars of war, but I can now jog down the tree-shaded walks along Miljacka river through what used to be the confrontation zone into Grbavica, the close-in neighborhood from which snipers attacked civilians walking in the main drag (“sniper’s alley”) from 1992 to 1995.

The population is more Muslim than before the war.  The Croat neighborhood of Stup near the airport never recovered.  The Catholic cathedral and the Serb churches are preserved and restored, but there are fewer Catholics and Serbs to attend them.  A few habit-wearing nuns cross paths in the street with women wearing the hijab.  Eighty per cent of the Muslims are believed to imbibe alcohol, according to one of the owners of a local brewery.  The signs for Sarajevska pivo hang next to mosques, but one shopping center refuses to allow alcohol to be served on the premises.  The call to prayer is audible during the day, but I think they must be suppressing it at night, as I am not awakened.  Sarajevo is still a melange, but with more Islamic content than before the war.

That is not the way the story is told in Banja Luka, the capital of the Serb 49% of the territory of Bosnia.  There the President does his best to stoke fears of Muslim revanchism.  The Muslims unquestionably have a lot to seek revenge for, but so too do Croats and Serbs.  Everyone suffered during the war, albeit not equally, as demonstrated in the extraordinary work of the Scholars’ Initiative. The politics of Bosnia is largely built on that suffering, with leaders of each ethnic group rallying its minions with promises to protect them from the depredations of the others.

A significant number of people in Sarajevo will tell you that things were better during wartime, because relations among people were better.  This may seem surprising, but Chris Hedges long ago noted that “war is a force that gives us meaning.” Broader purpose is now lacking–people have lots of things to live for, but little to die for.  One Bosnian wag, seeing the post-war flag designed by the international community for Bosnia because the Bosnians couldn’t agree on one, noted that at least no one would die for it (or be motivated to do so).  Sarajevans–Muslims, Serbs and Croats–found meaning in the siege of their city that is lacking today.

There is still a multiethnic strand to Bosnian politics, for the moment led mainly by the Social Democratic party (SDP) of Zlatko Lagumdžija, who did well in elections eight months ago but has been unable to form a government, due to resistance from Croat and Serb ethnic nationalist parties who did well enough to block formation of an effective majority in parliament.  With difficulty, the SDP has managed to lead formation of a government in the Croat/Muslim 51% of Bosnia (known as the Federation), but the real bargaining over a national (the Bosnians call it the “state,” because “national” refers to what we call ethnicities) government has not even begun.  Eight months is a long time to rely on a caretaker government, and the situation may last until towards the end of 2011, when the lack of a state budget would presumably force some kind of action.

In the meanwhile, the President of Republika Srpska (that’s the 49%) is doing everything he can to demonstrate that his “entity” functions and the “state” government does not.  In a maneuver that shamed the European Union, he managed to get Lady Ashton–the Union’s foreign secretary–to visit him in Banja Luka last month and agree to a discussion of the state justice system, about which he has complaints.  Rather than telling him to take his complaints to Sarajevo, the Brussels bureaucrats set up a “structured dialogue” without consulting the state government, and only due to pressure from the Americans and others were representatives of its justice system present for the opening session of the talks.

This is part of a more general strategy:  Milorad Dodik, the president of RS, is trying to put in place all the prerequisites for independence, without actually triggering the move until the time is ripe (the approach is analogous to a successful effort on the part of Montenegro).  Accordingly, he will try to get Brussels to negotiate application of the acquis communitaire, the 80,000 pages of EU rules and regulations that members need to follow, directly with the RS.  It is unclear whether the Eurocrats will fall victim to this ploy.

It is a clever maneuver whose ultimate result would be too clever by half.  If Bosnia is ever partitioned, as Dodik would no doubt like, it will not be in two pieces but in three (the Croats will want their share) and it is unlikely to be peaceful.  The bottom line would be a non-viable Islamic republic in central Bosnia that would necessarily look to either Tehran or Riyadh for support.  If I were Serbian or Croatian, I wouldn’t want that on my border.

In the meanwhile, Dodik and his RS are resisting even communicating with Sarajevo.  They are not present at the conference I am attending, despite many invitations and a good deal of sincere cajoling.  Coming would be inconsistent with their objective of maximizing autonomy in preparation for independence.  And why should they come to the Americans when the EU is willing to come to them? Better to have a dialogue with the EU in Banja Luka rather than one with Americans in Sarajevo.

Phil Gordon, the State Department assistant secretary for Europe, spoke to the conference yesterday.  He was good:  clear signals in favor of Bosnian government formation and reform, with a view to creating a more functional government and gaining candidacy for membership in the EU.  But his appeal was explicitly to politicians who want the best for the country as a whole.  That is definitely not what Dodik is looking for.  He is looking to protect Serbs on territory that they govern separately from the rest of Bosnia.  State Department is going to need to find a better way of convincing him to move in the right direction.  The road to Sarajevo still winds through Belgrade.

No Belgrade, but here is what I would say

Here is an interview I’ve done for Snezana Congradin and Matja Stojanovic, published by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade (also in Serbian).  I won’t be going there on my current trip to the Balkans, but here is what I would say if I did have the pleasure of walking on Knez Mihailova:

1. In your opinion, the EU should not help Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party win the next elections, due soon. You also said that the EU should take a firmer stance, continue its policy of conditionality and insist on meeting the criteria, no matter who ruled in Serbia. Does this mean that the policies of the current President Boris Tadic and his party do not make much of a difference, compared to other Serbian parties?

DPS:  No, not at all. That is an erroneous conclusion. Tadic and the Democratic Party are clearly making a big effort to qualify Serbia for the EU as quickly as possible. I doubt any other party would do as well. But the bar should not be lowered for them—if you want to join a club, you need to qualify.

2. What is the reputation of President Boris Tadic in the international community? One can hear conflicting views. One the one hand, for example, the international community is praising the arrest and transfer of Ratko Mladic to the Hague, while pointing out, on the other, that Serbia has been hiding the fugitive, for almost a decade. And most of that time, Boris Tadic held top positions in the government, or ruled as The President of The State (seven years of that time, now).

DPS:  You’ve described the international community’s ambivalence well. President Tadic is greatly appreciated in the international community not only for the arrest of Mladic but for the clarity with which he has pursued democracy and EU membership. But at the same time he appears not to been fully effective at countering nationalist forces within Serbia that protected Mladic (and others) and continue to pursue territorial ambitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo. His failure to turn up at the recent regional meeting in Poland—because the president of Kosovo was going to be there and treated equally—will have disappointed many of his fans in Europe and the U.S.

3. Messages that the government of Kosovo has been sending to it’s Serb community are similiar to those addressed by the central government in BiH to the citizens of RS – that, respectively, Pristina and Sarajevo should be perceived as their capital cities. Are those special links that are being kept between Belgrade and Banja Luka, as well as the demands for division of Kosovo, showing that Serbia still has territorial claims towards RS and the north of Kosovo? What do You think, is the Greater Serbia project dead? If not, is it implemented in any way by Boris Tadic too?

DPS:  The Greater Serbia project is not dead, but it is pursued now by peaceful means in both Bosnia and Kosovo—that makes a big difference. The problem with Belgrade’s links to Banja Luka and to northern Kosovo are that they are chains holding Serbia back from the EU (even if some of the connections are legitimate and should be preserved). Serbia has to be liberated from those attachments that are illegitimate in order to become a serious EU candidate. You should ask President Tadic how he feels about that. I wouldn’t want to speak for him.

4. You have said that Serbia will have to recognize Kosovo’s independence once it gets to the point of entering the EU, and that it should unambiguously prepare it’s citizens for that fact. Is that recognition possible before the genuine reconciliation between the two sides, that would have to include Serbia expressing regret for the ethnic cleansing, expulsions and the most serious crimes (that all led to Kosovo declaring independence)?

DPS:  I think recognition is possible any day Belgrade wants to do it. I would not want to make apologies a precondition, much as I would like to see Serbia acknowledge unequivocally the ethnic cleansing, expulsions and crimes. I would also like to see Kosovo take responsibility for crimes committed on its side of the war.

Even before formal diplomatic recognition, I would like to see Serbia acknowledge that the authorities in Pristina are the legitimate, democratically selected government, no matter what Kosovo’s status. This is already implicit in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. I’d like to see it made more explicit in a meeting between the two presidents.

5. Do You think that the international community must have been aware that Serbia would impose the idea of divison of Kosovo between the two sides, at the very begining of the dialogue?

DPS:  Yes, it has been clear for a long time that Serbia was seeking partition of Kosovo, but it cannot impose that idea. It can only ask. The Pristina authorities will say “no,” because they have no way of preventing partition of Kosovo from raising irredentist expectations in Presevo, Macedonia and Bosnia.

6. Albin Kurti, Kosovar opposition party leader recently said that the option that Kosovo will, one day, unite with Albania is not ruled out and that the issue should, in that case, be resolved on a referendum. At the same time there are voices that there should be a referendum in RS, too. Could that mean that, in the end, the old ideas of the Greater Albania and the Greater Serbia would help resolve the Balkans issue?

DPS:  I don’t think so. These are ideas whose time will never come. I am virtually certain that a referendum in all of Bosnia on whether that country should remain united and become a member of the European Union would win. There is no reason a decision on an issue of that sort would be made only in RS. Likewise I am virtually certain that a referendum in Albania and in Kosovo on whether the two states should unite and move their capital to Pristina (the historically correct capital for Greater Albania), giving up hopes to enter the European Union, would lose. Those are the real choices:  Bosnians get into the European Union only if they remain in a single country; Albanians get into the European Union only if they remain in two separate countries.

7. So far, the international community did not send a clear public message to Ivica Dacic, Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, that divison of Kosovo is an impossible solution. What do You think, why is that so?

DPS:  You’ll have to ask those who fail to send the message, but I can imagine there are some in the international community who don’t understand the perils of Kosovo partition, just as Dacic doesn’t appear to understand that whatever Serbia gets in northern Kosovo, the Kosovars will expect to get the equivalent in southern Serbia. Is he prepared to make that deal?

8. You have criticized Catherine Ashton for making a deal with Milorad Dodik, that postponed (not cancelled) the referendum in RS. Why does the EU not take more decisive steps in resolving problems in Bosnia, or even impose sanctions on RS President?

DPS:  Again, you’ll have to ask those responsible. I think too many Europeans think they can “manage” Dodik. More likely, he will manage them. He is a smart and wily politician who sees his future secured in a Republika Srpska that is at the very least entirely autonomous, if not independent.

9. Boris Tadic’s BiH policy could be seen as double-faced and hypocritical. At the same, we don’t hear any of the officials from the international community criticize Tadic publicly about it. What do you think why is that, and what is, in your opinion, the ultimate goal of Boris Tadic’s policy towards Bosnia?

DPS:  You’ve got to ask the President that question. It seems to me what Serbia is doing is advocating “One Bosnia,” but it is a Dayton Bosnia they want that cannot qualify for EU membership. I’d like to see a Bosnia that can qualify for EU membership, which means amending the Dayton constitution.

10. What do You think, to what extent is Dodik independent from the Serbian Government, when decision making is concerned? How far is his government from being practically the Serbian Government’s division?

DPS:  I think he has a fairly wide margin of freedom to govern as he sees fit inside Bosnia, but Serbia will stop him short of declaring RS independent because that would put Belgrade in an impossible position: recognize Banja Luka and give up hope for EU membership or not recognize and lose political support inside Serbia.

11. Do You find interlocutors in Belgrade, when people from the government structures are concerned, and why is that while You are about to visit Pristina and Sarajevo, You will not come to Belgrade, too?

DPS:  The honest answer is that I’ve been invited to Pristina and Sarajevo and not to Belgrade, where I have a lot of friends both inside and outside the government. I had hoped to stop there as well, but it will have to be on another occasion.

I hope it is well remembered in Serbia that I was an early and vocal supporter of Otpor, Cesid and the nonviolent rebellion against Milosevic—so much so that three deputy prime ministers of Serbia went on RTS one night during the evening news to claim that they had uncovered a top secret CIA plot to overthrow Milosevic. The paper they brandished turned out to be public testimony I had given in Congress weeks earlier, which they had downloaded from the internet.

No one should mistake honest differences on issues for lack of rapport and friendship. Serbia has made great progress these last 10 years. I hope to see it make a lot more in the next 10 years, but for that I believe Belgrade will have to establish “good neighborly relations” with Kosovo and make sure Bosnia stays a single country on track for EU membership. Neither will be easy, but both are necessary for Serbia to become an EU member.