Month: June 2011

The EU prepares for a worthy new member

This evening I got a note from HINA, the Croatian press agency, declaring me “the best US expert for the Balkan,” so it was hard to resist responding quickly to their request for a comment on the completion of Croatia’s negotiations for membership in the EU. This is what I said:

This is a great moment for Croatia and for the region.  It demonstrates that the promise of European Union membership can become a reality, provided the Balkan states make a concerted effort, as Croatia has done, to meet the tough EU requirements.  Washington will be delighted that Croatia is finding its proper home in Europe and will want to use this achievement to encourage others to make the same kind of effort.  My congratulations both the Croatian officials directly involved and to the people of Croatia, for whom this is a historic moment!

There is however a bit more to say.

Things get harder as you move south through the Balkans. Bosnia cannot become an EU member with its current constitution, which creates a dysfunctional set of governments, especially at the Sarajevo level (where by the way I am headed tomorrow). Serbia, while constitutionally better equipped, is slowing its progress towards the EU by continuing to harbor one last indicted war criminal and dragging its feet in talks with Kosovo intended to solve a few of the practical problems remaining between the antagonists. Serbia will also have to establish “good neighborly relations” with Kosovo before it can join the EU. Kosovo, which has only been independent for three years, lags substantially behind Serbia, while Macedonia is stalled by a dispute with Greece over its name, which Athens claims as its own. Montenegro, bless its small but exceptional heart, is moving rather more expeditiously than the rest.

So the Balkans are in no danger of becoming entirely European before your next vacation. If you want to visit the funkier version, I’d say you still have at least a decade, especially in the more southern reaches (though you’ll already be able to use euros in Kosovo and a euro-pegged “convertible mark” in Bosnia).

I hasten to add that even America’s best Balkan expert would not have predicted Croatia on the threshold of joining the EU as early as 2011. It still has a way to go–27 member states will have to ratify Zagreb’s accession treaty. There can be accidents and delays along the way, especially in this era of euro-skepticism and enlargement fatigue. But never mind, for today the Croatians are correct to celebrate, and my hat is off to them!

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Pleasant surprises but no firm conclusions

So I’ve returned to Pristina after an absence of eight years.  What have I found?  Let me say up front:  not much, as I’ve been here for two days.  But I’ll offer at least my initial impressions, based on a dozen or so conversations.  I’ll reserve the right to revise once I’ve heard a good deal more.

The variable weather–one moment pouring rain, the next moment pouring sunshine–has kept me wary.  Kosovo when I last visited had a government:  there were ministers, ministries, directors general and the rest.  But there was little of what I would call a state:  that is, a set of institutions that could be relied upon to maintain some reasonable level of continuity and objectivity regardless of who was elected.  More than one reader has assured me that I wouldn’t find the situation much improved.

I haven’t of course been able to test the services the state provides to ordinary citizens, other than to walk briefly in the main street and enjoy its conversion to a pedestrian mall. Mobbed with young people enjoying intervals between rainstorms, the atmosphere is certainly upbeat among those who can afford to enjoy a coffee in one of the many cafes that line Pristina’s main “Mother Teresa” drag.

I spent the day yesterday mainly in the foreign ministry.  The people I dealt with there–admittedly among the best–would measure up as intelligent and well-trained professionals in the State Department or elsewhere.  They have studied the issues we were discussing carefully and have prepared comprehensive dossiers that were informative, objective and up to date.  This was a great leap forward from eight years ago, when there was a kind of necessary conformity to government policy that shaped every conversation and prevented the preparation of honest assessments.

I also had the opportunity to meet with some of the political leadership in the state and government.  I first entered what is today the President’s office in 1998, when I called on the Serbian administrators of the then-province of Kosovo.  I had just come from the Council for Human Rights and Freedoms, only a hundred meters or so away, where I had seen careful and extensive documentation of the abuses committed by the Serbian security forces.  The authorities of the time denied there were any abuses and declined to join me in a visit to the Council.

I later visited Bernard Kouchner and Hans Haekkerup (UN mission chiefs) in 2000 and 2001 in that same room, as they struggled to try to administer post-war Kosovo, removed from Serbian administration by UN Security Council resolution 1244 after the NATO/Yugoslavia war.  Theirs was a difficult role, which they played with whatever skills and resources could be mustered in a thoroughly broken society only recently traumatized by war.

Today that same room is a lot brighter and cheerier, not only because of the redecorating.  The soft-spoken President Atifete Jahjaga joined the post-war Kosovo police in an effort to reverse the abuses of power that she had witnessed under the Serbian administration.  Determined she says to protect and serve, she was one of the few women to break with the practice of male dominance in the security forces.

Whatever your stand on the status of Kosovo, it is important to recognize that her elevation to president represents a real break with the past.  She is a non-politician whose candidacy it is said was favored by the American Ambassador.  Elected by a wide margin in parliament in the aftermath of a Supreme Court decision that invalidated on procedural grounds the narrow victory of a more traditional politician, she is trying hard to project an image of stability and inclusivity.

On the basis of a couple of other meetings with ministers, it is appears that the government gives unequivocal verbal priority to law and order, perhaps because it faces investigations and accusations that are embarrassing and potentially damning.  This situation is made doubly difficult by the requirement to cooperate with the very international officials who are at the same time investigating the government.  But everyone says they are ready to cooperate and see the investigations run their course.

The view from the government’s critics is harsher.  Some of them feel strongly that little is done about serious corruption allegations against high Kosovo government officials, whose claims to probity they view as less than truthful or sincere.  Yes, there are corruption investigations, but they are selective and not sweeping.  Too many allegations go uninvestigated.

I don’t envy the internationals who are still here trying to help Kosovo’s institutions build their capacity to act effectively.  At a certain point only locals with democratic legitimacy can really govern effectively, or deal decisively with organized crime.  The Kosovo authorities will err–the recent decision to raise salaries in defiance of the IMF will be counted as a blunder by many–but when it comes to learning there really is no substitute for making your own mistakes.  At least in the case of the IMF, those who made the decision will now need to fill the budget hole that they themselves created.

So I admit that I may regret tomorrow what I’ve written today, as I learn more about the realities of life and government today in Kosovo.  But if so I’ll try to admit that honestly.  For today, I am happy to have found some pleasant surprises, including the strong dissent of the government’s critics, which makes any firm judgment on the merits of its law and order stance premature.

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A star in my firmament wobbles

In a report out Monday, International Crisis Group calls for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, deployment of peacekeepers and negotiations with Muammar Gaddafi, rather than continuation of the current NATO-led military effort against regime.  Is this wise, or not?

First I should note that the bulk of the report is a first-rate history and analysis of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Gaddafi’s nominally unique “republic of the masses” that in the final analysis operated like other totalitarian regimes.  This analytical part of the report covers the complex institutional setup of the Libyan quasi-state, the main pillars of regime support as well as the opposition, tribes, minorities, the evolution of the popular protests, the Interim National Transitional Council (even critics of the INTC in the east) and other background that I haven’t seen elsewhere.  Even if I might quibble here and there, it is interesting, revealing, well-documented and well-written:  all the things we have come to expect of ICG.

But I have come to expect something else as well from ICG:  policy recommendations that are ill-crafted, only tenuously related to the careful analysis and all too often fundamentally flawed, with an obvious overoptimism about the prospects for negotiated solutions.  This report is a textbook example.

Basically what ICG argues is this:  continuation of the military effort means more civilian casualties, the UN authorized NATO only to protect civilians, ergo it should stop the military effort and begin to negotiate, thereby reducing civilian casualties.  ICG then elaborates a two-phase ceasefire (first a truce then a cessation of hostilities), deployment of peacekeepers, a negotiated exit of Gaddafi and his sons from power that entails guarantees they will not be pursued by the International Criminal Court, and construction of a new Libyan state based on the rule of law that ensures political representation and pluralism.

But this is a false and misleading logic that compares the current situation with an imaginary, even delusional, future in which civilians are protected even though Gaddafi is still in place and his accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity made inoperable.  Wishing won’t make it so.  The idea that Gaddafi is going to play a “constructive role” in the short term, in exchange for relief from accountability for himself and his family is thoroughly delusional, even if the International Criminal Court were willing or able to follow ICG’s unlikely prescription for how to make it happen.  Then there is some brief generic blah-blah about an interim executive that includes Gaddafites as well as the INTC.

There are many other things wrong with this four-page policy addendum to what otherwise is an interesting 40-odd page report.  Where are the peacekeepers going to come from?  Where would they be deployed and with what mandate?  Why do we think that would be acceptable to the INTC or to the Libyan people?  How would they prevent Gaddafi from brutalizing the people who live in the areas he controls?

Most of this policy addendum is just light-headed froth.  ICG is wedded to a formula for negotiation that doesn’t take into account the real situation ICG describes in its own report, a failing that plagues other recent ICG products as well.  Sad to see this star of my firmament wobble so.

 

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Half a Big Mac is not a smorgasbord

Jerry Gallucci over at Transconflict says Serbia is offering Kosovo a smorgasbord of possible solutions to the status question.  Looks more like half a Big Mac to me.  Not something I’d be interested in.

Anyone who thinks the European Union will accept Serbia as a member without settling the issue of Kosovo status, as Gallucci suggests, is living in a different reality from mine.   That would require twenty-two European states that have recognized Kosovo as sovereign to go mad, suffer amnesia or more likely brain damage.  Even if twenty-one of them did, the Dutch can be relied upon stay sane, remember and insist, as they did with the arrest and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic.  Several EU members have already stated that settling Kosovo’s status will be a precondition, and those that haven’t will rely on the EU requirement of “good neighborly relations” to make the same point.

Gallucci’s smorgasbord consists of one basic idea:  Serbia retaining control of northern Kosovo.  To agree to that, Pristina would have to gain control of the Albanian-majority areas of southern Serbia.  After all, Kosovo has its political pressures, too, including from the Self-Determination movement Gallucci mentions.  And Serbia would have to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity before any territorial exchange, since Kosovo could only engage in such an act as a sovereign.

In the unlikely event such an agreement could be reached, Pristina and Belgrade would then have to figure out how to guarantee  that it would not destabilize Bosnia and Macedonia.  This would be particularly important for Belgrade, since instability could of course spread from Bosnia to Sandjak, a part of Serbia in which many Muslims (they call themselves “Bosniaks”) live.

Gallucci wonders why ethnic states are such a bad thing.  They aren’t.  The problem is that forming them often entails a process known as violent conflict.  It did in the 19th century, it did in the 20th and it would in the 21st.  It’s admittedly difficult, but best to avoid war whenever possible.  And fighting, or even quarreling, over half a Big Mac would just be ridiculous.

It is time for Belgrade to accept reality.  Kosovo Serbs as well as the Serbian religious institutions in Kosovo can and should be treated properly.  Putting forward a smorgasbord of ideas on how to satisfy those requirements would be a good idea.  A one-way partition of Kosovo is not.

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Where are the patriots?

If nothing else, these weeks of protest and repression are demonstrating how tenaciously autocrats cling to power. This is not surprising, since for the three currently in question–Gaddafi, Assad and Saleh–there really is no role for them if they leave power. Worse, they fear for their livelihoods, their families and their lives.

This occurs to me as I am in Ljubljana (Slovenia) for meetings, one of which will be with a former president. As is all too apparent in the U.S., former presidents play useful roles in democratic societies, whether in talking with the North Koreans (or me), raising support for earthquake-ravaged Haiti, or just as living examples of the possibility of losing power without losing your life. The U.S. even pays and protects them well, as I imagine Slovenia does too.

The problem with our Middle Eastern chiefs of state is of course that they did things during their time in power that might merit justice once they are out of it and available to the courts. Saleh was offered immunity but refused to sign the agreement that would have provided it. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has already asked for an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. It is hard to see how Assad is less criminal, though he may have succeeded in preventing much hard evidence getting into the hands of the ICC.

So what we’ve got is four–I’d like to throw in ICC indictee President Bashir of Sudan as well–blatantly criminal chiefs of state (or the equivalent, since Gaddafi claims not to have any official position in what he terms the “republic of the masses”). Military force isn’t yet working against Gaddafi, sanctions aren’t working against Bashir, and protests aren’t working against Assad. Only Saleh seems out of the picture, and that because of an artillery strike that was luckier than the many missiles thrown at Gaddafi.

We shouldn’t expect much better from these four. What I’m waiting for is someone in their respective entourages to take up the cudgels (admittedly something like that has happened in Yemen). All four seem determined not only to stay in power but to take their countries down with them. That’s what should embolden some of their followers: loyalty to their own country and people. Is that too much to ask?

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How do you say serendipity in Arabic?

Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh has gone to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, due to injuries suffered Friday in an attack by rebellious tribal forces on the presidential palace. This is an extraordinary bit of good luck for Yemen, but the country will need a lot more serendipity if this story is to end well.

Vice President Abd Al-Rab Mansur Hadi, in office since 1994, is the constitutional successor. Who knows what he will do, but the right thing is to implement the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  agreement that Saleh never signed. It calls for an opposition-led government of national unity to prepare free and fair elections. If the attack on the palace leads in this direction, without further violence, we can all thank our lucky stars (and the Saudi princes who fund Yemeni bigwigs).

What could go wrong? Just about everything: tribes or the protesters could refuse to go along, someone in the military could try to seize power, Saleh’s family and cronies could balk, the Vice President could decide to crack down hard on the protesters, the Saudis could decide to back someone else, Saleh could try to return to Yemen…my imagination runs amuck. Yemen is one of the most fragile states on earth, more like neighboring Somalia than like the GCC rich guys who live on the other side of the Arabian peninsula. Its oil and water are running low, the population is very poor and very young, it faces an insurgency in the north and a secessionist movement in the south, and its institutions are weak enough to attract Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to take up residence.

That abused word, stability, is what Yemen needs now. A constitutional succession that follows the path outlined by the GCC is likely to be the best deal on offer.  Anything else bodes ill not only for Yemenis but also for the United States. Can we get lucky again?

PS: I took down the video originally posted with this, because it was starting up automatically.

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