Still another Balkans interview?
I did this one for Dejan Kozul of the Croatian weekly Novosti:
Q. You have been in Kosovo. Can you describe general feeling after latest problems in north Kosovo?
A. I was in Kosovo late last week, over the weekend in north Mitrovica, and in Pristina again Monday-Wednesday. People in the north are frightened of Pristina and resentful of what they consider abandonment by Belgrade. People in Pristina are so far satisfied with the results of their initiative at the border but anxious to establish permanently Kosovo’s customs and police authority there.
Q. Serbian press writes about autonomy for north Kosovo but on the other side Serbian officials deny that they discussed it. Do you think that this might be proper solution?
A. A very wide measure of self-governance is provided for the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan. That is still on offer. I imagine there might also be implementation agreements that would meet legitimate concerns of the Serbs in northern Kosovo. But anyone who imagines that northern Kosovo will be allowed to develop into the kind of autonomy that Republika Srpska is claiming in Bosnia is kidding themselves. It isn’t going to happen because Pristina, the EU and the U.S. will not want it.
Q. Can you compare the situation in Kosovo with the situation in Croatia during the nineties where autonomy was also solution for Croatian Serbs but in the end Milan Martic and authorities in Krajina refused it? Could it be compared at all (Krajina was not part of Serbia but Kosovo was)?
A. I think there is some analogy. But the kind of very wide autonomy that Milan Martic refused is not being offered and would not be acceptable to Pristina. Reintegration with self-governance is what is being offered, and it is not a bad deal if implemented correctly.
Q. When we speak about Croatia it is well known that Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor is supposed to visit Pristina. What are the reasons for this invitation and do you think that this is the right time for it?
A. I think it natural that the Prime Minister of Croatia visit Kosovo, which after all is a neighbor, even if not an immediate one. And certainly there is a good deal Croatia can now do to help Kosovo prepare for EU membership. Neither Serbia nor Croatian Serbs should regard a visit of this sort as anything more than routine.
Q. Two customs stamps, a Serbian and a Kosovo Albanian one, are mentioned as one of the possible solutions for stamp problems. Do you think that this might be good solution for beginning and is this problem taken too seriously? There are much bigger problems in Kosovo then the stamp question but it is used as a cause.
A. There are many solutions for the customs stamps, if there is good political will. We’ll have to wait until September when the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue reconvenes to see if that exists. It is important in my way of thinking that Belgrade accept the fact that the Kosovo government is the legitimate authority in all of Kosovo, even if Belgrade still refuses to accept its independence. What is needed in northern Kosovo is cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina to end a lucrative smuggling trade that is financing organized crime on both sides of the boundary/border.
Q. Ivica Dacic few months ago was the first Serbian official who mentioned that splitting Kosovo is the only solution. Do you think that this might be the official Serbian policy? What implications would there be?
A. Serbia denies this is the official position, but it seems clear to me it is what Belgrade wants. Even if you think it might solve one problem, however, it would reopen five or six other problems in the Balkans. Neither Serbia nor Kosovo can afford today to be a source of such instability. The Serb-majoirty communities in northern Kosovo have been offered a good deal under Ahtisaari. They should appreciate it and start negotiating about implementation issues.
Q. Recently, in Macedonia you mentioned that this is the era of reintegration. For something like that Serbia has to change its constitution and admit Kosovo’s independence. Under what condition do you think this might be possible?
A. That’s for Belgrade to figure out: they painted themselves into a corner with a constitution that they claim passed even though the requirement for 50 per cent of registered voters to vote was not met. It would be no easier for Pristina to change its constitution to allow the north to leave Kosovo, a proposition that clearly violates UN Security Council resolution 1244, which Belgrade refers to so often. It will not be easy to change the constitution, but it will, so far as I understand, be necessary before Belgrade can enter the EU.
Q. Do you think that referendum about Kosovo or EU might be solution?
A. That’s for Belgrade to decide. It is a possible solution, but not the only one.
Q. How do you see regional scene? The EU has so many problems. Do you think that Brussels has the will and strength to help the Western Balkans avoid more confrontations and to lead the region to EU membership?
A. The Balkans are an EU burden, but not an enormous one. Several of the countries are already de facto in the euro zone, and the Stabilization and Association Agreements give the Balkans countries many of the economic advantages of membership. What Europe has lacked is clarity about the Balkans. I hope they find it.
Q. It’s not just Kosovo that is a problem. We still have Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country without Government, we are aware that splitting Kosovo might cause other problems in South of Serbia (Presevo, Bujanovac…) and also in Republika Srpska, maybe in Macedonia, Sandzak…?
A. Yes, that is what I was referring to when I mentioned opening up new problems in the region. That would be a grave mistake, one neither Pristina nor Belgrade would want to make.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
8 thoughts on “Still another Balkans interview?”
Comments are closed.
RSS - Posts
reading this article makes me think that serwer wishes that Milosevic was still around. taking sides was so much easier then huh?
Glad to see that you are coming around to understanding a bit more the concerns that northern Serbs have about Pristina. And I agree that Ahtisaari Plan is a good basis for a special autonomy for the north, which could never be as the Serb canton in BiH. (See http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/2011/08/kosovo-what-next.html)
But I differ on one point, that Belgrade must accept “the fact that the Kosovo government is the legitimate authority in all of Kosovo.” By 1244, it is not. The ICJ found that the UDI was done outside 1244. What Belgrade must accept is that the government in Pristina is the defacto government south of the Ibar. More than that is a legitimate subject for negotiation.
“By 1244, it is not. The ICJ found that the UDI was done outside 1244. ”
1244 is silent on the matter of Kosovo’s final status. No, it doesn’t directly state that Kosovo has a right to declare independence, but then, it doesn’t say that it can’t. From the ICJ finding (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=4):
” 114. First, the Court observes that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) was essentially
designed to create an interim régime for Kosovo, with a view to channelling the long-term political
process to establish its final status. ** The resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the
final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. ” **
[When in the past the SC wished to establish restrictive conditions on the future status of a territory, it did so in the resolution itself.]
” By contrast, under the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve
for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions
for the final status of Kosovo.
** Resolution 1244 (1999) thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of
independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike
resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status
of Kosovo. ” **
So – 1244 was not designed to govern conditions in Kosovo permanently, and is silent on how the temporary regime is to be ended. 1244 doesn’t specifically grant Kosovo the right to declare independence (although, with references to Rambouillet, it allows for the possibility), but then, it doesn’t grant Serbia a right to be consulted on the matter, either. Serbia argued against the adoption of 1244 by the SC precisely because of this, and lost the vote.
In one of the oral arguments (by the New Zealander, I think), it was said that there is a procedure for deciding a country’s status as an independent nation, and that is recognition by other states. It was a long road for the United States, too.
“There are many solutions for the customs stamps, …”
The Serbs bungled this one, and now are desperately looking for some way to get out of the mess. The officials have stopped objecting publicly to the supposed presence of the dread words “Republic of”, but it still keeps turning up in newspaper articles and the comments on them (G. Gallucci refers to the “ROK stamp”). The problem is, there isn’t and never was any “Republic of Kosovo” on the stamp – here’s an image: http://www.gazetaexpress.com/?cid=1,15,60441. (A link to a similar image was even published in the Serbian comments section at B92; they previously wouldn’t take one for the English page.)
Tim Judah provided a link to a copy of a letter to the Serb government (Economist, Tuesday August 9th 2011) from Lamberto Zannier dating from the time when he was head of UNMIK and stating that there was nothing objectionable about it under Resolution 1244 rules and urging Serbia to accept it – it was entirely status-neutral. Apparently he notified Belgrade of this multiple times. The best story I’ve heard about the breakdown of the Brussels talks was that the Serbian negotiators had informally agreed that there would be no problem with the stamp’s design – and then changed their stance, saying they would not after all accept the existing version and would insist on “UNMIK-Kosovo” or something equally non-status-neutral. The talks were postponed, Thaci reacted to an apparent act of bad faith and sent in ROSU troops. This might have been just what Bg was hoping for, but then Serbian-speaking persons unknown attacked the border posts, and Buhler’s troops, and there went Serbia’s advantage. Finding a solution that will preserve their dignity is going to be a challenge.
But now they’ve lost the ability to stall indefinitely while a solution is being sought. The imposition of “reciprocity measures” means that simply waiting until Prishtina gives in, in order to keep the EU happy, will no longer work – Serbian businessmen are losing real money from the closure of the Kosovo market, and with elections coming, nobody wants to be held responsible for more layoffs. Kosovo’s own producers are benefiting from the absence of smuggled products on the markets, trade associations in Macedonia and Albania are signing deals, Bulgaria has promised to make up any shortfalls of food products, Kosorova is bringing along a large contingent of Croatian businessmen … Even if the stamp issue is quickly resolved, Serbia is apt to discover that getting back a customer is more difficult than simply keeping one.
I think it is a problem that all we have is rumors on what went wrong with the stamps. What should have happened was that all three parties involved (Pristina, Belgrade and Brussels) made a public statement on what had happened and (except for Brussels) also why they took the position they took and what concessions they made. Openness can do a lot to make people more reasonable.
In my opinion the steps Pristina took are totally wrong and the international community should have told it that in very clear wordings. Before the negotiations Pristina agreed not to take unilateral steps. By taking such steps and by allowing them Pristina and KFOR have basically killed the negotiations. We have seen this kind of foreign interventions before in Bosnia. The net effect will be that Pristina ups its demands – hoping that Western pressure will deliver – until Belgrade refuses. So I am pessimistic for future negotiations.
“the Serbs bungled this one”
Only if you forget that – when Kosovo finally starts to develop its own exporting industry – Serbia will be an important export market. Harming your neighbors may be good to please nationalists but it is bad long term economic policy.
“A very wide measure of self-governance is provided for the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan.”
Even their school curricula have to be approved by Pristina. That is what Ahtisaari calls autonomy. It is less freedom of education than parents both in the US and the Netherlands have. Sure, there is a clause that in case of disagreement internationals will decide. But who still trusts the impartiality of internationals after Bühler?
“Reintegration with self-governance is what is being offered, and it is not a bad deal if implemented correctly.”
Let them first reintegrate the refugees in the South. That would prove that they are sincere. The present situation in the South is such that nobody believes they are sincere.
“What is needed in northern Kosovo is cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina to end a lucrative smuggling trade that is financing organized crime on both sides of the boundary/border.”
I don’t like the rethorics here. You can call anything “organized crime”: from smuggling petrol to smuggling heroin and sextrade. But I don’t think restricting the smuggling of petrol will do anything to limit those more serious forms of organized crime in Kosovo.
(on partition)”Even if you think it might solve one problem, however, it would reopen five or six other problems in the Balkans. Neither Serbia nor Kosovo can afford today to be a source of such instability.”
I think it is very paternalistic to speak for someone else and to deny him possibilities because you think it would not be in his interest.
“to allow the north to leave Kosovo, a proposition that clearly violates UN Security Council resolution 1244”
Resolution 1244 does not forbid partition. It sets no limits on the solution at all. It was the Kosovo Contact Group, that self appointed cabal, that made this into a “principle”.
I want to add one note on your answer to the question about the comparison between Kosovo’s North and Krajna in the 1990s.
Many Croats believe that Croatia was justified in its ethnic cleansing because the Serbs had refused some proposal. I have always found that a ridiculous position. It is part of any negotiation process that proposals are refused and ethnic cleansing is unacceptable under any condition. What I find worrying is that you ignore this side of the question. It could easily be interpreted as that you would condone the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in Northern Kosovo if they don’t give in.
That would be a truly bizarre interpretation of what I said. To make the comparison explicit: the former Serb-controlled areas of Croatia have been reintegrated into Croatia, with a substantial portion of their Serb populations. I expect the same to happen with north Kosovo: it will be reintegrated into Kosovo with whatever Serbs wish to stay. I have no doubt that some will want to move, but I would advocate that Pristina do the maximum within its constitutional framework to get as many as possible to stay. That would include arrangements to guarantee that agreed upon subsidies from Belgrade reach their intended recipients.