Tough enough
While I confess to being thoroughly preoccupied with the Libyan revolution, I have tried also to keep an eye on German Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Belgrade. This is important because it is an opportunity to make clear to Serbia what it will need to do in order to gain EU candidacy status, which it hopes will be granted late this year or early next. Any ambiguity will be seen in Belgrade as opening up room for partition in Kosovo, an ambition that Serbia has not yet abandoned.
Merkel appears to have been tough enough: she reportedly asked Belgrade to renew the dialogue with Pristina (that’s easy!), allow the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) to establish its authority on the whole territory of Kosovo (hard for me to understand how that would be difficult for Belgrade, since EULEX regards itself as operating under UNSC resolution 1244) and abolish Serbian “parallel” institutions in north Kosovo, where they essentially govern the majority-Serb population without reference to Pristina (in clear violation of 1244).
It’s this last item that seems to have given Belgrade heartburn. The German ambassador to Berlin is quoted on B92:
Belgrade is not surprised by the German chancellor’s requests. This could be anticipated from the previous messages we were getting, maybe just the sharpness of the request to abolish the institutions in northern Kosovo is something that was not expected….The request is something that Serbian authorities absolutely cannot accept at the moment. They have some calculations and I am afraid that one of them that we are giving in to everything because of the candidacy and our wish to join the Union. We have warned them, but unfortunately the German side’s firm positions remain.
Note that “we have warned them,” as if Serbia is in a position to dictate to Germany what it should say and what not. But note also the “at the moment.” There could be a big opening in those three little words.
I suppose in a back-handed sort of way, Belgrade’s insisting that its institutions have to remain in north Kosovo is an implicit acknowledgement that the rest of Kosovo is lost, but that is little comfort to those who worry that partition of Kosovo could lead to instability in other parts of the Balkans, as different ethnic groups seek to adjust borders to suit their preferences. This is a first-order European and American concern that Belgrade fails to take into account, even though it could well affect southern Serbia and Sandjak.
Kosovo in resolution 1244 is a single entity. Belgrade’s lawyers would do well to note that, and recall all their own pronouncements about how Kosovo cannot be divided. The Church is also adamant against partition, fearing rightly that the enclaves south of the Ibar might also be lost if Kosovo is divided.
That said, there is room for compromise, just not on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina may want some of the Serbian institutions to stay in north Kosovo in one form or another, to assist with maintaining Serb education and culture and even to encourage Serbs to remain there, as they have done in the enclaves south of the Ibar, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan. That kind of compromise is something Belgrade will have to discuss with Pristina, not assert as a unilateral fiat.
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21 thoughts on “Tough enough”
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It’s good to see that PM Merkel reads peacefare.net and heeded the warning to avoid ambiguity in Belgrade. (Blic yesterday: “Merkel’s cold shower for Tadic.”) But only a day later, B92 headlines are returning to normal: (Serbian version): “Serbia assured of candidacy status”; (English version): “Minister: Serbia’s institutions to remain in Kosovo” and “Officials say Germany, Serbia do not agree on Kosovo.”
Why did she bother telling Belgrade to get back to the bargaining table, though? Serbian businessmen are the ones losing money and future market share from the “reciprocal measures” – Serbia pushed to get the starting date of talks moved up from the 5th to the 2nd. One calculation puts the potential loss to Serbian business through the end of the year at $250 million. Could Prishtina actually end up with a “Republic of Kosovo” stamp? They’re the ones who can afford to wait, after all.
The Russians are riding to the rescue of Serbia’s self-esteem by offering an initiative to combat the drug trade they view as being centered in Kosovo, since Eulex isn’t doing the job there and Kosovo thus poses a threat to all Europe. In their eagerness to find some way to denigrate Kosovo they’re making the case for Eulex to be able to operate throughout the entire country. Even Serbs are laughing over this one.
You keep missing the point that for the Serbs living in the north this is not just a matter of who must accept what but of whether they have a future in the place they were born. As for Merkel, it was not a matter of being “tough enough” but being tone deaf to the realities Tadic and the Kosovo Serbs face: http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/2011/08/kosovo-demand-for-north.html?m=1
Still, compromise is possible, but not with the Kosovo Albanian leadership. They want everything and will not agree to anything less if it’s left up to them. The Quint must lead the way to a real compromise if there is to be one.
Why can the Serbs in the north not have “a future in the place they were born” with Prishtina as their capital? The Serbs south of the Ibar seem to be coming around to that possibility. You’ve said before that that is because they have no choice. Making it clear to those in the north – the population of an American town (about 40,000) – that they’re not in Serbia any more may be the kindest and most respectful way to treat them, rather than allowing them to go on hoping that somehow they’ll end up back in Serbia, if only they’re stubborn enough and claim often enough that they’re feeling “upset.”
And as for being born there – how many were born in Croatia and BiH and only moved by the government after fleeing their homes during the wars to shore up the Serbian population in Kosovo? Belgrade has had to work for a century to persuade Serbians to remain in Kosovo. Perhaps it’s time to let that particular stone roll downhill.
Especially since Kosovo declared its independence, Belgrade has done everything possible to hinder its existence, from preventing the country from having its own telephone code to keeping its sports clubs out of international organizations to preventing its exporters from sending their products into or through Serbia by claiming that their customs stamp offends Serbian sensibilities. (UNMIK found no problem with a stamp that reads “Customs” and “HQ” in 3 languages.)
When Tadic entered office, his Foreign Minister – according to newspaper reports – asked the West for forbearance: they would have to pretend to “defend Kosovo” while preparing the Serbian public for the inevitable. And then they ended up going to the ICJ, trying to prevent Kosovo from participating in regional meetings without the presence of a UNMIK minder, not even allowing the north of the country to participate in an internationally-overseen census. It may be a little late to expect goodwill from Prishtina, or the internationals. And as for protecting a particular political party or person, is it really the role of other countries to protect citizens of any country from choosing whomever they want? Belgrade and the other, non-Kosovar, Serbs are going to have to decide whether defending the claims of a small minority is worth harming the interests of the country as a whole. Tadic bet on the EU becoming an attractive enough option that the loss of Kosovo would not hurt too much: his political career may be one more victim of the economic crisis.
“worry that partition of Kosovo could lead to instability in other parts of the Balkans, as different ethnic groups seek to adjust borders to suit their preferences”
In practice “no border changes” has meant that borders are more important than people and while borders are sacred it is just “collateral damage” when many thousands of people are driven out who might have been saved with some simple border changes.
The best illustration of how immoral this ideology is was “Operation Storm” where the US military actively assisted Croatia with a massive ethnic cleansing operation. And it is hard to say that it contributed to stability: 4 years later during the Kosovo War Milosevic used exactly the same arguments and tactics to drive Albanians from Kosovo.
So I think you are asking the wrong question. The question is not whether there are any risks connected to border changes. The question is whether those risks are greater than the risks connected to a policy of “no border changes at any price”.
“That kind of compromise is something Belgrade will have to discuss with Pristina, not assert as a unilateral fiat.”
What do you mean? Should Pristina be able to impose whatever it wants and should Serbia only be able to bring in its points as polite demands at the negotiation table.
There are still over 200,000 minority refugees outside Kosovo, its cities remain ethnically clean and its minorities complain about widespread discrimination. The Ahtisaari Plan obviously hasn’t worked to repair those problems. I think this situation is a very good reason to make Pristina’s “sovereignty” conditional both on good behavior and on some very hard guarantees that go far beyond Ahtisaari.
There are approximately 1.7 million ethnic-Albanians in Kosovo (95% of the census total of about 1.8 mln). This is about 19% of the combined populations of Serbia + Kosovo [1.7mlm/(1.8mln)+ 7.3mlm].
Kosovo occupies about 12.3% of the combined area of Serbia (77,474 sq km) and Kosovo (10,887 sq km). [CIA Factbook]
So: 19% of the population got 12.3% of the area of the former Serbia. (Which they share with non-Albanians.)
With a population of about 45,000, the Serbs of North Kosovo amount to about 2.5% of the population of the country. And they want 11% of Kosovo’s territory? (If that’s what your 11% referred to – it isn’t all that clear.)
How does 11% of the territory for 2.5% of the population make any sense?
Even if you used the total number of Serbs in Kosovo, 7-8% of the total, why would they get 11% of the country in addition to their municipalities in the south, where the majority of them live?
3 municipality in north was never a territorial part of Kosovo it was part of Serbia but in constitution 1974 Tito gave that lend to AP Kosovo.
ahtisari plan is good enough. i wouldn’t add anything to it generally, perhaps more representatives for serbs in the kosovo gov. i’m afraid serb won’t be able to get rid of the old paradigm that is cause of much pain they suffering: they don’t want to accept what’s on the table or what’s best at the moment (of course the best with necessary negotiations we all do) and later on when that opportunity is lost they ask for it. that’s shortly put 20 years of serbian diplomacy.
International community is a million times violated its own rules when it comes to Serbia, all that was done during the 90s there have been at the expense of Serbia and for the benefit of others, the last example is Kosovo, where international law is trampled, and forcibly made an independent state for ethnic minority.
To remind you those same minorities (Serbian) existed in Croatia where NATO and the U.S. helped to destroy Krajina and expel 250 000 people from Croatia, is also helping the Bosnian Muslims to take control over Bosnia all with the stories that the borders are unchangeable. After the terrible years of war what international community have done: everything what was forbidden for the Serbs its allowed fot ethnic Albanian minority in Kosovo in extinguishing the whole of international law, for Serbia borders are changeable.
Serbia will never accept that status and will always strive to change the committed injustice, and the international community is not aware of how much damage has done in the Balkans.
ahtisari plan is good enough
What makes you believe that? Many countries have more power decentralized to their regions and municipalities than Kosovo to its minorities with the Ahtisaari Plan. So it is not a particularly generous plan.
Also the plan still isn’t implemented completely and the Souther Serb communities are complaining about that.
But the biggest problem is the level of discrimination in Kosovo. That is very hard to fight with a plan anyway. And the plan makes it only worse by making the minorities for many things dependent on Pristina and Albanian decision makers.
Pristina and US ambassador Dell take the participation of the Southern Serb communities as evidence that the Ahtisaari Plan works. But what choice do they have? If they don’t vote they get ruled by some the local Albanians. And it is a pity not to claim the money that is available in Pristina for their municipality. But that all does not say that the plan provides for a situation where their community can survive in the long term. It doesn’t and the young are leaving en masse.
They don’t want to accept what’s on the table or what’s best at the moment [..] and later on when that opportunity is lost they ask for it. that’s shortly put 20 years of serbian diplomacy.
That is a strange way to look at diplomacy: take it or you get nuked. It reminds me of how the US treated its Indians 150 years ago. Experience learned that if they took it they often ended up badly anyway.
Maybe the US just listened a bit too much too its “friends” in the Balkans and was it deceived by them. Maybe those friends always deliberately asked just a bit more than they knew the Serbs were prepared to give. Maybe they deliberately increased their demands when they got the impression that the Serbs might give in. And maybe they just used this show to give Uncle Sam the impression that they were reasonable anyway so that he wouldn’t condemn it when they in the end indulged in ethnic cleansing….
“The best illustration of how immoral this ideology is was “Operation Storm” where the US military actively assisted Croatia with a massive ethnic cleansing operation.”
us military was never part of cleansing operation. they had western planners who helped tudjman break serb rebelion (of which goal was separating parts of croatia to serbia) in the croatia had tudjman’s assurance no ethnic cleansing was going to happen. you have on record many westerners breaking ties to tudjman after he took the opportunity to clean croatia of serbs.
Us military planes were bombing radar stations of Kraina Serbs so they were directly involved .
I agree with this. American and Western armies and intelligence were never part off Oluja, but private military contractors from the USA who were giving advice to Tudjman goverment. It is totally legitimate. What Tudjman did was not legitimate, and came to a lot of criticism by USA govt, ambassador of the US then, Galbraight, and EU.
Well thats a nice cover up story . But the truth is that US military did supply and train Croat army gave them all available intelligence and actually bomb few Serbian radar positions in Kraina
NATO (US) Aireplane havely bombardment serbs radar and other buildings at the start of operation , it was the wind in the back for Croatian army so NATO is responsible for ethnic clensing.
“us military was never part of cleansing operation.”
Operation Storm was not the first Croat military operation against Serb controlled areas. Given the experience in Western Slavonia and elsewhere the modus operandi of the Croat army was well known. So the US knew what it supported. The US had also torpedoed efforts to condemn those previous operations in the Security Council. The fact that Croatia still celebrates Operation Storm with a national holiday is witness that whatever Western condemnation there was was so soft that is wasn’t noticed beyond a small group of insiders.
Dear Dan
Ahtisaari plan does not give enough reassurance for Serbian community. It gives to Serbs on North less then they already have.
Serbs are very aware of the old paradigm, and you could have never heard more people mentioning Z4 and Oluja then on the barricades during those 15 days here in the North. So people are well aware of that. The thing here is that they just want their right for self determination. Right that is given to Albanians at the 15 percent of Serbian territory, given to, Serbs at the 11% of Serbian territory.
On the other hand. kosovo govt is not providing any solution to the North except sending force. Did they come out with any proposal that should even sound like compromise. Did they come out with the solution that calls for territorial autonomy of the north and functional autonomy (Ahtissari plan) for the enclaves.
Even though Ahtissari plan calls for Serbian healthcare system and education system, you can not see that being implemented in the enclaves. Also, education in albanian scools in ultimately nationalistic and fascistic toward serbso, just like serbian ti albanian. Is that how you build multicultural society in Kosovo.
Mr Serwer, even though you paid visit to Pristina, I honestly think that you should take more things into consideration, then those that you are taking.
I dont like labeling people, and I am usually not doing that, and I don’t trust radical Serbian intellectuals who label you as proponent of Kosovo independence and Albanian lobbyist in DC. But please for the truth sake and well being of all of us here, take into consideration more factors, such as subjectivity of North Kosovo, Serbian fear of Kosovo institutions (not because Serbs are criminals, we here would like even more than Pristina to someone take care about criminals in the North, which coopearate with those on the South, but because their behavior and treating of Serbs as lower class {typical revenge}); and truth that nationalism and its side effects will not be solved through integration of North to Kosovo. More probably they will never be solved.
I understand that from the safe chair anyone can give proposals, but from the thoughts of someone who lives here, it is hard to explain to people that something that works for Albanians (right to live in their own state), does not work for Serbs in the North), because they are special case also.
As for the Sandjak, south Serbia, Macedonia, Republika Srpska are concerned, Quint led dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on the North issue can also solve this problems. If both capitals agree to refrain from territorial claims (as Serbia did) in Dayton. This question could be solved easily. Don’t you think that it is more the apetite of Albanians that needs to be satisfied, and is Kosovo not enough? Where will it stop?
In answer to Amer. Just counting numbers from 1991 census, and considering baby boom in the North in the 2000 and a lot of IDP’s and refugees from Kosovo who stayed here, built homes etc. Population on the North is somewhere between 60-70 thousand.
I’ve seen that figure, but I used the number Tim Judah cited in a recent article. If the population of Serbs in the South is supposed to be 2/3 of the total number, and there are only 80,000 or so of them, then the 60-70,000 you cite seems high.
It would help to have census figures, but the citizens in the north chose not to participate, so at this point it’s anybody’s guess. Perhaps the return of the civil registers will clarify the situation.
Now that Merkel has everyone’s attention, and the Serbs are considering the possible loss of even their schools and hospitals in the north, maybe it’s time for a deal: immediate recognition (plus bringing Cyprus etc. along) in exchange for the piece of Raška transferred to Kosovo in 1959 (to increase the Serbian population of Kosovo). (Plus the Presevo Valley towns.) I have no idea where the 1959 boundaries were – would that be all of north Kosovo or not? Prishtina could claim it kept all of the “real Kosovo” and Belgrade could rename the region Serbian Kosovo and only have to tweak the constitution.
To allow the internationals to demonstrate that no borders were changed by force, the change would have to wait until after recognition (side international guarantees would probably be necessary), when it could simply be viewed as a mutually-agreed border adjustment. A Serbian poster at B92 yesterday suggested that the Serbs should leave the south en masse, taking their churches and monasteries with them. The Egyptians moved larger structures to allow for the construction of the Anwan Dam, he pointed out. (It got more votes than a similar suggestion by an American a couple of years ago, anyway, but he only offered the London Bridge as an example.)
It will mean changing the design of the Kosovar flag, of course, but the American flag has been changed multiple times – it’s not that big a deal. They’re probably going to have to add a star for the Montenegrin community at some point, anyway. (Although some Serbs have suggested the Montenegrins can have theirs, they don’t want it.)
Kosovo’s independence is vastly outdated an issue of Serbian national policy, but the regime in Belgrade is striving to artificially keep it alive so as to avoid dealing with real, substantial problems – such as economic malaises, enormously high crime rate and so forth – that are requiring profound systemic reforms for which Serbian state institutions simply do not have both the capacity and courage. Serbian political elite is aware that Serbia, even under the best of circumstances, cannot expect to join the EU any time before 2020, and that on condition that the EU itself survive until then. Furthermore, there are many influential “business” figures in Serbia which have earned their wealth in more than illegal way and therefore have a huge interest in preventing the formation of strong, stable and independent institutions, especially the police and judiciary. Need I mention at all that these figures are regularly funding all relevant (i.e. parliamentary) political parties in Serbia?
What I am wondering is whether the aggressive post-Merkel visit rhetoric is due to the upcoming Serbian elections only or not?! It’s not excusable in any case. But, it would be more understandable if it were.