Day: August 26, 2011
To the shores of Tripoli
Audio of the Atlantic Council’s session this morning on what Qaddafi’s demise means for Libya, NATO and the Arab Awakening is up. Here are the speaking notes I used:
- The immediate requirements are clear: end the resistance, block revenge killing, stabilize Tripoli, get water and electricity flowing, deal with humanitarian requirements, begin an inclusive political process.
- But at the same time we need some focus on long-term goals. Libyans need to tell us where they are going and begin to discuss what kind of help they will need to get there. European interests most at risk—they should carry the burden.
- A safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is the first requirement.
- But it is not enough: Libyans will want rule of law. This is no simple matter: retraining and reorganization of the police, judiciary and corrections. Start now, because it takes a long time.
- TNC hodge podge is good. Big tent better, with Islamists in, for writing the rules of the game.
- Roadmap in the constitutional charter already calls for a new constitution within 6 months and elections within 12. This may be overly fast, but if so they will postpone. Municipal elections first. Democratic culture will not develop this quickly—second elections are the real test.
- There has been lots of focus on getting the Libyans the financial resources they need, less on the mechanisms of transparency and accountability that will be necessary to avoid new problems.
- Oil and gas will not flow until companies have reassurance, which Libyans are trying to provide. But citizens also need to know oil revenue will go transparently and accountably to everyone. Too much money can be more harmful than too little.
- The immediate social needs are acute: to provide food, water, shelter and health care to the most vulnerable, especially displaced people.
- But in the long-term social needs are much tougher: documentation and accountability of the past regime for its crimes, and national reconciliation. Strong civil society.
- These longer term goals—a united, democratic Libya under the rule of law with resources used for the benefit of all its citizens in a way that is inclusive, accountable and transparent—need to be laid out, preferably in a UNSC resolution follow on to 1973, which is OBE.
- This kind of Libya will be a model for the region and vindicate—though perhaps not justify—the NATO intervention.
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Does anyone still listen to podcasts?
I did two yesterday:
- One for Irish Radio;
- The other for The Economist.
I confess I thought this format had all but died, but maybe there is still someone out there who listens to podcasts?
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Bashar unabashed
Bashar al Assad, Syria’s beleaguered president continues his crackdown, despite growing international condemnation and pressure. What has happened to Muammar Qaddafi, who is hiding somewhere, and Hosni Mubarak, who is on trial, has likely given him renewed determination to avoid a similar situation. The only way he knows to avoid it is to use violence to repress the demonstrations, which continue even if they are not gaining headlines during this Libya week. The regime even took the trouble to injure a cartoonists hands, a bizarre but telling acknowledgement of its own impotence against the humor and spirit of the protest movement.
The opposition claims to still be moving toward forming a Syrian National Council, but this week’s meeting in Istanbul does not appear to have been a brilliant success. I’m not sure what the problem is, but in my view unity is overrated. There is no reason the opposition today should agree on much more than getting rid of Bashar. There will be time enough in the future to quarrel over politics.
Nor do I think the lack of “leadership” is really a big problem. The demonstrators have been remarkably effective at coordination and coherence without clear leaders. United is important, but regimes enjoy decapitating movements. Only when the time comes to negotiate do they really need an empowered group to undertake that thankless task.
What the Syrian opposition needs now is a program. What are they going to do if Bashar does step aside? The Libyan Transitional National Council did itself a great service when it put out its “constitutional charter,” which included a political roadmap for the next year. It gained some support inside Libya, but just as importantly it enabled the internationals to say they know what the Libyans want. Something like that is needed from the Syrians.
Next week the international community needs to move ahead with European Union sanctions targeting Syria’s energy sector. That would be a serious contribution to depriving Bashar of the resources he needs to continue his brutal repression. But it really isn’t sufficient. Turkey needs to step up its game, which once seemed headed in the direction of toughening but somehow went flaccid in the last ten days or so. There is a lot at stake for Turkey: its “no problems with neighbors” policy is teetering, and it gets 20% of its gas supplies for its booming economy from Syria’s principal supporter, Iran.
There isn’t a lot else out there, though David Schenker offers a few more “incremental” (that means small I think) ideas. I fear that we are going to end up with a long-term stalemate in Syria: the demonstrators unable to unseat Bashar, Bashar unable to repress the demonstrations. This situation will bleed the finances of both Syria and Iran, but it will also bleed the protesters and increase the likelihood of a chaotic sectarian breakdown in Syria.
The Syrian regime continues to portray the uprising as an armed rebellion of terrorists. That is clearly untrue, as the Syrian protesters have chosen a nonviolent course from the first. They are fired up about dignity. The demonstrators haven’t got a lot more than daring, cleverness, unity, and amazing good humor on their side. And me, I’m on their side too!
PS: The question on some minds today is why not have an international intervention in Syria, since it worked so well in Libya? In my way of thinking, it did not work well in Libya: it worked in the end, but only at a high cost in lives and other destruction.
Just as important: the Russians, who have a naval base at Latakia on the Syrian coast, are not going to allow a Security Council resolution to pass authorizing force (they haven’t even let one pass denouncing the regime violence), the Arab League is not on board and the topography of hilly Syria weighs against effectiveness from the air. The Syrians are likely going to have to sustain their efforts until the security forces turn on Bashar and tell him they are not prepared to continue on his behalf.
PS: Ali Ferzat, the cartoonist the Syrian government felt it had to beat up, responds eloquently today with this:
PPS: The UN humanitarian mission to Syria has completed its visit and is calling for protection of civilians, who are under “constant threat.” Not bad for a group shepherded around by government minders.
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