The long diplomatic game in Syria

It is past time to take a look at the possibility that the protests in Syria will not bring down Bashar al Assad any time soon.  While some of the opposition appears in frustration to be calling for violence on the part of the demonstrators, my inner voice tells me that would be a big mistake.  Bashar has the advantage in use of force, and he has demonstrated willingness to use it.

There is no real possibility of external military action in support of a violent Syrian rebellion, which is what made the difference in Libya.  The Arab League is far from advocating a UN Security Council resolution authorizing force.  The Russians, who enjoy the use of the Syrian port at Latakia, would block it anyway–they haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning regime violence.

If the protesters take up arms, they will elicit a response in kind and drive the violence in Syria in the ethno-sectarian direction, which is precisely what Europe and the United States fear the most.  Even Iran will agree:  a Sunni-defined uprising against the Allawi regime would be particularly unwelcome in Tehran.

So the question becomes this:  how can the protesters sustain their nonviolent efforts over the longer term, defined as months or even a year or two?  Only if they are clearly able and willing to do so will Bashar yield.  If he thinks he can outlast the demonstrators, why would he give in?

First, the international community needs to warn the protesters that there is no real alternative.  There will be no external military action.  Not even a “no fly zone,” which has become code for the kind of aggressive air campaign NATO conducted in Libya.  Syria is not Libya.  Damascus has strong backing from Tehran and Moscow.  Ankara has talked tough but has not backed it up with action.  Ditto the Arab countries, several of which have withdrawn their ambassadors but done little else.

Second, the international community needs to reward and encourage those among the protesters prepared to keep to nonviolence and maintain unity of purpose.  Monday’s formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC), an analogue to the  Transitional National Council that has become the post-Qaddafi governing structure in Libya, is a good development.  It will need wholehearted moral and financial support from Europe and the United States, though at this stage formal recognition would be premature.

The SNC, led by a diaspora professor, will necessarily be an outside Syria affair for the most part, unless the protesters can somehow carve out some liberated space inside the country.  They have tried to liberate particular cities several times, only to see the regime security forces eventually surround and retake them.

An alternative approach is to use cyberspace, as the Libyans also did, to publish their intentions and plans for post-Bashar Syria.  This could include a constitutional charter or framework that projects the kind of Syria they would institute, including a roadmap for preparation of a new constitution as well as local and national elections.  This would give the international community something to respond to and provide a blue print for future preparations and eventual implementation.

Third, the SNC will need to encourage defections from the military and business communities.  This can be done by making it clear, as the Libyans have done, that contracts will be maintained, revenge avoided and continuity valued once Bashar is gone.  There is time enough in the aftermath of a revolution to vet and re-vet government officials, military officers and crony businessmen.  It need not be done immediately, or used as a threat against the regime.  The trick is to get regime elements, especially the security forces, to turn on Bashar, which they will do if they believe it will help protect them after the regime falls.

Fourth, while the SNC figures out how to convey the impression of knowing what to do if Bashar steps down, the international community needs to give him a stronger shove in the right direction.  Europe has still not blocked imports of oil and oil products from Syria.  Over time, that would deprive the regime of at least some revenue (assuming Damascus sells the oil at a discount elsewhere) and signal to businesspeople that the European Union is serious about getting him to step aside.  Secretary of State Clinton needs to spend some quality time beating up the Europeans on this subject when she sees them Thursday at the Libya contact group meeting in Paris.

Getting the Russians on board for a Security Council resolution, even a relatively weak one, would also be useful.  At some point, Russia needs to begin worrying about making sure that any new regime is not going to throw its fleet out of Latakia.  The SNC might start raising questions about the Russian presence there and suggesting that it could be sustained, but only if Moscow goes along with a resolution taking the regime to task for its treatment of the protesters.

What else can be done?  It is better in my view to maintain the U.S. ambassador in Damascus rather than withdraw him.  But he needs to continue his visits to demonstrators and do what he can in other ways to provide encouragement and succor.  Also on the diplomatic front:  we should of course be consulting constantly with Turkey and Lebanon, encouraging these frontline states to confront the regime as best they can.  Turkey in particular could wield a bit more clout than has so far been apparent with Syria’s business elite.

Jordan has already spoken up against the Syrian regime, but Iraq Prime Minister Maliki has preferred to toe the Iranian line and suggest that the Arab spring can benefit no one except Israel.  Apart from the patent inaccuracy of that allegation, Maliki’s attachment to Bashar, who spent years shipping terrorists into Iraq, is passing strange.  Our man in Baghdad has presumably objected appropriately, but we need to do a bit more to ensure that Maliki is not actually helping Bashar, presumably on the theory that the enemy of my enemy (Saudi Arabia detests Maliki) is my friend.

Fifth, more unanimity against Bashar in the Arab League might help a good deal.  The Secretary General of that august but ineffectual organization was supposed to visit Damascus earlier this week to plead for an end to violence and more reform, but the Syrians rejected his not too vigorous plan before he even arrived.  Not clear to me whether he was able to make the trip. Iraq is not the only problem–Algeria is also Qaddafi-sympathetic and welcomed members of his family yesterday.

The Syrian regime will find it difficult to resist unanimity in the international community, if it can be achieved.  When even Iran and Hizbollah are distancing themselves, you know you are in trouble.  One of Qaddafi’s serious mistakes was to alienate Arab governments, two of which even joined in the NATO military action against him.  But it will not be easy to get everyone aligned in the right direction.  The diplomats have a big job to do.

PS:  For a pessimistic view of the Syrian opposition, see Kinda Kanbar’s piece at Middle East Progress.