Month: August 2011
The buck still stops with the Syrians
It has taken longer than Syria-watchers predicted, but President Obama today finally called on Bashar al Assad to “step aside” in Syria. This is an interesting formulation that implies he could remain nominally president but allow reforms to move forward. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon seems to have also taken that line yesterday with Bashar in a phone call.
Let’s look at the options from Bashar’s perspective. Egyptian President Mubarak stepped down and now finds himself on trial. Libyan non-president Qaddafi refused to step down and now is fighting a war he is likely to lose. Yemen’s President Saleh is recovering from wounds his opponents inflicted in retaliation for his military attacks on them, but he has managed to continue to dominate Sanaa from Saudi Arabia, using his son and other loyalists as proxies. Only former Tunisian President Ben Ali is managing an untroubled, but powerless, retirement somewhere in Saudi Arabia. None of those options looks as good as “step aside,” though I have my doubts the protesters would accept Bashar remaining even nominally in power for more than a brief transition period.
President Obama also signed an executive order that
- blocks the property of the Syrian government,
- bans U.S. persons from new investments in or exporting services to Syria, and
- bans U.S. imports of, and other transactions or dealings in, Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products.
The trouble of course is that there is little Syrian government property in the U.S., few new investments or service exports to Syria and almost no U.S. import of Syrian oil or oil products.
For President Obama’s new rhetorical line to be effective, other countries–especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Europeans–will need to play hard ball with the Syrian regime. Both the Turks and Saudis have sounded recently as if they are willing to do that, and the Europeans in their own complicated way seem to be moving in the same direction.
Diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do. As many in the blogosphere are noting, Washington’s direct influence on events in Syria is small. President Obama himself said:
The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.
So that’s where the buck stops: with the Syrian people, who have shown remarkable courage and determination so far. Here they are in Aleppo yesterday:
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Planning for Libya 2.0
I continue to plug preparation for post-Qaddafi Libya, which I looked at in some detail in a Contingency Planning Memorandum the Council on Foreign Relations published 10 days ago.
Foreign Policy last night published a new, updated piece I did for them, under the appropriate subhead:
Make no mistake: Qaddafi will be ousted, and probably sooner rather than later. That’s why the hard work of rebuilding Libya must start now.
Finally, it seems that Libya’s rebels have momentum on their side: They have pushed back Muammar al-Qaddafi’s forces on multiple fronts and are poised to encircle the capital of Tripoli. Libyans, and the entire world, will no doubt cheer the country’s liberation, but it’s not time to celebrate yet. Even if Qaddafi falls sooner rather than later, the immediate post-war period will still pose serious risks to both Libyans and the international community.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. A botched transition to a new regime could imperil the security and welfare in a post-Qaddafi Libya, discredit the NATO intervention, provide haven to international terrorists, lead to a new dictatorship, and even break up the country. We know from the experience in Iraq how costly a poorly planned transition can be.
The most pressing requirement will be reestablishing security. There’s no sign as of yet that Qaddafi intends to go quietly. On Aug. 15, he implored his supporters to “pick up your weapons, go to the fight for liberating Libya inch by inch from the traitors and from NATO.” Even if the regime collapses, remnants of his armed forces may take these words to heart. Tripoli presents the greatest challenge. While liberated areas in other parts of the country have stabilized quickly as Qaddafi’s forces and sympathizers fled, there is no guarantee that the same will hold true for the capital. Many regime supporters and mercenaries have gathered there, and could mount the kind of “stay-behind” operation that brought chaos to post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
Security cannot be maintained for long without at least a rudimentary system for police, courts, and incarceration. These new institutions will be forced to grapple with internecine warfare among rebel or tribal factions, revenge killings, and criminal gangs. The Qaddafi-era institutions may suffice in the immediate post-war period, but thorough reforms will be needed if the rule of law is to be established on a more permanent basis.
Humanitarian requirements are also likely to be acute in Tripoli as well as other newly liberated population centers. Even in liberated areas, casualties and humanitarian requirements have not yet been fully assessed. Electricity outages are already reportedly severe in Tripoli, while Misrata has been in need of food shipments. Following Qaddafi’s fall, it will be vital to quickly restore basic services to these neighborhoods. Providing food, water, shelter, and health care for the most vulnerable — including what may amount to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people — will also be key. An angry citizenry does not make for a smooth transition.
Kickstarting Libya’s economy will require getting its energy production and exports back online as quickly as possible. But it is not just a matter of getting the oil and gas flowing: A more transparent and accountable system for spending the resulting revenue, much of which used to disappear into Qaddafi family accounts, will be needed to help forestall quarrels over the proceeds and set the country on a more sustainable path. The post-Qaddafi regime will need to do a full accounting of its assets and try to ensure that some of them are not “privatized” by officials seeking to line their pockets.
Establishing transparent, accountable, and inclusive institutions of governance will be the responsibility of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which has now received diplomatic recognition from the United States as well as much of Europe and the Arab world. This will be key to determining Libya’s political future. The TNC’s inclinations are clearly in the democratic direction, but it has been rent by factionalism and disorganization. The killing of the rebel military chief Abdel Fatah Younes by what appears to be a dissident faction within the rebel ranks is only the most visible example of this internal chaos. In order to maintain its claim to legitimacy, the new government will need to swiftly incorporate new people from recently liberated areas and heal long-standing tribal and minority wounds.
The TNC should consider including officials formerly belonging to Qaddafi’s army and security services, who otherwise may try to spoil the transition. Just as de-Baathification harmed international efforts to construct a stable government in Iraq, premature de-Qaddafiization could create more problems than it solves. On the institutional level, it needs to lay out a roadmap for preparing a constitution, organizing national and local elections, and convening a parliament. This is a tall order for a government that recently disbanded its executive committee in the wake of Younes’s murder. Even in Egypt, where a solidly unified military remains in charge, the timing and order of these political events has posed knotty issues.
The international community has a role to play in this transition as well. It must lend its help to Libyans in overcoming the many challenges that they will face. The process should begin at the United Nations, where the coordinated effort to protect Libya’s civilians first began. A Security Council resolution could affirm that Libya should remain a single country, should be able to sustain and defend itself, should be committed to using the wealth of its natural resources in an equal and beneficial manner, and should be governed by inclusive institutions that respect the will of all its people and their human rights. This kind of internationally supported transition framing will help to ensure common purpose and coordination among the dozens of governments and hundreds of organizations likely to become involved, some of which are already providing assistance in liberated areas.
The United Nations, which authorized the NATO intervention, has both the funding and the credibility with Libyans to play a leadership role in the transition. From Washington’s perspective — which is no doubt to avoid getting embroiled in more nation building — it is also a relatively economical way to get things done, as the United States usually pays no more than one-third of the U.N. costs.
The European Union also has serious capabilities — in particular, the ability to deploy hundreds of paramilitary police needed to stabilize a city like Tripoli — which will likely need to be brought to bear. Several important European Union members, such as Italy, France, and Germany receive oil and gas supplies from Libya or have invested in Libyan energy production, and therefore have a vested interest in seeing the country manage its transition effectively. Europe, however, is preoccupied with its own financial difficulties. Libyan assets frozen in the United States and Europe will eventually provide ample financing, but wealthy Arab oil producers may be needed to meet Libya’s most immediate requirements.
The United Nations and the European Union should lead in assisting the Libya transition, but that does not exempt the United States from contributing. American logistics and intelligence have been vital to the NATO military operation and will likely also be crucial in the post-Qaddafi period. The United States is not completely devoid of interests in Libya, after all — it does not want sensitive materials from Libya’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs to get loose, for known terrorists to seek haven there, or for any Stinger-type anti-aircraft weapons to escape into the world arms markets. The United States will also want to make sure that NATO is prepared to step in if chaos threatens to break up Libya, re-install a dictator, or unleash a humanitarian crisis across North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Libyans have much to look forward to celebrating after a long and difficult conflict. But the really difficult challenges still lie ahead. The more we think through the challenges and prepare for them now, the easier it will be to meet the requirements later.
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Qaddafi near the end, Bashar still bumping along
It’s only been a week or so since I published a Council on Foreign Relations paper on preparing for post-Qaddafi Libya. It looks as if we are going to be there before the end of the month, if not in Tripoli itself in most of the rest of the country. A high-level defection, talks in Tunisia between the regime and the rebels, an ineffectual Scud missile launch by Qaddafi’s forces and rebel penetration of more western Libyan towns all signal that Qaddafi is near the end of his road.
That will of course be cause for celebration, but the really tough challenge–a successful transition to a more democratic regime that can govern and defend united Libya while respecting the rights of all its people–lies ahead. The Transitional National Council (TNC) that Europe and the United States have recognized as the legitimate governing authority has good intentions and even some good plans, but implementation in the confused period after the fall of Qaddafi will be difficult at best.
It seems to me that the international community is already well behind the curve. It needs a new UN Security Council resolution laying out the goals, parameters and leadership for the post-Qaddafi period. The EU, preoccupied though it is with the problems of the euro, needs to be thinking about deployment of a paramilitary police force at TNC request to ensure public order in Tripoli, at least temporarily. Hoping it won’t be requested or needed is not a good plan.
The internationals are in worse shape in Syria, where they haven’t managed to pass even a Security Council resolution denouncing Bashar al Assad’s horrendous assaults on his own population. The Turkish national security council is planning to meet Thursday to consider “radical” moves on Syria. Foreign Minister Davutoglu has pronounced what he terms the “final word,” which presumably means that action is coming soon. Speculation centers on a Turkish military incursion across the border into Syria, presumably to protect civilians in neighboring villages. In that event, all Bashar has to do is concentrate his attacks on the population in areas the Turks would find it hard to reach.
The more important move could come in the form of Turkish economic sanctions that signal clearly to businesspeople in Damascus and Aleppo that they need to convince Bashar al Assad to stop. But that isn’t easy for the Turks, who are enjoying their role as the burgeoning economic power of the region and will not want to give anyone reason to think twice about doing business with Turkish companies. It would be far easier for the Turks if any economic sanctions were multilateral and decided at the United Nations.
I am in Istanbul this morning–it really is a thrilling city of fabulous economic activity. Turkish geopolitical confidence is growing, but taking on Syria either militarily or economically when your foreign policy is focused on “zero problems” with neighbors is not easy. Still, I have to hope Ankara decides this week to save Europe and the United States from their own ineffectiveness.
PS: A demonstration in Aleppo, this evening:
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Diplomatic observers in Syria?
Reading the news from Latakia, it is hard for someone just coming out of Pristina not to note the similarity in military technique between Bashar al Assad’s Syrian forces and Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslav forces.
Milosevic aimed more explicitly to cause the Kosovo Albanians to flee their homes, using artillery to put holes in roofs and leaving the bodies of prominent people in the centers of towns. But the indiscriminate attacks on one neighborhood after another (or one village after the other in Kosovo) seem to the non-military eye comparable. Ditto the rounding up of young people, the random shootings and the mistreatment and torture in prison.
Also similar is the difficulty the rest of the world is having coming to a clear and unequivocal statement against the violence, which Nadim Shehadi notes is the truly complicated side of the equation. But it is an instructive analogy. When the international community unified and spoke with a single voice, it was always difficult for Milosevic to continue the violence.
We haven’t had that kind of unity yet vis-a-vis Syria. The Security Council has managed a statement, but no resolution. Individual voices have been crystal clear: I am in Istanbul this evening and read a statement from the Turkish Foreign Minister in the English version of Hurriyet that was unequivocal in demanding that the Syrian regime stop. We have to make those many voices one. A Security Council resolution passed with Russian and Chinese support would be the ideal diplomatic vehicle.
There is also a need to operationalize the international community’s concern. In Kosovo, this was done with the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), an effort agreed to by Milosevic that I felt at the time was too little too late. But it was a lot more than has been done or even proposed in Syria, where the regime has kept out even the press. And KDOM ultimately had a big impact, when its chief was shown a massacre site and reacted with appropriate horror, calling Milosevic out for what had been done in Serbia’s name.
Diplomatic observers would do what Robert Ford can’t: be present all over Syria and report on any violations of a ceasefire quickly. They can only be deployed once Bashar al Assad agrees to stop the military action. If and when he does, would it be a good idea?
PS: See Jeff White’s piece, which I don’t seem to be able to HTML: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3393
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The rap, good and bad, from Iraq
The several dozen attacks across Iraq today that killed at least 68 people raise many questions: is al Qaeda in Iraq reviving? can the government handle the violence as the Americans withdraw? is the failure of Prime Minister Maliki to name Interior and Defense Ministers a contributing factor? what can be done to prevent future attacks of this sort? should the Americans consider slowing their withdrawal?
It is too early for answers to most of these questions, though personally I doubt there is any reason to slow American withdrawal. Responsibility for preventing this kind of attack clearly lies with the Iraqis. There is no way that slowing the withdrawal will help in preventing them. It is even arguable that doing so would stimulate more, and encourage targeting of the Americans, who were not targeted today.
I am not as exercised about this as those who rail against slowing the withdrawal, largely because I do think that the United States has continuing national security interests in Iraq that need protection. That means we need to keep our commitment to helping Iraq acquire the means to defend itself. The gigantic American investment in Iraq over eight years should not be written off as a total loss. But it is no longer an American responsibility to protect Iraq and its citizens from its internal enemies.
That is Prime Minister Maliki’s responsibility, in particular because he has dragged his feet in naming the Defense and Interior Ministers, in an apparent effort to enhance his own control over the country’s security forces. With that control comes accountability. In a more established parliamentary system, attacks like those that occurred today would lead to the prime minister’s resignation. At the very least, he should recognize that naming new ministers would give him someone to hold responsible when things don’t go well.
The fundamental problem is that Maliki does not trust his own institutions and believes his personal authority is the only trustworthy authority. That’s a bad rap. He underestimates Iraq’s institutions and leans in authoritarian directions. It is time for Maliki to share power more effectively with his coalition partners, enlisting their considerable talents in an effort that requires the broadest possible political consensus.
While you hold your breath for that to happen, here’s a good rap out of Iraq, from before today’s terrible events:
Making unity attractive
I’ve just arrived back in Pristina from North Mitrovica, where things couldn’t be calmer. Adults in the shade drinking beer, kids in the sun enjoying a beautiful, warm Sunday, a few in the river getting happily wet. A few people moving back and forth across the bridge between the Serbian-controlled north and the Albanian-controlled south without hindrance.
The only real cloud was the guy in the singlet with Karadzic’s portrait. Who wears the face of someone accused of genocide in another country to the local cafe for a beer with a friend? The nationalist graffiti and Serbian state symbols everyplace are to be expected. The Serbs of northern Kosovo want to remain citizens of Serbia, not of Albanian-majority Kosovo.
The north seems a good deal less populated and the population older than on the south side of the bridge, but the poverty on both sides is all too apparent. It is truly difficult to imagine this as the front line in a confrontation that once absorbed the world’s attention. Today a few bored Italian carabinieri and Romanian police preside over a bridge where nothing has happened for a long time. Even when the Kosovo government sent its special police in late July to seize control of the customs posts along the border with Serbia, the bridge in Mitrovica remained calm.
Two sentiments dominated the few conversations I was able to have with Serbs in the north: fear and resentment. The fear is directed towards the Albanian-dominated institutions headquartered in Pristina. The Serbs cannot imagine trusting the court system, or being governed by institutions that report to Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s prime minister and a wartime political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
The resentment is directed mainly towards Belgrade, which is viewed as abandoning northern Kosovo in the dialogue it is conducting with Pristina. Belgrade has already “given away” the Serbs south of the Ibar and seems prepared to give away those in the north as well, the Serbs there believe. President Tadic has bought himself little credit by taking what the international community regards as a relatively hard nationalist line, or even by proposing partition.
There is also an edge of resentment for the international community in general, and the Americans in particular. The internationals are collecting nice salaries and doing little. And the American bombing may even have grown in the Serb imagination. One elderly pensioner said he thought the Americans would blow up the whole world.
Everyone, north and south, is awaiting the visit of German Chancellor Merkel to Belgrade August 24. If she tells Belgrade clearly and unequivocally to give up its control of north Kosovo, dreams of partition will be ended. If she doesn’t, or if she leaves even a slight ambiguity, the aggravation on both sides of the Ibar river will continue.
The Pristina government believes it has succeeded in changing the facts on the ground, so that the border crossings in northern Kosovo will not be returned to Serbian control. But that will do nothing to enable Pristina to govern the Serb population in the north. It will need to have the wide degree of autonomy allowed it under the Ahtisaari plan that Belgrade has so far rejected. But even that much will not come easily: people in the north lack confidence in Pristina and will need some clear demonstrations that they can expect fair treatment.
“Making unity attractive” is the apt phrase the Sudanese used to describe what was required to keep north and south Sudan together, an effort that failed. It is what Belgrade failed to do for the Albanians of Kosovo during the Milosevic regime. It is what is needed now from Pristina to gain confidence of a significant portion of the Serb population in the north.
I am under no illusions. Some of the Serbs will leave northern Kosovo no matter how gentle and attractive the offers they get, because they have good reasons to fear Albanian retaliation or because their livelihoods depend on the Serbian administration or the smuggling it has enabled. But the guy who served me burek today may well be one of the many who never did any harm to his Albanian neighbors, would leap at the opportunity to double his sales and can be convinced to stay.
Statecraft is not only knowing when to act forcefully. It is also knowing when to act gently. My advice to Pristina is to be absolutely unequivocal about where the state borders of independent and sovereign Kosovo lie, but at the same time to offer to the Serb population of the north self-governance and even preferential treatment if they will stay and begin to participate in Kosovo’s institutions. I don’t see anything else that has a chance of restoring Kosovo’s territorial integrity.
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