Month: August 2011
Macedonia is not an island
I’ve been out all day getting to Ohrid and back to Pristina, so haven’t posted or tweeted. The best I can do after eight hours of road travel is to offer a few summary tics of what I had to say at the conference celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Ohrid agreement, which ended the fighting in Macedonia in 2001 and ushered in a new era of stronger Albanian participation in the Macedonian state.
- Macedonia is not an island. The Ohrid agreement is mainly about internal governing arrangements: decentralization, representation of Albanians and others in the state institutions, police reform, use of languages. While the agreement unquestionably saved the state, it has also meant that Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia have spent 10 years focused mainly on their own internal arrangements. There is a tendency to forget that what happens in Macedonia affects the region, and what happens in the region affects Macedonia. It is time for Macedonia to play a stronger role regionally, in particular by helping to make sure Kosovo and Bosnia are not partitioned.
- Changing the status of a boundary is not the same as moving a border to accommodate ethnic differences. Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia all gained independence within well-recognized and accepted borders, some of which had previously been boundaries internal to former Yugoslavia. But none of these borders was moved from their previous positions. Belgrade today would like to move Kosovo’s border to hive off the Serb-populated portion of the north, with the explicit purpose of accommodating ethnic differences. That is fundamentally different from changing the status of a boundary. If we start down that road, we will never finish, or maybe we’ll finish but not peacefully.
- The era of separations in the Balkans is over, the era of reintegration has begun. In any event, the many after-shocks of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia are now clearly fading in magnitude and significance. There will be no more new states in the Balkans. What people need to focus on now is ensuring equality before the law for all their citizens, which is what makes me comfortable with being a minority in the United States: I’ve got precisely the same rights as the rich, white, male slave-holder Thomas Jefferson. That’s a good deal, if it can be implemented fully. The ultimate paean to the Ohrid agreement will be sung when people tell me its provisions are no longer required to ensure proper treatment of anyone.
This new era of reintegration is going to require vision and leadership that is sometimes lacking. Macedonia is facing a difficult choice. Greece is blocking its path to integration in NATO and the EU by refusing to allow it to enter until it adds a geographical qualifier to its constitutional name, since Greece claims “Macedonia” as its own. Prime Minister Gruevski, who notably did not attend the Ohrid conference and takes a negative view of the agreement, has remained adamant against this change, a position that gains him votes and avoids his having to call a referendum on a new constitution that he might lose.
The Albanian leadership in Macedonia is keen on NATO and EU membership. The former they regard as a guarantee of Macedonia’s internal security; the latter they see as eventually opening up Macedonia’s borders to Albanians in Kosovo and Albania. So refusal to compromise on the “name” issue gives the Albanians of Macedonia real heartburn.
None of this is insoluble. In fact, we’ve gone from doubts about the very existence and viability of the Macedonian state to doubts about what to call it, though I hasten to add that my own preference is to call it what its citizens want it to be called, which for now is “Macedonia.”
PS: I gratefully acknowledge Ylber Hysa, one of Kosovo’s finest, for suggesting the “Macedonia is not an island” theme.
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Reintegration requires a plan
Pristina is a lot cooler than I had anticipated–barely a cloud in the sky too. It looks a lot better under these weather conditions than raining or foggy, that’s for sure!
The weather may be clear and cool, but the security situation is not. Pristina’s move late last month to seize control of the two border posts with Serbia has inspired widespread support among Albanians in Kosovo, without triggering the inter-ethnic strife south of the Ibar River that some might have feared. But it did trigger Serb roadblocks and violence in the north that killed a Kosovo police officer and destroyed one of the border posts.
KFOR, the NATO force that deployed in Kosovo after the war with Serbia in 1999, has now taken charge of the border. Most imports from Serbia are blocked (humanitarian assistance and goods for the Serbiann Orthodox Church can pass). Belgrade and Pristina are to meet September 5 to try to find a way forward by September 15, when the agreement for KFOR control of the border gates expires.
What might be the solution? It really all depends on what is decided about the status of northern Kosovo, which has remained under Belgrade’s control since the war. Belgrade wants to keep it that way. Pristina wants to take control of what it regards as its sovereign border, with the Serb communities of the north enjoy the wide measure of autonomy allowed to them in the Ahtisaari plan, an international community product that Belgrade never accepted.
The three dimensions on which this game will be played include a) the situation on the ground in the north, b) Belgrade’s efforts to gain candidacy status for the EU as well as a date for the beginning of negotiations, and c) Pristina’s efforts to make its governance acceptable to the Serbs of the north.
The situation in the north
Belgrade will try to get back to the status quo ante, in which it controlled the border posts and refused to allow collection of Kosovo customs duties on the products crossing there. It woud also prevent Kosovo products from entering Serbia with a stamp and documentation reading “Kosovo customs.” This practice in the past deprived Pristina not only of an important export market but also of what it figures as $30-40 million euros per year of customs duties. It also fed a substantial operation smuggling untaxed products to the area south of the Ibar.
Pristina will try to prevent return to the previous situation and to ensure that its police and customs officers control the northern border, with the eventual goal of retintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan.
Belgrade’s EU ambitions
With elections likely early next year, Belgrade is looking this fall for the European Union to grant it status as a candidate for membership and a date for the beginning of negotiations. The issue is what it will have to do to achieve these substantial goals. It has already met the EU requirement to arrest the remaining war criminals. Now several European states appear to be insisting that it also agree to give up its territorial ambitions in northern Kosovo and agree to reintegration in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan, perhaps elaborated further.
German Foreign Minister Westerwelle appears to have said this in a visit to Pristina this week. The question is whether Chancellor Merkel will repeat the hard line in Belgrade when she visits August 24.
Pristina’s efforts
It is not going to be possible to force Pristina’s governance on the Serbs, who believe they have good reason to fear retaliation. The Ahtisaari plan would provide the northern municipalities with wide autonomy, but that is not in itself going to compensate for the loss of tens of millions of euros as well as a general lack of confidence, amounting to fear and loathing.
The Pristina authorities have tried to signal their willingness to provide substantial resources to the north and claim that Serb communities in the rest of Kosovo get far more per person from the government purse than Albanian majority communities do. They are going to have to make more efforts in this direction than they have made so far if they hope to convince anyone who lives in northern Kosovo.
What the situation requires is a goal and a plan. In my view, the goal should be reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. With that kind of clarity, the international community successfully reintegrated Eastern Slavonia (a Serb-majority area) in Croatia and Brcko (a town contested by Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia). The plan needs to be worked out jointly between Pristina and Belgrade, with help from their European friends (and the occasional push from the Americans). Such a reintegration plan does not require Serbia to accept Kosovo’s independence–only its territorial integrity, which in any event is implicit in UN Security Council 1244, to which Belgrade appeals regularly.
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Preparing for post-Qaddafi Libya, shortened
For those who think the full Council on Foreign Relations version is too long, here is my 750-word version, most of which has also been published on CFR’s The Water’s Edge and CNN.com:
Muammar Qaddafi clings to power in Tripoli. The end could come with little warning. That will mark the beginning of a difficult transition in Libya, not the end. We need to be prepared.
The first challenge will be security. Failure to maintain public order is what got us into big trouble in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s “stay behind” operation stirred civic unrest and destroyed government buildings. The murder in Libya last month of the overall rebel commander is a reminder that internecine warfare among the more than 45 rebel militias is a real possibility. People who lost family and tribal members to the Gaddafi regime may seek to settle scores. Former regime elements may seek to defend themselves and to “privatize” state assets. Criminals will see opportunities to traffic in arms, drugs and even people.
The humanitarian challenges will be no less daunting. Fighting has displaced at least half a million Libyans from their homes. Perhaps half of those are still in Libya, and many who are not will seek to return quickly once Qaddafi falls. Food, water, shelter and health services need to be secured for the most vulnerable. In addition, keeping water and electricity flowing to the residents of Tripoli and other major urban centers will be vital to maintaining public order, especially if Qaddafi falls this summer.
U.S. interests in Libya are limited, but a relatively successful transition from the Qaddafi regime to a united, stable, more open and democratic Libya would be seen in the region and more widely as a credit to the NATO-led intervention. It would also enable Libya to resume oil and gas exports, demonstrate international community capacity to manage such transitions and encourage positive outcomes to other Arab Spring protests, including those in Yemen and Syria.
Failure to stabilize Libya could lead to chaos, breakup of the Libyan state that sets an unwelcome precedent elsewhere, or restoration of dictatorship. These outcomes would all damage American and allied credibility and likely also cause major problems for our European allies, including shortfalls in energy supplies, loss of major investments and a continuing refugee flow. Refugees could also cause problems in Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Mediterranean.
It is therefore the Europeans, along with the Arab League, who should take the lead in post-Qaddafi stabilization of Libya, under a clear United Nations Security Council mandate that recognizes a legitimate post-Qaddafi Libyan authority and sets out strategic goals for the transition. The goals should include a united and sovereign Libya within its well-established borders that can sustain, govern, and defend itself through inclusive democratic institutions, using Libya’s resources transparently and accountably for the benefit of all its people.
Quick deployment of a peacekeeping force of several thousand paramilitary police, mainly to keep order in Tripoli and other population centers, would help ensure these goals are met. The European Union and its member states can deploy several hundred paramilitaries. Turkey and Arab countries might supply the remainder. An international peacekeeping operation would not administer Libya but would support an inclusive interim authority in maintaining stability, providing humanitarian assistance, and beginning the reconstruction process.
What if this does not work? NATO will need to be prepared to step in. Only as a last resort—to deal with widespread disorder, a threatened breakup of the Libyan state, or a humanitarian catastrophe—should the international community consider armed intervention without the invitation of a legitimate Libyan authority. This could mean U.S. boots on the ground, but only briefly as part of a broader multilateral effort.
Leadership in post-Qaddafi Libya should be passed as quickly as possible to the Libyans, who have already set up local councils and a Transitional National Council, which help to organize and provide services in the liberated portions of the country. These indigenous institutions merit nurturing and support, including unfreezing of Qaddafi-era assets so that the councils in liberated areas can begin to meet the needs of their populations. The post-Qaddafi era has already begun there.
Libya is a resource-rich country with a relatively well-educated citizenry that has demonstrated courage under fire. The country lacks institutions and political experience, but not talent and commitment. The international community should prepare to support Libyan efforts to take charge of the country’s destiny once Qaddafi leaves the scene.
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Getting to post-Assad Syria
By Adam Lewis, Editor & Webmaster at Peacefare.net
Today a Middle East Institute panel entitled “Syria on the Verge: Implications for a Nation in Revolt” stirred hopes for the revolt there to succeed.
The four panelists featured were Radwan Ziadeh (Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and a member of Syria’s “opposition in exile”), Ausama Monajed (Executive Director of the London-based Strategic Research Communication Centre), Andrew J. Tabler (a Next Generation fellow at the Washington Institute) and former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Theodore Kattouf. While offering different perspectives, there were a few key points on which they agreed: The collapse of the Assad regime has become inevitable.
- The Obama administration announcement that President Bashar al Assad must step down will have positive effects.
- There are still major obstacles to overcome on the road to a democratic Syria. Most worrisome is that the regime continues to maintain almost uniform loyalty among the security and military forces.
- To facilitate the collapse of the Assad regime and the peaceful emergence of a new Syrian government, the U.S. should lead in international efforts to isolate the regime. This will require sanctions and diplomatic pressure while at the same time offering “lifelines” (or incentives to defect) to key regime supporters: senior military commanders, Allawite community leaders, and members of the Sunni business elite.
Through this combination of carrots and sticks the international community can convey to the regime loyalists that they have a great deal to lose by going down with the Assad ship and alternatively have the option to be part of a brighter future for Syria.
Radwan Ziadeh
The Assad regime’s Ramadan offensive has not impeded the gathering momentum of the Syrian opposition. It is a mistake to overestimate the role that religion is playing in the uprising. Ramadan, and specifically the Friday prayers, have provided a gathering place where protesters organize. It is difficult for the regime to prevent such gatherings.
Prominent Allawites are beginning to speak up against the regime. By doing so, they are undermining the regime’s attempts to present the Allawite community as an unconditional supporter and are diffusing sectarian tension. In fact, many Allawites have not done particularly well under the regime.
More forceful U.S. and global condemnation of the regime would give Syrian protesters greater momentum while also encouraging wider-scale defections within the regime. But Ankara should take the diplomatic lead in international efforts as Syrians view Turkey more favorably and with less suspicion than the U.S.
Ausama Monajed
While the growing movement has created a vast proliferation of opposition groups, committees and factions (each city or small town has its own), it should not be understood as divided. All of these various factions share a similar vision for a post-Assad Syria and have a similar set of core principles that guide their activity. On any given day, 70% of the slogans protesters use are shared across Syria.
The international community should not worry about a non-democratic outcome. Syrian protesters are experiencing a form of democracy as they build a broad coalition. Many of the larger opposition groups are already discussing the formation of political parties as well as the drafting of a new constitution.
International efforts can be most helpful if they:
- help Syrian opposition groups both inside and outside the country coalesce. The outsiders have a stronger grasp of foreign policy and can help the domestic Syrian movement develop a leadership core that can effectively engage internationals;
- convince the Sunni business elite to abandon the regime. This can be accomplished by pairing sanctions that undermine any benefits that come from working with the regime with assurances that those who jump ship now can avoid prosecution. If this group can be won over, Damascus and Aleppo will succumb to protest and the regime will crumble.
Andrew Tabler
The Syrian regime is not immune to international economic and diplomatic pressure. It has anticipated this movement for a long time. Since 1980 Syria has been one of the twenty fastest growing countries in the world, and the regime has recognized the economic challenges that its now burgeoning population poses. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 is an example of how international pressure caused the regime to change policy. The international community’s best leverage is energy export sanctions. Oil proceeds account for about 25-33% of Syria’s revenue and if eliminated could cripple the regime without decimating society (as occurred with oil sanctions in Iraq).
The opposition’s lack of a clear leadership group is both its greatest weakness and greatest strength. While it has not offered the international community an effective negotiating partner, it has also avoided a hierarchical structure that the Syrian security forces could decapitate.
A coup is an alternative to either the regime maintaining power or the opposition winning outright. The lack of government control in Eastern Syria, as well as the growing Saudi support for opposition elements in that area, could lead to the creation of a Benghazi-type opposition stronghold.
Theodore Kattouf
Since talks in Geneva broke down in 2000 there has been general confusion about how the U.S. government should approach the Syrian regime. The aftermath of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon in 2005 shook Bashar al Assad. Since then, however, Assad has become smug and overconfident.
The Obama administration has been right to be cautious, even if it was overly optimistic early on that the protests could inspire Assad to implement meaningful reforms. The administration recognized at the beginning of the conflict it simply did not have the leverage to take effective action without Arab League or UN Security Council support. It thus avoided taking ownership over the outcome of the conflict. The Syrian opposition generally endorsed this approach, as it did not seek international intervention.
The U.S. is now in a much stronger position. It can and should push the UNSC to apply sanctions against Syria as well as encourage Turkey and the EU to help it further Syria’s economic isolation. The Syrian security forces still appear fiercely loyal to Assad. These forces will have to be stretched much further before they break. If sanctions can trigger an economic collapse that prevents the regime from paying the troops, loyalties could shift quickly.
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Post-Qaddafi Libya
I’m traveling tonight, so I’m putting up tomorrow’s blog post today:
Politicians don’t like to answer hypothetical questions, but analysts do. When Paul Stares, who leads CFR’s conflict prevention efforts, asked me a month or so ago to write about post-Qaddafi Libya, I jumped at the opportunity. I’ve been thinking about Libya since the uprising there started six months ago, discussed it in my post-war reconstruction class here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, and published a few pieces about it on www.peacefare.net.
To my great regret I’ve never been to Libya, but I did work on it at the State Department once upon a time (around 1994), trying to figure out whether we could convince our allies to tap a small portion of frozen Libyan oil assets to compensate families of Pan Am 103 victims. It was a flaky idea the Brits told me. They had what I regarded as an even flakier one: a trial for the perpetrators in a Scottish court convened in The Hague. Go figure.
That was Libya before Qaddafi decided to give up his nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs. But in one profound sense nothing changed. Qaddafi gave up his WMD because he feared the Americans would do to Libya what they had done to Iraq. He was still in power and wanted to stay there.
The rebellion in Libya is determined to deny him that privilege. I don’t know whether they are going to succeed. I could certainly write another paper treating a scenario in which he stays in place in Tripoli and central Libya, having lost control of Benghazi and the east (Cyrenaica) as well as parts of the west. But this one focuses on a scenario in which he and the regime collapse. I’ve tried to imagine the most urgent problems arising in the days after Qaddafi’s fall, outline options for dealing with them, and recommend appropriate policies.
The result is Contingency Planning Memorandum 12, the first CFR has done on what most people would define as a post-conflict situation, albeit one that has not yet come into existence. I prefer to refer to “societies emerging from conflict,” since conflict doesn’t end, even if you are relatively successful and violence does. That’s just the point with Libya: there are many ways in which post-Qaddafi Libya could be conflictual and even violent, unless we prepare carefully and take the necessary preventive measures.
I am convinced that American interests do not justify a major U.S. role in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, just as they do not require a continued leading role in the military action the UN Security Council authorized. The Europeans stand to lose oil and gas supplies as well as investments in a chaotic Libya, not to mention the possibility of Libyan migrants reaching Italy, France and Spain in numbers that would cause serious political tension. The Europeans should lead, preferably with a UN Security Council mandate and lots of Arab and African support. We should be prepared to fill in, and step in with NATO intervention if the Europeans fail.
It will be interesting to see how much of what I’ve written holds up in the weeks after Qaddafi loses power. Analysts like hypotheticals more than they like reality, unless they get lucky and hit the mark. We’ll see, soon enough I hope.
PS: “Q”addafi is CFR’s (and the NY Times’) preferred spelling. “G”addafi is what I’ve been using, I don’t remember why. I guess I’m inclined to switch to the usage of my betters. Anyone want to tell me which one is closer to being correct?
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Anyone still think it was the downgrade?
Yesterday’s sharp bump upwards on the stock market following the Fed’s announcement that it would keep interest rates low for two years demonstrates all too clearly that the sharp falls the previous two days were not reactions to the S&P downgrade of U.S. government debt. I shouldn’t say it, but I will: I told you so.
The press this morning attributes the Fed action to concern about growth, which is surely in part true. But it also reflects concern about banks and the financial system, which are always close to the Fed’s heart. Low interest rates have helped to save the banks for several years now–their profits are soaring–and will continue to help in the future, as a result of the Fed’s commitment.
Does this change the picture for foreign policy? Is the Federal budget under any less pressure? The short answer is “no.” If Congress sticks with the debt deal, it still has to cut expenditures sharply starting in fiscal year 2013. All the Fed has done is to make monetary policy carry the burden of adjustment until then.
The longer answer is a bit more nuanced. Certainly U.S. government borrowing costs for the next two years will continue to be unusually low, unless the markets really do lose confidence in the dollar or inflation rears its you know what. Low interest rates will ease the government’s fiscal situation. I confess to relief about this, but it does not reduce the need for triage on foreign policy.
Nina Hachigian, who was overly optimistic about the American role in the world a few years ago, is overly pessimistic now. America is no less indispensable today that it was last week, but it is likely to be less available in the future. People who have grown to rely on the United States to help them out of the deep holes they dig for themselves–from the Balkans to Israel/Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan–are going to find us preoccupied elsewhere, with our own top national security risks.
This is not a bad thing–most of them will discover their own capacities to manage are greater than they had imagined. And it is high time some of America’s burdens shifted to Europe and the Arab League, even if the former has financial problems of its own and the latter lots of money but little experience. Far more often than in the past, the message from America will be handle it on your own, or figure out a cheap way to get it done.
What we need to be careful about is cheap shortcuts that end up of creating expensive longterm problems. In the Balkans, that expensive delusion comes from those who advocate rearranging borders to accommodate ethnic differences, a sure formula for instability if not war. In the Middle East, it comes from those who resist defining clearly the borders of the Palestinian state or want to turn a blind eye to the Arab spring, ignoring Egypt and Tunisia because the revolutions there have been “successful.” Backing a revolution doesn’t necessarily mean paying for it or bombing a regime into submission, as Robert Ford (our man in Damascus) has demonstrated with his deft visits to protesters in Hama.
Diplomacy is not inherently expensive. Military action is. In tight financial times, we’ll do better with a foreign policy that relies less on deployed forces and more on alert diplomats.
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