Month: August 2011
Forget the downgrade
Forget the downgrade. It really is a non-event given the decline in U.S. government bond rates. If the world is still willing to buy USG paper, why should anyone worry about how S&P rates it? Though I hasten to add that I think S&P had a point: the Tea Party has demonstrated it will stop at nothing, including default, to try to ensure that President Obama is not reelected.
The downgrade did not cause the fall in stock markets. It is the shrinking prospects for growth that did that. The debt deal is clearly deflationary. It will reduce aggregate demand by reducing government expenditures. Reduced demand means less growth.
Among the more interesting but little noted things that happened yesterday was the European Central Bank purchase of Italian government bonds. This kind of central bank support for government finance is verboten in Europe. The Fed calls it quantitative easing, and it is precisely what the Germans think should not happen in monetary policy. They’ve got to be pretty desperate to go along with it.
Some of you will know that I spent 10 years in Italy, whose government paper is now declining sharply in value. That’s a problem because a lot of it is held by European (and American) banks. The big worry is that depositors will think the banks shaky and decide to withdraw their funds. A “run” on the banks–in Italy or elsewhere–could be catastrophic. As in: need a lot of government funds, potentially dwarfing the U.S. bank bailout.
So what does all this have to do with peace and war issues? Tight budgets and potentially large bailout costs make it hard for many governments to think about, much less execute, operations abroad. We are broke. The Europeans are broke. Some will welcome a major retrenchment; others will think it a really bad idea to pull troops from commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But the pressures for retrenchment are going to be enormous.
The right approach is to see this as an opportunity to define our priorities more clearly. Triage is necessary: which commitments really do serve our national security interests? which don’t? are there alternative (and cheaper) ways to meet our goals? are there others who should pitch in more?
The United States has traditionally depended on its military to execute much of its foreign policy. Military spending has doubled since 9/11, not counting the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Are we using an effective but expensive military instrument in the best ways we can? is it the appropriate instrument for the purposes for which it is being used? are there alternatives?
The questions are obvious. The answers are not. I’ll be trying to offer some answers over the next few months, as this is precisely what the book I am writing is about. So stay tuned: we are going to explore American foreign policy in a century that is still young but is already challenging us think hard about national priorities and the instruments of foreign policy.
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Is Macedonia better off with Ohrid?
I am hoping to be in Ohrid Saturday. Here is an interview I did with Slobodanka Jovanovska of Utrinski Vesnik, a Macedonian daily. They planned to publish it today:
1. You will take part in conference about the ten anniversary of Ohrid Agreement. What will be your message there?
A. The Ohrid Agreement saved and consolidated the Macedonian state. That in my way of thinking is an excellent achievement. I find it hard to imagine that there are many people in Macedonia—Macedonians, Albanians or others—who think they would be better off today without the Ohrid agreement.
2. Macedonia celebrates the Ohrid Agreement, EU countries and US call it major achievement. If it is so good, why no one of the neighboring countries is not using this experience and, even implement the opposite policy? Greece is not recognizing minorities, Bulgaria didn’t allow questions about ethnic origin in the last census, Albania the same…
A. Each country has its own circumstances and will implement policies it thinks appropriate. I think it is a mistake to deny people the opportunity to define their own ethnic origin in a census, but I have to admit that the issue is a sensitive one also in the United States. We have moved in the direction of allowing more choices, but that is because we have confidence that the vast majority of citizens of all ethnic groups consider themselves first and foremost Americans. Maybe unwillingness to allow more choices reflects fear that some citizens will choose other identities as primary. Greece in particular seems to suffer from this fear.
3. There is a resolution in the US Congress calling for decrease of US aid to Macedonia, for conditioning it with the name dispute and referring to the country as FYROM instead of Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia it was understood as a sign that Barack Obama’s administration is changing sides and inclining more to the Greek positions about the name dispute?
A. It is important to remember that the United States has separation of powers: the Administration is distinct from the legislative branch, where there has long been sympathy with the Greek perspective on the name dispute. It is also true that both President Obama and Vice President Biden have previously indicated sympathy with the Greek perspective when they were in Congress. The Administration clearly wants to see a compromise, and in the last year or two has come to the conclusion that Skopje is more an obstacle to compromise than Athens.
That said, the United States still recognizes Macedonia as Macedonia. I trust Skopje’s diplomats are doing everything they can to keep it that way.
4. How you you see Macedonia-American relations now? Good, excellent, downgraded…
A. So far as I know, relations are good, but I have to admit that few in Washington see Macedonia’s problems as among America’s top priorities.
5. From this time distance, do you think that the veto for Macedonia’s membership in NATO, initiated by Greece and supported by other countries, provoked some steps forward in the country?
A. I really don’t know, but I’d like to see Macedonia in NATO, where it belongs. If it remains willing to enter as FYROM, I think Greece should allow it to happen.
6. How do you comment the controversial project Skopje 2014?
A. I don’t. But I would note that Washington DC was designed in the late 18th century as the “new Rome.” Dreams of grandeur are not limited to Skopje. I just hope you have the money to pay the bills for it.
7. The leader of the Albanian coalition party DUI, Ali Ahmeti, last week said that he will not be able to guarantee the peace in Macedonia if Kosovo is destabilized and divided? Do you agree that the crisis in Kosovo inevitably will provoke crisis in Macedonia and what should be the role of Albanian leaders here?
A. Proposals to divide Kosovo cause strains not only in Macedonia but also in Serbia and Bosnia as well. The proper role of Albanian leaders in Macedonia will be to try to ensure that pan-Albanian political forces do not take advantage of the situation, but that will not be easy. One thing is clear though: the Albanians in Macedonia have a far stronger role in Skopje, partly due to the Ohrid agreement, than they would have in any Greater Albania.
8. This fall the International Court of Justice in Hague will decide about the case of Macedonia against Greece, about the veto in NATO. What you think could be decision and whether it will change something?
A. I really don’t know what the legal decision will be, but I think it is wrong for Greece to veto Macedonian (in fact FYROM) membership in NATO.
9. For the first time in the last US report for human rights there was a part about political prisoners in Macedonia. Independent media almost disappeared in the country, and instead of creating transparent and free society, the Government is hunting people, “collaborators to the secret services.” Why there is such a silence about this political climate in Macedonia in US and also in EU?
A. There are a lot of other problems in the world that affect the EU and US directly: Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, just to name a few. I think Brussels and Washington expect Macedonia to care for itself these days and not to rely too much on EU and US intervention.
10. Was the decision to give up the prosecution of war crimes in Macedonia during 2001 the right one? Is it possible to give amnesty for war crimes?
A. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that there is no amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in many countries prosecutors have discretion. If Skopje has decided to exercise that discretion, I would want to think twice before suggesting it was a mistake.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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Back to Pristina
I’m headed again to Pristina this week, where I’ll focus mainly on northern Kosovo issues. That’s the 11% of its territory that Serbia still controls and wants to hold on to. To many readers not so interested in the Balkans, this will sound like a small problem in a small country, but it arouses great passions and has potential for unraveling several of the relatively new states that occupy the western Balkans, including not only Kosovo but Macedonia, Bosnia and even Serbia itself.
I think I understand the Kosovar side of this equation relatively well. The Pristina authorities want to maintain the territorial integrity of the state they declared in February 2008. They have been reasonably assiduous in implementing the Ahtisaari plan, the internationally imposed condition for independence that provides a wide margin of autonomy for Serb-majority municipalities. South of the Ibar river, where most of them live, Serbs have more or less accepted Pristina’s authority (if not its independence from Serbia) and are participating in its institutions.
The Kosovars see no reason why the north can’t be part of Kosovo, and good reason why it should be. Particularly troublesome from the point of view of most Pristina politicians (and the entire international community) is that partition of the north would strengthen irredentist Albanian passions for union with Albania and Albanian-majority portions of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Partition would also open the door to extremists who don’t want any Serbs south of the Ibar.
In addition, Pristina wants to establish its customs enforcement at the northern border with Serbia. This is particularly important because Serbia won’t take products made in Kosovo, while Kosovo imports a good deal from Serbia. So the Pristina authorities want to be able to block Serbian imports, or at least collect taxes on them, and end the tax-evasion smuggling that deprives the Pristina government of tens of millions of euros.
I confess to less certainty about Serbia’s perspective. When Belgrade used to say that all of Kosovo is its Jerusalem and therefore cannot be independent, I understand both the sentiment and the implications, even if I can’t agree with the conclusion. But when Belgrade says, as it has lately, that it wants a deal to keep the north, that is more than a little puzzling. None of the main Serbian monuments, churches or monasteries are in the north. Most of the Serb population lives in the south. And the north would have a wide degree of autonomy if the Ahtisaari plan were implemented there.
The only serious objection to the Ahtisaari plan I’ve heard is that it would make Belgrade’s legitimate payments (pensions, teachers, etc.) to the north go through Pristina; some worry that they might be blocked there. This is a soluble problem, not an insurmountable one.
Some people tell me the real issue is Trepca, the large mine that has long dominated the economy of the north. Others say it is face saving: Serbia has to get something, if only “Ahtisaari plus,” whatever that means. Otherwise, Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party will lose the next election to the more nationalist, but now rhetorically quite tame, Tomislav Nikolic. Sometimes I think it is inat (usually translated “spite”) and the hope that by eventually surrendering Belgrade can extract concessions of more importance elsewhere (extraterritoriality for the Serb monasteries for example). Some claim that taking the north is just part of Belgrade’s persistent attachment to the idea of Greater Serbia, and the underlying notion that wherever Serbs are in the numerical majority that territory should be part of Serbia.
But I really don’t get it, so I invite readers to offer contributions to www.peacefare.net The rules of this game are the following: no vitriol, no personal invective, just a clear and compelling statement to non-Serbs and non-Albanians (who constitute most of my readers, and I don’t anticipate any Serbs or Albanians will be converted by any argument, however compelling) of what Belgrade hopes to achieve in dividing the north from the rest of Kosovo.
Comments on my understanding of the Kosovar perspective are of course also welcome. But again: no vitriol or personal invective. I’ll be delighted to be enlightened.
The preferred way to provide me with your contributions is to register with www.peacefare.net and submit a comment. Otherwise, daniel@peacefare.net should get an email to me. Editorial discretion is of course mine, and mine alone.
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Half a loaf isn’t really enough
OK, this isn’t the most stirring announcement this month from the White House, but Michael Abramowitz is right to call attention to it. The full statement is worth a read.
What it does is to put the emphasis on anticipating mass atrocities and preventing them. This isn’t as hard as it sounds–those contemplating mass murder often announce their intentions, as Gaddafi did in preparing to take Benghazi and Hutu power advocates did in Rwanda. But it is difficult for a bureaucracy to focus on anticipating problems when it has a full plate already on the table. The Atrocities Prevention Board is an attempt to prioritize prevention.
Just as important is “the full toolbox”:
The President rejects the idea that, in the face of mass atrocity, our options are “limited to either sending in the military or standing by and doing nothing.” He instructs his Administration to undertake a 100-day review – to take an “inventory” of the full range of economic, diplomatic, and other tools available to U.S. policymakers; to develop the appropriate governmental organization to try to ensure early and less costly preventive action; to improve the collection and processing of indicators of mass atrocity; to provide a channel for dissent to be raised during a crisis; and to appropriately train and prepare our diplomats, armed services, development professionals, and others.
It would be easy to mock this as half a loaf, but I prefer to think it sounds like the beginning of a serious effort. I think we can rely on Samantha Power and others in the White House to make sure there is some real result. Too often, we’ve “missed the story,” in Roy Gutman’s journalistic but profound phrase.
The trouble is that history doesn’t wait for 100-day reviews. As misfortune would have it, atrocities have already reached truly alarming levels in Syria. The new ban on admissibility to the United States that the policy vaunts looks like a thin reed in the face of real horror. Are Bashar al Assad’s cronies going to behave differently because they miss their vacation in Florida?
Let’s get that old-fashioned oil embargo out of the tool box, with a UN Security Council resolution to back it up multilaterally. That would have a real impact. And let’s not wait for that 100-day review.
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His pants are still on fire
May this be the last time I post this lying bastard’s nonsense:
Already in March his pants were on fire.
PS: Even Tripoli says Saif is lying.
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