Tempest in a tea pot
B92 reports that Pristina and Belgrade have reached agreement on customs stamps and documentation: they will read only “customs of Kosovo,” which is what they have read since independence in February 2008 and contain no symbols.
None of that is very important, however much the press and commentators have gotten excited about it. The key issue is who will be present at the border posts between Serbia and Kosovo to collect customs. Edita Tahiri, the Pristina negotiator, is reported to say it will be Kosovo police and customs, but even that doesn’t quite tell us what we need to know, since that was also the case before the seizure in late July of gates 1 and 31 by Pristina’s special police.
The issue is whether the Kosovo police and customs will actually be people loyal to the authorities in Pristina and therefore willing to enforce its laws and collect the customs duties. I guess we’ll have to wait and see whether that will be the case. We shouldn’t have to wait long. The Serbian negotiator, Boris Stefanovic, expects goods to start flowing across what he would consider the boundary line in 7 to 10 days.
What does this incident tell us about the prospects for Kosovo and Serbia to achieve “good neighborly relations,” which is the European Union’s requirement for all members? It bodes reasonably well, provided the EU keeps the pressure on, as it did in this case. German Foreign Minister Westerwelle and Chancellor Angela Merkel, in visits respectively to Pristina and Belgrade, made it clear that northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest, without moving the northern border to accommodate ethnic differences.
While Belgrade still seems far from fulfilling the Westerwelle/Merkel expectation, it ducks the issue and relieves the pressure by resolving the customs issue expeditiously, even if on terms that seem manifestly favorable to Pristina. It is after all far more important for those in Belgrade who want to hold on to north Kosovo to maintain its extensive network of Serbian institutions in the north than to worry about how the customs stamps and documentation read.
If Pristina actually collects the customs duty, that from Belgrade’s perspective will also be a plus, as it will disincentivize the illegal, tax-free trade that has deprived not only Pristina but also Belgrade of revenue. So what we’ve got here is what most negotiators would consider a “win-win” solution, even if the tempest was in a tea pot.
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And so the readers of Serbian newspapers, who had been encouraged to believe since the brouhaha began that the objection was to the design of the customs stamp, finally learn that, actually, the stamp had been perfectly unobjectionable all along: there was never any “Republic of Kosovo” on it. The more emotionally labile are declaring that not only has their government been lying to them, but that it has recognized Kosovo’s independence with this agreement.
The mystery is why the Serbian negotiating team made such a point of refusing to accept a simple stamp, when it was perfectly acceptable under the Resolution 1244. Somebody may have made the same assessment they made in deciding to ask the ICJ to rule only on the legality of the “declaration of independence” by Kosovo, not on its right to independence itself. If they had won on the declaration, they would have won everything. But international law is silent on the question of declarations, and the judges ruled against Serbia.
In the present case, they fought on the question of the unobjectionable – even from their standpoint – stamp design. If they had been able to force Kosovo to accept “UNMIK-Kosovo” instead of “Kosovo” they could argue that even Kosovo doesn’t accept its own independence. Or perhaps they took Thaci at his word about applying reciprocal measures (allowed under CEFTA rules) and expected things would spin out of control and Serbia would gain points by appearing peaceful and reasonable by comparison. So once again, Serbia has lost, although Kosovo still hasn’t won. (Just ask the tomato-throwing Self-Determination guys.) But there remains the matter of the “accompanying documents” where the dreaded “Republic of Kosovo” does appear: the fight will undoubtedly go on. Now, however, Kosovo has learned how to leverage its power – by insisting on “reciprocity” it will be able to continue to block Serbia’s imports, and as the panicked response in Belgrade has shown, this gets the government’s attention. Allowing the Serbs in northern Kosovo to take matters into their own hands (or Kostunica to send in the hooligans) gave Kosovo an easy win on the stamps, and puts Serbia in a weak position for the next round. Kosovo can live without Serbian imports, it’s even good for their own businesses, but Serbia’s been losing substantial amounts of money it really can’t afford. If jobs begin to disappear as a consequence, especially during the election campaign, things could get interesting.
The “tempest” has remained in a “teapot” only because of KFOR’s strong intervention on behalf of Pristina, Belgrade’s eagerness to please the EU almost at any cost and the northern Kosovo Serbs’ interest in avoiding conflict with the internationals if at all possible. The agreement on the customs stamp is a compromise as it does not say either “UNMIK” or “ROK” as Belgrade and Pristina, respectively, each preferred.
But you put your finger on the real issues, will Kosovo customs be at the gates, will they try to collect customs fees and will these go to Pristina. If the Quint decides to keep on the pressure, as you advise, the tempest may leap the teapot. The question of the north cannot be resolved through use of force and KFOR/EULEX bullying will not work beyond a certain point. That point is where they try to make the northern boundary into a real border under the control of Pristina. To do that, they will have to use real force and this will almost certainly trigger violence.
Danas is reporting today that Eulex is in negotiations with Belgrade to take over responsibility for customs between Serbia and Kosovo on Sept. 16. All freight will go through Gate 3 at Merdare. (Eulex only turned over control of the borders with Macedonia within the past year, and the handover of the border with Montenegro occurred only days ago, so this should be acceptable to both sides.) Serbian police are also being reported as turning around tank-trunks with gasoline approaching the disputed gates. The smuggling is costing the Serbian government millions every year on lost VAT taxes, not only on the goods delivered to Kosovo, but on goods granted VAT-free status by Serbia (as a way of supporting Serbs in Kosovo) that are then sold, either in Serbia or abroad, at the normal price, resulting in a windfall for the exporter.
Merdare is the logical place for the customs post, since it will eventually be the connection point between the Pan-European Corridor X and the Kosovo highway to the port at Durres.