For the Balkanites among you

Matja Stojanovic of Danas asked a few questions again.  I understand my replies were published today.  Here is the interview in English:

1.      What instruments will the EU and the USA apply in order to try and push Serbia to stop blockades and barricades?

DPS:  I don’t really know, but I imagine they will tell Belgrade that it is embarrassing itself with support to efforts that are unlawful and counterproductive.  Serbia needs to settle the Kosovo issues, not make them worse.

2.      If Serbia remains firm at its current positions, what actions would the EU and the USA have at their disposal in order to avoid violence, or in other words, is the violence inevitable?

DPS:  Violence is certainly not inevitable.  If the day comes when NATO feels it has to use force, I imagine it will do so effectively, with a minimum of violence.

3.      Do you think the Ahtisaari plan is the only acceptable solutions for the EU and the USA? Is there any maneuver space for Serbia, in terms of gaining another kind of special status for the north (like shared sovereignty or something similar)?

DPS:  The first thing to be done is to sit down and discuss the Ahtisaari plan, which provides a large margin of autonomy to Serb communities in Kosovo, including those in the north.  I don’t think Belgrade is likely to convince Pristina to agree to something other than that, but I imagine there may be some aspects of implementation that could be usefully discussed and specified in more detail.  The best way to reintegrate the north with the rest of Kosovo—and maintain legitimate ties to Belgrade—would be as a cooperative project between Belgrade and Pristina.

4.      What is the reason, in your opinion, that those who organize trafficking at the north, represent criminal structures, organize barricades and incite violence are still at large and not arrested (having in mind that, for example, even Borko Stefanovic confirmed his life was threatened by a local strongman)?

DPS:  I think it is clear that there are elements of the government in Belgrade that support the people in the north who are causing difficulties.  And they likely use threats to ensure that support continues.

5.      Is Belgrade controlling the north, in your opinion, and to what extent?

DPS:  The day Belgrade decides to settle issues in the north, they will be settled.  I’m not sure it is correct to say that Belgrade “controls” everything that goes on there.  Moreover, there are different components in Belgrade, some of which may not be fully under control of the government.

6.      Could ambassador of Russia Alexander Konuzin’s appearance and his now well-known speech be seen as an intention to destabilize political circumstances in this important moment?

7.      Do You think Russia has interest in having the nationalist and war prone parties back to power in Serbia, and if so, why?

DPS:  I confess I really haven’t followed the Russian angle, but Konuzin has long been more Serb nationalist than the Serbs.  He is just trying to carry out his assigned task of keeping Serbia as far from NATO and the EU as possible.  Yes, he would like to see real Serb nationalists back in power in Belgrade—that would serve his purposes well.  Anyone in Serbia who thinks that would be a better route is entitled to his view, but I don’t think most citizens will agree.

8.      What could be the next EU move if Tadic says, at the meeting with Ashton, that Serbia does not want to remove the barricades?

DPS:  I think the EU would be glad to have an excuse to delay Serbia’s candidacy and date for negotiations.  There is no great need for the EU to move quickly on these things right now.