peacefare.net

The friends we need in Islamabad

If all roads lead to Islamabad, which one do we take to get out?

Max Boot says we have to begin treating our “frenemies” in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate the way we do Iran’s Quds force in Iraq:

Apply economic sanctions against its vast range of business interests. Limit the travel and freeze the assets of its leaders, starting with its current head, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. A designation of the ISI as a formal state sponsor of terrorism might also be in order. No doubt the Pakistani military would react angrily to such steps, but many civilians in Pakistan​—​including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani​—​who chafe under heavy-handed military dominance might quietly welcome them.

Vali Nasr understands the temptation, but urges that we make nice anyway, in order to keep to our 2014 date for drawdown from Afghanistan:

Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.

But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.

This is as sharp a policy choice as diplomats ever face. Which option is the right one?

Neither Max nor Vali discusses the issue I would regard as paramount:  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.  Nothing about Afghanistan–even our withdrawal–is more important than making sure they do not threaten the United States.  This could happen if the Pakistani government were to fall under extremist control or if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear technology or materials to people who would use them against the United States.  For those who think that unlikely, it is important to remember that Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan already transferred sensitive technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s.

It seems to me that what we need to ensure our interests are protected is a two-pronged approach.  We should isolate and target (I would say even with military means) those who insist on supporting the Haqqani network and other Taliban forces, as Max suggests.  At the same time, we need to make nice, as Vali suggests, to both civilians and military in the Pakistani government who understand the responsibilities of a nuclear power and are prepared both to cut off support to extremists and ensure that Pakistan’s weapons and technology remain under tight control.  We will also have to provide Pakistan with assurances on limiting the role of India in Afghanistan and with a role in any peace negotiation there.

It is no easy matter to make these distinctions. What if we don’t find reliable civilians and military in the Pakistani government willing to opt unequivocally against extremism?  Then, as Vali suggests, full withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes impossible and we’ll need to hunker down for a long confrontation across the Durand line that marks the border with Pakistan.  That is an unattractive proposition that should make us try all the harder to find the friends we need in Islamabad.