Good facts, lousy policy
It wasn’t easy, but I managed to plow, or at least skim, my way through the 37 pages of ICG’s report on the 49% of Bosnia that constitutes Republika Srpska (RS), since I know you are all waiting for my verdict.
It’s mixed. The report seems to me clear and compelling in portraying the profound corruption and extreme nationalism that dominate the RS as well the difficulties in the relationship between the RS and the governments in Sarajevo (both Federation and “state,” as Bosnians call what Americans would term the Federal government). There are few better sources than this report, if any, for a comprehensive account of how RS has sought to weaken the state government and establish its own control over as many state functions as possible. And the section towards the end on “The War: Facts” is a useful compilation.
But when it comes to policy, the report treats the RS as if neither corruption nor extreme nationalism is really a serious problem. RS President Dodik’s efforts to block transfer of competences to the state are treated as mistakes from which it might be convinced to back off, not as a concerted effort to wreck any real prospect for a functional state government. Dodik’s push for referendums on issues that clearly are intended to weaken the state are viewed as quixotic and erratic, when they are all too clearly purposeful and consistent. Even the hope for independence is described as “vague”, when it in fact is clear and explicit.
Here’s a sample of ICG perceiving ambiguity:
The government in Banja Luka plays a strange game when it comes to independence – shifting from advocating a referendum on independence to reforms to return Bosnia to its
Dayton roots. While Dodik constantly publicly threatens secession,and the RS leadership continues to harden its positions, Dodik’s aides explain that his statements are meant for internal RS consumption and complain that Federation officials and internationals take them seriously. Yet,even far from the public and in bilateral meetings, Dodik and his closest advisers say they do not believe Bosnia has a future.
I am at a complete loss how anyone can think this “strange game” is anything but the usual one in which internationals are led around by aides who have placed a figurative ring in their nostrils. Dodik has publicly and repeatedly told his electorate that he intends to deliver them to freedom from Sarajevo. There is no ambiguity. The only thing that prevents him from doing this is the international community.
ICG can’t admit this because it has committed itself to dismantling the main international community barrier to Dodik’s secessionist ambition: the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Instead, ICG thinks the EU will solve all. Somehow this view creeps into the Executive Summary, though I looked in vain for any detailed discussion of the issues involved in the main text of the report:
The EU’s response, aided by the U.S. and others, to the political and legal challenge the RS posed in June offers a non-coercive alternative from which it will be difficult for any party to walk away.
This is almost comic: I can’t remember the last time I heard American diplomats angrier at their European colleagues than over Catherine Ashton’s ill-conceived and poorly executed maneuver to create this “non-coercive alternative,” a maneuver in which she managed not only to side-line the OHR but blind-side the Sarajevo government and provide a gigantic boost to Dodik’s claims of RS sovereignty. The only good thing about it was that it ended Dodik’s hope of an early dissolution of the OHR, because it stiffened American spines and gave even Europeans second thoughts.
I won’t grace the recommendations with a detailed critique, though it is notable that they lack any for Belgrade even though the report itself highlights its role in supporting Dodik’s last electoral campaign. The recommendations that do exist amount to asking everyone in the RS to do good things without providing any real reason why they should do so other than the goodness of their hearts. I think we all know how that will work out. But there is one recommendation that is downright pernicious:
Declare that neither partition nor greater centralisation is compatible with Bosnia’s early progress toward EU membership.
This is neither true nor wise. The Bosnian state is clearly incapable of EU membership without greater centralization, which is unquestionably compatible with early progress in that direction. Centralization of some functions is not the same as eliminating the RS, a canard that ICG should be savvy enough not to believe. I am a strong proponent of decentralization and subsidiarity for those issues that can be handled at an entity or municipal level, but EU membership will require more functionality in Sarajevo than currently exists there. ICG’s effort at balance, falsely equating centralization with partition as two polar evils, has led it to err more than its fine leadership should allow.
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No doubt, Dodik is the key stumbling block to any effort at transforming Bosnia into a stable, self-sustained society. At the same time, it would be erroneous to simply assume that Dodik is the only obstacle to the process. By the way, Dodik is not even trying to disguise his secessionist intentions, which indeed indicates how self-confident he is feeling at the moment.
However, far bigger problem than Dodik’s personal secessionism is that such an idea is cherished by an overwhelming majority of ordinary people in his entity. That said, even if Dodik was somehow removed from office, there is no ground to believe that his successor would be any better in that respect (unless he or she was directly imposed by the West instead of being elected in the popular vote, but such an option appears highly unlikely).
While the anti-Bosnian posture of Serbs in RS cannot be expected to disappear any time soon, it could be gradually softened if the West managed to deprive RS’ political leadership of the support they are receiving, either overtly or covertly, from Serbia. Hence, the international community should concentrate most of its efforts toward Belgrade. (It is perhaps worth noting here that even though they belong to the same nation in purely ethnic terms, rigid, conservative nationalism among Serbs in Serbia, albeit also at a relatively high level, appears rather insignifficant when compared to that of Serbs in RS).
Ultimately, the Serb nationalism in Bosnia, while most aggressively exercised, is not the only ethno-religious nationalism in this country that is threatening its survival. What most of us often tend to overlook is behavior of some Bosniak political leaders and clerics, such as the reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Ceric. While publicly portraying themselves as political opponents to Dodik, these politicians/clerics are actually doing exactly what Dodik wants them to: radicalizing Bosnian Muslims and thus providing Dodik with plausible argument for his claim that Bosnia is an “impossible/failed state, not because of him but because of the Muslims”.
Whether those Bosniak politicians are doing so advertently or inadvertently is something I cannot figure out for sure at this point, but there is at least one reason to suspect that the former is more likely to be the case. Simply because leaders of that ilk usually prefer autocracy to a democratic rule, inasmuch as a real, western-type democracy would considerably restrict the effective – and disproportionally high – power they currently hold in their hands. Simply put, the more nationalistic their ethnic group is, the more political leverage they can expect to have over it. After all, isn’t this exactly how Dodik has managed to obtain so much power in RS? Should we then be surpsrised at all if some of his counterparts from the Federation have opted to follow his example? Of course, not.
P.S: I cannot resist quoting the most “ingenious” recommendation of the ICG to Dodik: “strengthen the rule of law and root out corruption”.
Do they really expect him to root out the very himself?! Come on, give me a break!
They forgot to include the subtitle: BOSNIA: WHAT DOES REPUBLIKA SRPSKA WANT? And How to Make Sure It Gets It I assume that was the reason for suggesting that the United States follow the EU’s diplomatic lead.
The Serbs are the nation in the area most ready and willing to cause problems, and therefore, I guess the reasoning is, it’s important to make sure they’re happy – what they couldn’t win on the battlefield they’re to be given diplomatically, to make sure they don’t try to try to get what they want again, militarily? Or maybe the fear is just that they’ll just be an unending pain in the neck, diplomatically? Schools haven’t had a great deal of luck in dealing with bullies, either, but interventions to increase the self-esteem of the bully only end up leaving the teachers feeling virtuous, and the bully more empowered. (Taekwondo – especially with a teacher who emphases self-restraint and avoidance of force wherever possible – can work, especially for kids who aren’t comfortable “fighting.”)
I agree with what has been said that Dodik look for reasons for his policy where ever he can. Even in formerly laud but benign Ceric. However he would find reasons for running his policy in rising of the sun if there was nothing else to be found like nationalists usually do. He’s attacking Bosnia and defending Dayton Agreement, period without government he’s creating, while claiming that RS had ratified Dayton Agreement all while waiting for and working with Pro-Russian option in Serbia. His hart is set on this: He will not wait for EU and an end for himself that happened to former Croatian prime minister Ivo Sanader. he’ll leave Bosnia with or without RS before he gets the chance to be brought before the court. The very same reason why he’s against Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He doesn’t trust Catherine Ashton one scintilla when it comes to her promises that he’ll not end up like Ivo Sanader. He would believe Markale Angel before she gave a go for the papers about Ivo Sanader corruption to be revealed. He sees only out for himself in 1) Radicalization of Serbia and changing policy from EU toward Russia, 2) Moving to Russia
Demonization has a tendency to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. For that reason I believe we should be extremely conservative in attributing negative intentions to people.
Many politicians in the Balkans are corrupt. Yet most don’t use ethnic polarization as a way to escape imprisonment. Sure, Sanader ended up in prison. But Romania and Bulgaria are still full of politicians with a corrupt past. So the suggestion that Dodik’s fate is hopeless without radicalization doesn’t hold.
Well, perhaps Dodik’s fate is not hopeless without radicalization, but it undoubtedly is far more secure with radicalization. Try ,for example, to guess why is Dodik so opposed to the judiciary reform in Bosnia that he had been threatening with no less than a referendum on that issue for months, until Ms. Catherine Ashton came and finally dissuaded him. Not to mention investigative journalism reports with evidence of his involvement in corruption, or Wikileaks embassy cables about his dubious business enterprises, in some of which a Bosniak nationalist leader Fahrudin Radoncic is also mentioned as Dodik’s likely business partner.
If you read the ICG report still over 80% of the Bosniaks is in favor of more centralization (down from over 90). If Dodik keeps quiet everybody will assume that the Serbs no longer object to centralization so he has to stay vocal on the subject until the Bosniak side is finally ready for a real solution that is acceptable to the Serb side too. This is just politics and has nothing to do with his personal situation.
I suppose Dodik is smart enough to understand that too much tension is not in his interest. It harms business and economic growth and it creates a volatile climate where unexpected things might happen that might harm him personally.
Montenegro is a perfect example of how a person like Dodik might want to retire.
If Dodik would at this time be indicted for corruption by some central prosecutor everyone – not only Serbs – would see it as a politically motivated attempt to weaken the RS. It reflects continuing tensions that are not only Dodik’s doing.
I am wondering why so many people confuse centralization with the abolition of ethnically-based entities. Bosnia would be better off without its two currently existing entities. It would not entail centralization in the sense that all power is transfered to Sarajevo; to the contrary, Bosnia would still be a decentralized state, but on political and economical rather than ethnic basis. But for that to happen, people must first desist from the nationalist way of thinking once and for all.