Good facts, lousy policy

It wasn’t easy, but I managed to plow, or at least skim, my way through the 37 pages of ICG’s report on the 49% of Bosnia that constitutes Republika Srpska (RS), since I know you are all waiting for my verdict.

It’s mixed.  The report seems to me clear and compelling in portraying the profound corruption and extreme nationalism that dominate the RS as well the difficulties in the relationship between the RS and the governments in Sarajevo (both Federation and “state,” as Bosnians call what Americans would term the Federal government).  There are few better sources than this report, if any, for a comprehensive account of how RS has sought to weaken the state government and establish its own control over as many state functions as possible.  And the section towards the end on “The War: Facts” is a useful compilation.

But when it comes to policy, the report treats the RS as if neither corruption nor extreme nationalism is really a serious problem.  RS President Dodik’s efforts to block transfer of competences to the state are treated as mistakes from which it might be convinced to back off, not as a concerted effort to wreck any real prospect for a functional state government.  Dodik’s push for referendums on issues that clearly are intended to weaken the state are viewed as quixotic and erratic, when they are all too clearly purposeful and consistent.  Even the hope for independence is described as “vague”, when it in fact is clear and explicit.

Here’s a sample of ICG perceiving ambiguity:

The government in Banja Luka plays a strange game when it comes to independence – shifting from advocating a referendum on independence to reforms to return Bosnia to its
Dayton roots. While Dodik constantly publicly threatens secession,and the RS leadership continues to harden its positions, Dodik’s aides explain that his statements are meant for internal RS consumption and complain that Federation officials and internationals take them seriously. Yet,even far from the public and in bilateral meetings, Dodik and his closest advisers say they do not believe Bosnia has a future.

I am at a complete loss how anyone can think this “strange game” is anything but the usual one in which internationals are led around by aides who have placed a figurative ring in their nostrils. Dodik has publicly and repeatedly told his electorate that he intends to deliver them to freedom from Sarajevo. There is no ambiguity. The only thing that prevents him from doing this is the international community.

ICG can’t admit this because it has committed itself to dismantling the main international community barrier to Dodik’s secessionist ambition: the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  Instead, ICG thinks the EU will solve all.  Somehow this view creeps into the Executive Summary, though I looked in vain for any detailed discussion of the issues involved in the main text of the report:

The EU’s response, aided by the U.S. and others, to the political and legal challenge the RS posed in June offers a non-coercive alternative from which it will be difficult for any party to walk away.

This is almost comic: I can’t remember the last time I heard American diplomats angrier at their European colleagues than over Catherine Ashton’s ill-conceived and poorly executed maneuver to create this “non-coercive alternative,” a maneuver in which she managed not only to side-line the OHR but blind-side the Sarajevo government and provide a gigantic boost to Dodik’s claims of RS sovereignty. The only good thing about it was that it ended Dodik’s hope of an early dissolution of the OHR, because it  stiffened American spines and gave even Europeans second thoughts.

I won’t grace the recommendations with a detailed critique, though it is notable that they lack any for Belgrade even though the report itself highlights its role in supporting Dodik’s last electoral campaign. The recommendations that do exist amount to asking everyone in the RS  to do good things without providing any real reason why they should do so other than the goodness of their hearts. I think we all know how that will work out. But there is one recommendation that is downright pernicious:

Declare that neither partition nor greater centralisation is compatible with Bosnia’s early progress toward EU membership.

This is neither true nor wise. The Bosnian state is clearly incapable of EU membership without greater centralization, which is unquestionably compatible with early progress in that direction. Centralization of some functions is not the same as eliminating the RS, a canard that ICG should be savvy enough not to believe.  I am a strong proponent of decentralization and subsidiarity for those issues that can be handled at an entity or municipal level, but EU membership will require more functionality in Sarajevo than currently exists there. ICG’s effort at balance, falsely equating centralization with partition as two polar evils, has led it to err more than its fine leadership should allow.