Not too much to ask

In today’s hierarchy of international challenges, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks low.  It is an out of the way place, off the main axes of current concerns:  terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, oil, shifting sands in the Middle East, economic crisis.  It had more than its 15 minutes of fame in the 1990s, when war in Bosnia attracted worldwide attention, NATO intervened and the international community at Dayton imposed and sustained a settlement that has more or less lasted until now.  Isn’t that enough?

Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber argue forcefully in a report published this week by the Atlantic Initiative and the Democracy Policy Council that it is not.  They see real risks of renewed instability and spell them out in striking detail:  dismantling the Office of the High Representative and the extraordinary powers he once wielded, inflammatory rhetoric, capacity of the Bosnian state institutions (including the police and judiciary), the impact of the global economic crisis on the country’s weak economy, the Bosnian armed forces and the extraordinary dispersal in the country of weapons, football hooligans, minority returnees and Islamic radicals.  If war ever does break out again in Bosnia, no one is going to be able to claim there was no warning.

They also outline what they view as a necessary policy shift in the international community approach to Bosnia:

At the policy level, this shift would mean accepting, at least implicitly, that the path pursued since 2005 has failed and must be redesigned, starting from the identification of the strategic goal. That goal must be that BiH function well enough to meet the requirements to join the EU and NATO. Until that goal of durable functionality is reached by popular consent and demonstrated, it should be clear to all in BiH that the Dayton rules will continue to prevail and be enforced. That the country will not be allowed to fall apart, and that efforts in that direction will bring appropriately strong responses, needs to not only be articulated forcefully and clearly, but be believed.

What will that take?

– Additional troops from EU and non-EU members. EU/NATO member PIC SB countries not presently participating in EUFOR should make significant contributions.
– Sufficient helicopter lift for a quick reaction force based at Butmir of at least platoon, preferably company strength.
– Forward deployment in company strength to obvious potential flashpoints: Brčko and Mostar.
– Regular patrols between Tuzla airfield and Brčko, also to areas of minority return.
– De-emphasis of EUFOR activities not directly linked to the Chapter 7/Annex 1A SASE mandate.

Restoration of credible deterrence would not only prevent a return to violent conflict, but would create the potential for forward movement on the political and social fronts by stripping the entrenched political elites of their current ability to leverage fear. This would create space for citizens and potential leaders who want to find a way to make the country function consensually. Restored, credible deterrence is the sine qua non of any political and social progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This all makes a good deal of sense.  We are not talking giant resources here but a relatively modest increase in European commitments, including from non-members of the EU.

But the forces pushing against it are heavy.  The United States is understandably frustrated with years of trying to convince the Bosnians to fix the Dayton constitution and anxious to confront more substantial risks to American national security.  Distracted by the eurozone crisis, Brussels is happy to delegate Bosnia to its bureaucracy and entangle Sarajevo in the details of getting ready to make itself a candidate for EU membership. The longer that takes, the better from the perspective of those EU members hesitant about enlargement.

So we can’t expect much.  I’m hoping that at least EUFOR will strengthen its forces in the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, which would be a primary objective of opposing Muslim and Serb forces if there is ever a return to conflict.  The more important adjustment is less tangible but not less meaningful:  making all concerned understand that Bosnia will remain a single country and enter both NATO and the EU as such, or not at all.

This should not be beyond Brussels’ capacity to communicate, even with its current distractions.  And Washington will back it up.  It is not too much to ask.