I tweeted this question yesterday: “Do those who think Quds too smart for this operation think we are dumb enough to blame it on them without evidence?” The operation in question is the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington.
My Twitterfeed was divided on the answer. About as many retweeted the question as replied “yes.” Those who replied yes had several reasons, mainly linked to the idea that the U.S. is looking for an opportunity to go to war with Iran. Past U.S. behavior, including WMD in Iraq, was mentioned. I am old enough to have lived through the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Remember the Maine.
Several said maybe, that more evidence is needed to decide. I’m with them. There have been several alleged terrorist plots over the past decade that have collapsed like souffles. But we need to ask for more details and confirmation to decide whether this will be one of them. I hope energetic young reporters looking for their first Pulitzer are hard at work [note to Adam Serwer: get busy!]
That said, if the Administration believes that Iran backed this cockamamie plot, it needs to come up with an appropriate response. It has already added four Quds force dodos to the sanctions list. That’s enough if you think those people were directly involved but without higher approval. It’s not enough if you think this was truly an approved operation.
The Pentagon is letting it be known it regards this as a diplomatic and legal issue, not a military one. I don’t see anyone in the Administration ready even for a cruise missile attack on Quds force headquarters, though I suppose we might not know about that until it was over. They seem intent on naming and shaming, likely through a UN Security Council resolution. That’s a good idea, as it would get Russia and China lined up for further sanctions on Iran. But it isn’t going to be easy. Ambassador Rice has proved adept in the past. Let’s hope she can repeat.
What more can be done? We’ve got some time while the journalists sort out whether the plot was real and how deeply it reached into the Iranian power structure, so let’s consider the options
Blocking transactions to and from Iran’s Central Bank would have a devastating impact on the Iranian economy, but it is hard to see how we are going to convince Iran’s major trading partners to join such a move. We’d need to make some sort of exception for food and other humanitarian goods, unless we are ready to find ourselves accused of starving the Iranian population into submission. Iraq’s Oil for Food program is a precedent, one that was rife with corruption and exploitation by the regime we were supposed to be sanctioning.
China gets over 500,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran, 15% of its consumption. Beijing is not going to give that up easily. Nor will Japan, India or South Korea–Iran’s other major markets for oil.
Saudi Arabia may not have enough excess capacity to boost oil production much. If they try, current weakness in the market risks could send prices spiraling downwards past what even the Saudis will appreciate.
Tightening existing sanctions sounds practical, but it is not the stuff of a clear and compelling diplomatic signal.
So let’s have a contest: excluding the four things I’ve mentioned here, and leaving aside military action, what measures should be included in the options for President Obama in considering how to respond to Iran’s plot with what it thought was a Mexican cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador?
Do I dare call it the IranTel plot?
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