Mr. Petrović comes to Washington
Slobodan Petrović, the leader of the largest Serb political bloc in the Kosovo parliament and a deputy prime minister in the Albanian-majority country, has visited us previously in DC, but this is the first time we’ve had him as a solo act at Johns Hopkins. He appeared previously with then Finance Minister Ahmet Shala. Petrović outperformed, as they say on Wall Street (when it isn’t occupied).
He starts from a simple premise: he can do more to protect his constituency, attract Serbs back to Kosovo (or keep them from leaving) and improve their economic and social conditions by political participation than by isolating the Serbs and refusing to vote or serve in parliament, which is what Belgrade prefers. This is a marvelously simple, even self-evident, but decidedly non-Balkan notion.
It has worked reasonably well for Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most of them live. Forty per cent of them voted in the last Kosovo election. They are less isolated than five years ago, when Petrovic launched his Serb Liberal Party, and their rights are more widely respected. The Pristina government has funded housing and infrastructure for Serb communities, and the international community has pitched in as well. Decentralization, in accordance with the Ahtisaari peace plan that Belgrade rejected, has provided Serb-majority municipalities with a wide degree of autonomy. Freedom of movement has improved. I won’t say all Albanians have learned to embrace the Serbs, but they are certainly far more accepting of them today than in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war, when something like half the Albanian population of Kosovo returned from having been expelled by Serbian forces.
There is lots more to be done for the Serbs south of the Ibar, but the big problem is northern Kosovo, where Belgrade has not permitted Pristina’s institutions to be established, even those that are guaranteed autonomy by the Ahtisaari plan. As Petrović recounted, Belgrade instead maintains barely functioning municipal governments with large payrolls. Nationalist Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north, including some Croatian Serbs relocated to Kosovo in 1995. The result is a lawless area where courts don’t function, services are poor and extremists are determined to resist not only Pristina’s authority but also the UN, EULEX, NATO and the EU.
Ultimately, this is a European Union problem. The EU Commission has recommended candidacy status for Serbia, provided it improves cooperation with Pristina. The question is how far Belgrade will go. The smart money is betting not far, since Serbia has elections early next year and the EU is believed to have set a low bar, apparently in the hope that will boost Serbian President Boris Tadić’s reelection prospects.
Some believe things are moving in the right direction and we just need to patiently keep them on track. Eventually, Serbia will have to accept Kosovo independence as a reality. Some even believe that Tadić, if reelected, will bring nationalist Tomislav Nikolić into the government as prime minster, reducing Kosovo’s salience as a competitive issue in Serbian politics and enabling both to accept reality sooner rather than later.
I’m not ready to sign up to optimism on Serbia’s acceptance of the Kosovo reality. I’ve been disappointed too many times. But I am optimistic about the prospects for the Serb communities south of the Ibar. Petrović is leading them in a good direction, one I hope the Albanians of Kosovo will appreciate and reward. Pristina’s fate still depends, as it has since 1999, on how fairly it is prepared to treat Kosovo’s Serb population. That is also the key to the north, where it is not going to be easy to gain the confidence of the population.
One note of appreciation: to the Kosovo embassy in Washington, which handled its deputy prime minister’s visit well. As those of us who deal with the Balkans in Washington know only too well, Washington embassies sometimes provide support that depends all too obviously on the ethnic background of the visitor. Thank you, Ambassador Spahiu, for showing that Kosovo knows better!
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“… and extremists are determined to resist not only Pristina’s authority but also the UN, EULEX, NATO and the EU.”
They’re not paying much attention to Belgrade, either – at the meeting of the leaders of the four communities held to decide on their response to Kfor’s call to remove the barricades, they also voted against implementation of the agreements reached between their supposed capital and Prishtina in the Brussels talks because “they’re not in the interest of the Serbs.”
A slight correction: they do pay attention to Belgrade, but not to the government in Belgrade. And even within the very government there are obvious divisions on how the issue of (north) Kosovo should be handled further. In a word, neither President Tadic nor his government (yes, his government!) don’t have a clear idea what to do next. Simply put, they have heedlessly entered a game they have never been really prepared for and thus are now under enormous pressure to somehow find the way out. What the president and his teammates are desperately lacking is statesmanlike courage.
“Slobodan Petrović, the leader of the largest Serb political bloc…” about 10 members… All of them are member of his family. LOL
Slobodan Petrovic is a leader who courageously and responsibly lead the Serbian community forward, a politician with a vision!
Congratulations!
There is money to divide, so the Serbs south of the Ibar have a good reason to vote. In addition they know that if they don’t vote the local Albanian minority will get the majority in the municipal council and the Kosovo police will enforce their decisions. But the last weeks already two Serbs in the South have been killed by Albanians – showing how delicate their position really is. It is just that they don’t have a choice.
The Ahtisaari Plan does not give a wide array of autonomy. If you would propose such “autonomy” to the Catalans or the Basques in Spain they would just snicker. It is autonomy that requires permission from Pristina for every detail. In a corrupt environment like Kosovo that means you can take nothing for granted.
” resist not only Pristina’s authority but also the UN, EULEX, NATO and the EU.”
As far as I know the UN still hasn’t left its neutral point of view. The EU is showing a double face – but what else should we expect when its Kosovo policy is set by a man who previously was the prime foreign policy advisor of Blair.
“nationalist Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north”
Do you want to claim that all 20,000 refugees in the North who come from elsewhere in Kosovo are nationalists who can’t live elsewhere in Kosovo because they committed war crimes in 1999? Sounds to me like a propaganda trick to reason away that all Kosovo’s cities and many villages in the South have been completely cleansed of their Serbs.
Show me any returns to Kosovo’s cities. Show me young people capable of building a life in Kosovo. Show me anyone who believes that the villages in the South will not slowly die out. Maybe then will I believe that there is any good reason to bring Kosovo’s North under Albanian rule.
“Show me anyone who believes that the villages in the South will not slowly die out. ”
In the south of Kosovo, or the south of Serbia? Or simply, in Serbia? Look at the results of the current census – you can’t hold Albanians responsible for Serbs’ lack of willingness to reproduce outside of Kosovo. According to the country’s population pyramid, this has been going on since before the events of the Nineties, and the trend can only accelerate (there will be fewer young women every year to give birth, and more elderly to die off.) Serbia really has bigger problems to worry about than northern Kosovo. Paying pensions, for example.
Yes, “the big problem is the northern Kosovo” and, concerning the rest, the situation of Kosovo Serbs just reminds Frank Capra’s movies. It’s a wonderful life, for instance.