Elections in conflict zones
Post-conflict zones are prone to violent outbreaks. Competition for power in any form, elections included, runs the risk of reigniting violence.
These issues were discussed at a Carnegie Endowment event yesterday featuring Susanne Mueller, Benjamin Reilly, and Francesc Vendrell, with Thomas Carothers as moderator.
Election timing is one delicate matter that can spoil democratic progress. Though traditionally the inclination has been to hold elections quickly, thereby restoring legitimacy to the new government in a timely manner, recent scholarship has revealed important flaws in this approach. Premature elections often result in relapses of violent conflict, Ben Reilly points out, because previously repressed parties and factions feel indignant about the time constraints placed on their campaign preparation. Reilly thus worries that, because the civil war is only just ending in Libya, elections scheduled for only eight months from now could trigger a violent backlash.
One way to mitigate the issue of timing, Reilly argues, is by phasing elections in gradually. While the tendency is to hold national and sub-national elections simultaneously, experiments with gradualism in East Timor and Kosovo have cast doubt over this policy. By holding sub-national and municipal elections before those at the national level, both governments and populations can ease their way into the democratic process. Equally so, sequencing can allow national parties more time to organize and campaign, at least creating the perception of a fairer process.
Another virtue of delaying elections is the additional time gained to decide upon the proper voting system, which is often selected out of expediency rather than concern for long-term viability. As Reilly insists, the electoral system is a pivotal factor influencing the government’s ability to guide policy after elections. Too often inclusivity wins out over efficiency, leading state-building groups to favor proportional representation arrangements over those inviting the formation of larger, more centralized parties.
Inclusivity, of course, is crucial, especially in environments where key groups have been marginalized for decades. Blowback from the exclusion of low-level Baath officials in Iraq provides one among many clear examples.
But if, in Reilly’s words, we “reify factions” to the extent that inclusivity undermines functionality, the purpose for creating a democratic government in the first place can be jeopardized. Lebanon’s post-Ta’if environment illustrates clearly the pitfalls of highly factionalized and decentralized governmental frameworks forged in the pursuit of inclusivity. And, as Reilly argues, an overly-representative arrangement in Libya will undoubtedly lead to tribalization, potentially producing another version of the Qaddafi regime.
Technical analysis of this sort, however, is only so useful. Susanne Mueller reminds us that even the most finely tuned electoral apparatus is not averse to exogenous political factors unique to individual countries. Political cleavages, as Mueller reiterates, are capable of derailing the electoral process in the short and medium term regardless of the electoral framework in place. When players in the democratic process perceive there to be no returns on further participation, they may resort to violence in an attempt to solidify some gains.
Elections in Kenya, Mueller’s area of expertise, offer a useful illustration of this reality. Members of parliament employed gangs before and during the 2007 presidential election to scare-off supporters of the president, no doubt a reaction to vote tampering by the governing coalition and the failure of non-violent protests to effect change.
Perhaps the broader point then, as panelist Francesc Vendrell offers, is that scholars must be cautious when generalizing about electoral models in post-conflict countries. Political science can offer useful guidelines, but these must be flexible. Placing too much trust in one model can lead to myopic analysis. Political realities in Libya are different from those in Egypt, so it is unwise to simply assume, for example, that delayed elections in each will be favorable. Egypt’s military has, for better or worse, maintained a monopoly on force and deployed units to maintain relative order, which at least creates the potential for peaceful elections in the near term. Libya, on the other hand, must reconstitute its armed forces entirely, rendering the prospects for orderly and transparent voting dim in the near term.
These distinctions must be central to any decision concerning election timing and voting systems, an assertion upon which yesterday’s panelists expressed clear agreement.
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