peacefare.net

Syria still needs nonviolence

Today’s suspension of Syria from the Arab League will be seen by some as irrelevant, even risible.  Who would even want to be a member of an organization as feckless as the one that 10 days ago reached an agreement with President Bashar al Assad to end the violence, only to see him turn around and gun down hundreds of protesters? Nor does the Arab League have a great record of achievement elsewhere, and many of its members would arguably respond to protesters in much the same way as Bashar has.

But that misses the point.  The key to ending Bashar al Assad’s reign of terror in Syria is to attack his legitimacy.  Anything that contributes, even marginally, to that end has to be counted as positive.  International legitimacy is important to autocrats.  Bashar certainly doesn’t care much about the Arab League–if he did he would not have so blatantly violated the agreement he reached with it–but if the League did not act at this point it would certainly redound to his benefit.

Assistant Secretary of State Feltman testified this week with admirable clarity about U.S. goals and strategy:  we want to see protesters protected, Bashar out, and a transition to democracy begun.  But he was also appropriately modest about our capacity to get what we want.  Our primary leverage is through the European oil embargo, which seems to be holding, and other, mainly financial, sanctions, which are beginning to bite.  There is not, at the level of goals, much of a gap between the Administration and outside experts like Andrew Tabler, who also testified.

But Andrew did have some specific policy suggestions worthy of consideration:  formation of a Syria contact group, development of a strategy to peel away the regime’s supporters, helping the opposition unify and begin planning for transition, pushing for human rights monitors, preparing for military action and pressing for a Security Council resolution.

The Administration is certainly pursuing several of these already.  Feltman made it clear that international monitors is among them, as is helping the opposition.   Surely they already are thinking in terms of a strategy to peel away the regime’s supporters and are beginning to press again for Security Council action.

The one that gives me pause, and likely does likewise Feltman, is preparing for military action.  It would certainly be justified against a regime that is taking military action against its own citizens, but any visible preparation for international military action will encourage violent resistance inside Syria.  That is a bad idea.  As Feltman makes amply clear, Bashar al Assad is intentionally encouraging violent resistance, as it solidifies the security forces as well as his political support and gives him every reason to crack down forcefully.

Just as important:  there is not likely to be any military protection for the protesters, apart from welcoming those who flee along the border with Turkey.  Russia will block any authorization in the Security Council, the Europeans are exhausted after Libya and preoccupied with the euro crisis, and the Arab League is still far from asking for the use of force.  The Americans stand to gain a great deal from peaceful regime change in Syria, but violent change will risk ethnic and sectarian warfare with wide and potentially devastating regional consequences.

Bashar is finished, sooner or later.  We need to worry about making sure that what comes after is a democratic regime prepared to allow all Syrians a say in how they are governed.  That will be far easier to accomplish if the protests can be kept peaceful, no matter how violent the regime gets.  For those who doubt this proposition, I can only recommend Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works.