Good news and bad
It is good news that Jerry Gallucci has taken up the challenge of seriously assessing the Ahtisaari plan provisions for north Kosovo. This is a first: a hard look at what it contains and how, from a northern Kosovo Serb perspective, it falls short or requires additional clarification. I don’t mean by this that I agree with what Jerry says, especially on the courts, applicable law and some other matters, but his is definitely a step forward. And well-crafted to boot. Please read before reacting. But by all means react: it would be a good idea for one or more of the capable think-tanks in Pristina to react point by point.
Gallucci couches his suggestions for improvements (from the north Kosovo Serb perspective still) in terms of implementation plans, rather than “Ahtisaari plus” or other formulations calculated to excite immediate rejection in Pristina. That is also good. But he continues to want “status neutrality.” He thinks Belgrade can refuse to accept Kosovo as sovereign and independent but gain all the substantial benefits that the Ahtisaari plan offers (and then some).
That’s the bad news. The ongoing quarrel over collection of customs at the north Kosovo border crossings with Serbia should by now have convinced everyone that lack of clarity about sovereignty and borders is a bad idea. I don’t know any two countries with a border that is not agreed and demarcated who have good relations. Belgrade and Pristina are not going to be an exception to the rule.
I fully accept that Belgrade will never bilaterally recognize Kosovo–the politicians there have repeated this line so often they can’t back up. Fortunately, they don’t need to. They just need to ask the Russians to stop blocking UN General Assembly membership for Kosovo, which requires a positive recommendation from the UN Security Council.
Eighty-five states have now recognized Kosovo. It will not be long before the recognizers outnumber the non-recognizers in the General Assembly, which could then move to make Kosovo a non-member state (the status Palestine is now seeking). Even within the EU, more than one of the non-recognizers may reconsider as governments there change.
Admission to the UNGA as a nonmember state won’t do much more for Kosovo than it will do for the Palestinians. It would be far better for Pristina and Belgrade to reach a real agreement, not only on how the Ahtisaari plan is to be implemented but also on status, which would then allow Serbia to pursue its ambition of EU membership without the ball and chain called Kosovo attached to its ankle.
Gallucci gives some reason for optimism on the status question, which is really two questions:
1) who are the properly constituted, democratic authorities in Kosovo?
2) are they sovereign and independent?
He goes so far as to say, “North Kosovo remains part of Kosovo, and that Kosovo’s territorial and political integrity be maintained.” His discussion of the Ahtisaari plan implementation includes participation by the north Kosovo Serbs in the Pristina institutions, which at least answers the first question definitively.
Here’s some more good news: the IMF says Kosovo’s policies are broadly on track, 2012 growth will be 4% and inflation is moderating. It is ironic of course that this corner of the euro zone is avoiding the problems bedeviling the bigger boys. My advice to Pristina: governing well is the best revenge.
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Please allow me one clarification and one related gloss:
— My riff on the Ahtisaari Plan is not meant to be from the “northern Kosovo Serb perspective.” It aims at helping to find areas of possible compromise between the two sides within the plan devised by President Ahtisaari. It would require that both accept things that they would rather not. The Kosovo Serbs, for example, would as part of an overall agreement, agree to take part in central institutions. This would be necessary to balance the Kosovo Albanians accepting they would have no direct involvement in the lives of the northerners. The various elements of the suggested framework offer something to both sides in return for not getting their maximum.
2. The suggested package is status neutral because a non status-neutral solution to the north is not possible while Serbs and Albanians differ about Kosovo’s status. Efforts to impose a status affirmative solution on the northern Serbs – which is what the Quint has been trying to do through KFOR and EULEX – has failed. It has been demonstrably shown that such cannot be forced on the northern Kosovo Serbs and that they will continue to reject any approach that puts them under Pristina’s rule or imposes Kosovo customs on them. Even if Belgrade agrees. Furthermore, while it might be possible for the northern Serbs to accept participation in central institutions, this would be much more difficult to accept if they were asked to recognize them as sovereign institutions of an independent country rather than simply the institutions of the territory (province, if they will) of Kosovo. What the Kosovo Albanians would get from this arrangement is recognition of the role of their institutions in the life of all of Kosovo’s people and retaining in this way the political as well as territorial integrity of Kosovo. All of this would require, an agreement to continue to disagree on status.
We do hope that the ideas in the TransConflict paper will provoke discussion about how practical solutions can be found to the issue of the north. This would be preferable to more conflict or to a continued, tense stalemate. And it could avoid partition.
Compromise is never easy and the effort to find one may require greater optimism and trust than now exists. Actions since July to force a solution on the northern Kosovo Serbs may not leave them in any mood to even try. As long as the US – its National Guard forces are still trying to close all alternate roads in the north? – does not throw its weight into seeking practical solutions, Pristina too may be in no hurry.
Thanks, Dan, for remaining tuned in.
The details are irrelevant if Serbia refuses to implement the agreements reached. This is what may happen to the first agreements out of the Brussels talks – the Serb parliament is up in arms and refusing to accept them because handing over even copies of the land registers they interpret as recognizing the authority of the Kosovo courts. Prishtina can afford to wait, Serbia (demographically speaking) can’t.
The Serbs in the north (and some in Serbia) have sent a petition with 20,000 signatures to the Russians asking to be granted Russian citizenship. It worked for the Abkhazians, after all. I wonder if they’d be subject to the Russian draft?
Kommersant is commenting on the Kosovar Serbs’ request for Russian citizenship, mentioning specifically the South Ossetian precedent. (I figured “Abkhazian” would be more recognizable, but it was actually South Ossetia that the Russians invaded when their “citizens” were attacked by Georgian forces, although Assad surely wouldn’t have seen any problem with their actions. Was there ever a rational put out for attacking the Georgians in Abkhazia, it was just convenient?)
There’s a line in the article Saakashvili will surely cut out and save for future talks with the West – “in Kosovo we would not have just Mikhail Saakashivi to deal with, but the entire Nato block.” Just what he was saying in pushing for some kind of Nato association at the time.
Mr. Serwer wrote: “I fully accept that Belgrade will never bilaterally recognize Kosovo–the politicians there have repeated this line so often they can’t back up”.
So, you do not believe that someone like me could ever become the president of Serbia? Well, frankly, neither do I.
O.K., joking aside, Mr. Gallucci’s proposal offers a pretty good framework for moving toward a final solution, yet there remains an essential problem that Serbs in the north of Kosovo are zealously in favor of clearly anti-Western Serbian political parties, such as Democratic party of Serbia (DSS) led by Mr. Kostunica, Serbian radical party (SRS) led by Mr. Seselj, and Serbian progressive party (SNS) led by Seselj’s former closest aide, Mr. Tomislav Nikolic, which, despite now being nominally pro-European, is still a conservative nationalist party with very strong links to the Kremlin. This means that even if the current regime in Belgrade somehow accepted everything that is required – which, by the way, is highly unlikely at this point given that the pre-election campaign is heating up – the north Kosovo Serbs would definitely refuse to comply, even at the cost of provoking a very forceful response from KFOR. Those people, i.e. vast majority of them, simply regard Boris Tadic and his government as “traitors” and they are repeatedly condemning each single deal Ms. Tahiri and Mr. Stefanovic as negotiators have striked thus far, even though most of these deals have yet to be implemented.
About a month ago, I happened to meet a Serb from Kosovska Mitrovica who frequently comes to Serbia for his own business (the man is a construction worker). His hatred toward Albanians as a nation is enormous. When he said that Boris Tadic is an “American puppet” because he doesn’t want to send Serbian armed forces to Kosovo, I told him that Serbian army is so weak that it could not do anything in Kosovo even if Tadic was willing to order the military action. And do you know what he replied: “Well, if you (Serbs from Serbia) don’t want to help us, then we are going to expel ‘Shiptars’ (an offensive term for Albanians) from ‘our’ Kosovo ourselves. We are unified enough to do that on our own!”.