Good news and bad

It is good news that Jerry Gallucci has taken up the challenge of seriously assessing the Ahtisaari plan provisions for north Kosovo.  This is a first:  a hard look at what it contains and how, from a northern Kosovo Serb perspective, it falls short or requires additional clarification.  I don’t mean by this that I agree with what Jerry says, especially on the courts, applicable law and some other matters, but his is definitely a step forward. And well-crafted to boot.  Please read before reacting.  But by all means react:  it would be a good idea for one or more of the capable think-tanks in Pristina to react point by point.

Gallucci couches his suggestions for improvements (from the north Kosovo Serb perspective still) in terms of implementation plans, rather than “Ahtisaari plus” or other formulations calculated to excite immediate rejection in Pristina.  That is also good.  But he continues to want “status neutrality.”  He thinks Belgrade can refuse to accept Kosovo as sovereign and independent but gain all the substantial benefits that the Ahtisaari plan offers (and then some).

That’s the bad news.  The ongoing quarrel over collection of customs at the north Kosovo border crossings with Serbia should by now have convinced everyone that lack of clarity about sovereignty and borders is a bad idea.  I don’t know any two countries with a border that is not agreed and demarcated who have good relations.  Belgrade and Pristina are not going to be an exception to the rule.

I fully accept that Belgrade will never bilaterally recognize Kosovo–the politicians there have repeated this line so often they can’t back up.  Fortunately, they don’t need to.  They just need to ask the Russians to stop blocking UN General Assembly membership for Kosovo, which requires a positive recommendation from the UN Security Council.

Eighty-five states have now recognized Kosovo.  It will not be long before the recognizers outnumber the non-recognizers in the General Assembly, which could then move to make Kosovo a non-member state (the status Palestine is now seeking).  Even within the EU, more than one of the non-recognizers may reconsider as governments there change.

Admission to the UNGA as a nonmember state won’t do much more for Kosovo than it will do for the Palestinians.  It would be far better for Pristina and Belgrade to reach a real agreement, not only on how the Ahtisaari plan is to be implemented but also on status, which would then allow Serbia to pursue its ambition of EU membership without the ball and chain called Kosovo attached to its ankle.

Gallucci gives some reason for optimism on the status question, which is really two questions:

1) who are the properly constituted, democratic authorities in Kosovo?

2) are they sovereign and independent?

He goes so far as to say, “North Kosovo remains part of Kosovo, and that Kosovo’s territorial and political integrity be maintained.”  His discussion of the Ahtisaari plan implementation includes participation by the north Kosovo Serbs in the Pristina institutions, which at least answers the first question definitively.

Here’s some more good news:  the IMF says Kosovo’s policies are broadly on track, 2012 growth will be 4% and inflation is moderating.  It is ironic of course that this corner of the euro zone is avoiding the problems bedeviling the bigger boys.  My advice to Pristina:  governing well is the best revenge.