The places we’d like to forget
Busy morning: conversations with people who know the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo really well. What’s the common denominator? Ethnic strife, which makes everything so much harder. Each of my interlocutors (that’s people you talk with in diplomatese) has his/her own agenda and views. Here are my conclusions:
1. Iraq:
Not going badly. Much more Sunni ethnic nationalism than in the past, with Sunnis and Kurds getting on better as the Sunnis start thinking about wanting one or more regions of their own. Maaliki managing to maintain the fragmentation and shifting alliances that keep him in power, even as he continues to gain greater control over the army. Arrests of Ba’athists and Exxon contract with the Kurds are not causing giant problems: Iraqiyya is staying in the government and the Exxon move brings pressure on Baghdad to pass the oil law. Both sides reasonably content with the American withdrawal, looking forward to stronger implementation of the Strategic Framework Agreement that will now govern the bilateral relationship. Not clear however whether they see implementation of that agreement in the same way.
2. Afghanistan:
Not going well. Governance is the main issue. This is well-recognized among the Americans, who regard the 2014 presidential succession, strengthening of independent institutions, and improvement of national and provincial planning and budgeting as the governance priorities. But there is not a lot of sign of progress, despite substantial effort. Governance is difficult. President Karzai’s way of governing is not one we can ever much like, as it involves behaviors that we regard as corrupt, but creating an alternative requires a degree of commitment and sophistication that the now declining American presence is not likely to display.
3. Bosnia:
No prospect of forming a “state” government (that’s what they call the central government), ten months after elections. Meanwhile the Federation half (51%) of Bosnia, led by engineer turned Social Democrat Zlatko Lagumdžija, is competing with Republika Srpska (49%), led by social democrat turned ethnic nationalist Milorad Dodik, for both improved governance and political clout. RS is thought to be running out of money and is borrowing at high rates. Federation has recently borrowed at lower rates. RS is trying hard to negotiate pre-accession funding and other matters directly with the European Commission, which is inclined to accommodate. The Federation is intervening to prevent this, in order to preserve the prerogatives of the state government and block RS from weakening it further.
4. Kosovo:
No clear solution has emerged yet to the problems of the north, where Serbia still controls the territory. There is hope NATO and EULEX will resolve the issue of collection of taxes at the border posts, seized by Pristina last summer, but governance in the north is a bigger problem and can only be solved with Belgrade’s cooperation, which has not been forthcoming. It is not clear what the Europeans will insist on as the price for a positive decision on EU candidacy, due December 9, even though Merkel was clear enough on the need to eliminate the Serbian “parallel structures.” Meanwhile Pristina is weighing constitutional amendments, which may provide for popular election of the president (rather than election in parliament). But then they might have to augment the functions of the president as well.
All in all, not such a bad picture, if you consider the very real difficulties of post-war state building, which is a decades-long process. Afghanistan is the greatest of the concerns–it is just very difficult to picture how the situation there comes out well enough for U.S. troops to be able to stay on after 2014, an idea Karzai has been trying to sell to this week’s loya jirga. And even more difficult to picture how we would leave Afghanistan if things do not straighten out.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
2 thoughts on “The places we’d like to forget”
Comments are closed.
RSS - Posts
“President Karzai’s way of governing is not one we can ever much like, as it involves behaviors that we regard as corrupt, but creating an alternative requires a degree of commitment and sophistication that the now declining American presence is not likely to display.”
Perhaps we have to wait for the political equivalent of neoteny recapitulating phylogeny – the country may be years if not decades (I don’t dare to think longer than that) to change from a pre-medieval society (warlords, religious control superseding political control, much less by elected leaders. What is corruption to a Westerner in many societies is simply depending on the people you know you can trust, and rewarding them appropriately. Supposedly such friends and relatives will do a good job to avoid embarrassing the family, something you can’t count on a complete stranger, maybe a member of a tribe you’re on the outs with, to do. Couldn’t we settle for a level of governance that would have been acceptable in the 1500’s, for example, if the 21st century seems impossible? (I’m not suggesting this for our Congress, BTW – they’re supposed to know better.)
And as for Kosovo: KiM Radio, which tries to be objective – it refers to “Kosovo and Metohija” when the source is Serbian, and “Kosovo” when a story is out of Prishtina – and which seems to have come into some funding recently, has opened a comments section.
There’s an article today on Stefanovic’s message to the local Serb leaders: you don’t represent all Serbs in Kosovo, and you don’t have a veto on Belgrade’s decisions: the agreements reached in Brussels will be implemented. Maybe it’s no longer worth it for Belgrade to imply they are helpless against the log-sitting patriots?
There are two responses so far. The much longer one, from “Srbin iz severnog dela Mitrovice” (A Serb from the northern part of Mitrovica), fully supports S. and Tadic in their efforts to find the best possible solution for the Serbian population in Kosovo. The support the local leaders have, according to him, is small and based entirely on economic interests and implemented through threats and blackmail. Belgrade has been sending [publicly undisclosed amounts of] money to Kosovo since the end of the war but, he says, services have never been worse – the hospitals are a disgrace, not a pot-hole has been filled for the past year. Srbin claims that Stefanovic (whom the local leaders are threatening to take to court for his efforts in Brussels) has the support of most of the Serbs in Kosovo, who merely want to live a normal life. (And no, I didn’t write it – my Serbian isn’t nearly good enough.)
Vitas, on the other hand, says that the leaders represent the people living there and as such have a mandate to accept or reject decisions affecting them, and that the people should get behind the leaders and not the other way around. (Not the leaders in Belgrade, obviously.) He does not discuss the pot-hole situation.
Mr. Serwer wrote: “No clear solution has emerged yet to the problems of the north, where Serbia still controls the territory”.
A problem is that neither Serbia nor Kosovo are who actually controls the territory, but local clans made up of politicians, so-called “controversial businessmen” and criminals with common interest in keeping the north as a no man’s land. Earlier today in Serbian parliament there was a wrangle between Borislav Stefanovic and the northern Kosovo Serb political representatives over the forthcoming implementation of the agreements reached so far in the negotiations with Kosovo. It seemed pretty encouraging to me that for the first time a Serbian government official clearly and publicly warned the arrogant Serb leaders from the north that Serbia was going to respect the agreements it had signed, whether they liked it or not. And it really was high time to teach a lesson to those who deemed it normal to receive the salaries from the government but instructions from their own politicial parties.