The second law of holes
As I’ve dared give advice to Belgrade, I might as well go on and compound the felony by giving advice to Pristina.
The problem is this: Pristina does not control the relatively small part of its territory north and west of the Ibar river, including two border/boundary (Pristina regards it as a border, Belgrade as a boundary) posts with Serbia. Much of the population there–majority Serb even before the war in the three northernmost municipalities–wants to remain in Serbia.
In the short term, it seems to me the best Pristina can hope for is collection of its taxes and enforcement of its laws at the border/boundary. Exactly who will do this and under what supervision are the issues that need to be decided. It might also hope for a clear statement from Belgrade that it regards Kosovo as a single entity, which is consistent with UN Security Council resolution 1244.
Achievement of these shorter-term goals will not however solve the problem of north Kosovo, where there is a population that does not accept Kosovo institutions. Pristina needs to compete for the hearts and minds of the Serb population north of the Ibar, who are nearly as resentful of Belgrade as they are apprehensive about Pristina.
This is going to be difficult. More radical Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north, where they have built up a lucrative trade in untaxed goods shipped not only into the north but also back into Serbia and to Kosovo south of the Ibar. Pristina has successfully competed for the hearts and minds of at least some Serbs and other minorities living south of the Ibar, many of whom now participate in Kosovo’s institutions and derive benefits from them even if they reject Kosovo’s independence. There is no reason to settle for less in north Kosovo, but lots of reasons why it will be a greater challenge.
The right approach is to use implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, which provides the Serb municipalities with ample self-government, adjusting as need be to meet legitimate concerns and changed circumstances. This should be done in cooperation with Serbia, which will need to dissolve or withdraw some of its institutions in the north even as it commits to maintaining and even expanding others. Educational, health, religious and cultural institutions and personnel that serve the Serb community in Kosovo should in principle be welcomed, because they will encourage members of that community to stay. The last thing Kosovo needs is a big exodus of Serbs from the north.
Pristina will need to back its efforts with substantial resources and high-level attention. It should appoint a minister to coordinate the government’s efforts on the north and provide generous funding. It should also have a representative in Belgrade to improve cooperation and ensure coordination.
It would be reasonable to aim for the next municipal elections, in autumn 2013, to be held in the communities of north Kosovo, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan. By then, Belgrade and Pristina should have developed a joint plan for reintegration that will among other things decide the disposition of the Serbian institutions in the north, including the status of their personnel and programs.
I would expect the Kosovo Government to be prepared to discuss these issues, but it cannot be expected to allow Serb institutions that undermine Pristina’s authority in order to lay the groundwork for partition. Belgrade has to be clear about the goal: reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo.
One wag has proposed a second law of holes: fill it in and keep it from becoming a hazard.
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5 thoughts on “The second law of holes”
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If anything is certain in all this uncertainty, it is that no conclusive, long-term settlement can be made until very first people – i.e. presidents and/or prime ministers – of Kosovo and Serbia sit down with each other, shake hands and begin a formal conversation over all undecided issues.
” This should be done in cooperation with Serbia, which will need to dissolve or withdraw some of its institutions in the north even as it commits to maintaining and even expanding others. ”
Er, it sounds like it’s still a matter of getting Belgrade to change its position – the Albanians are already living with such an arrangement in the south, with the Serb-majority municipalities in control of their own schools and roads etc. Suggesting as a by-the-way that Serbia should simply agree to allow the implementation of Ahtisaari in the north, which it is what it is adamantly refusing to do and which is causing the problem, seems wishful thinking, and out of Prishtina’s control in any case.
When I get depressed about the situation, I get out the population pyramids for Serbia and for the Albanians in Kosovo. It has a calming effect. The current situation, too, will pass.
All agreements should be reached within 1244 UN resolution. I would like to take an advantage of an opportunity to remind you that it recalls the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Serbia and other states in the region, and reaffirmed its call for meaningful autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo and not “INDEPENDENT KOSOSVO”.
Everything else, including Daniel’s “suggestion” above is to be considered as an occupation of Serbian territory.
I would also like to let you know that I see myself as a liberal and anti-nationalist.
The world without the law or the world where NATO interprets international law is not working. Look around you. After WWII USA was the “motor of the world” and look where we have ended. Is it kind of a world you want to leave to you kids? Best regards Simeon
“I would like to take an advantage of an opportunity to remind you that it recalls the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Serbia and other states in the region, and reaffirmed its call for meaningful autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo and not “INDEPENDENT KOSOSVO”.”
The business about reaffirming Serbian sovereignty is irrelevant, since it was in the preamble. Vuk Draskovic at least understands the difference between the scene-setting and pious wishes of a preamble and the enforceable provisions that follow in a contract or treaty – he said they learned that in first-year law school. The Serbian negotiators at the time understood perfectly well what the resolution implied for the future and attempted to block it at the Security Council. Since that time Serbian politicians have cheerfully used the confusion to imply they are due all kinds of things that the resolution doesn’t give them, as became clear for the rest of us during the ICJ proceedings. There was no guarantee to protect Serbia’s sovereignty and prevent Kosovo’s independence forever, there was merely recognition of the existing state of affairs – Serbia was technically sovereign, although it was not to exercise any of the powers of a sovereign under the arrangement. And then, years later, Prishtina finally declared independence, and the situation changed.
“More radical Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north”
This looks to me like demonizing. Most Serbs that went from southern Kosovo to northern Kosovo did that because everyone from their place of origin was driven out. Serbs with a really troubled war record know that they are much safer in Serbia proper where there is no KFOR to arrest them.
If I might give advice to Pristina it would to agree to disagree with Belgrade on the north for the moment and to focus on other subjects. There is enough to do that is more important than this sorry nationalist game.
If Pristina really manages to convince the southern Serbs of their good intentions the north will come along in due time. If they can’t there must be a good reason and it might be better to keep the North out of Pristina’s direct control.
As long as Serbs have to live in enclaves to survive in southern Kosovo I think it is irresponsible to bring more Serbs under Pristina’s rule anyway.