Countering the counter-revolution

It all seemed elegantly simple 10 months ago:  peaceful demonstrators took to the streets and threw out autocrats who had ruled for decades in Tunisia and Egypt.

Now it is far more complicated.  In Egypt the army that helped to remove Hosni Mubarak is holding on to power and engaging in pitched urban battles with both Islamist and secular protesters.  In Syria, Bashar al Assad is killing dozens a day to preserve his regime.  In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh continues to defy both protesters and army rebels.  The UN envoy’s claim today that an agreement has been reached is at best prelude to a negotiation over getting it signed, which has failed several times.  In Libya, militias that once fought Muammar Qaddafi have begun to fight each other, defying the leadership of the National Transitional Council and its recently appointed interim prime minister.

The forces of counter-revolution are alive and well.  They should not be underestimated.  Many Egyptians crave stability and will support the army.  Minorities and businesspeople in Syria continue to support the regime, fearing loss of privilege and protection if it falls.  The young men with guns in Yemen and Libya, wanting their slice of power and money, won’t hesitate to defy unelected leadership that is largely unarmed.  Things can still go awry in all these places, as they have already in Bahrain, where the monarchy has managed to consolidate its power (with help from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) even as it admits that some of the security forces have used excessive force in dealing with protesters.

What is needed to keep these revolutions on track towards democratic outcomes?  It certainly helps to have, as in Tunisia and Libya, a clear roadmap for when parliamentary (or constituent assembly) elections are to held as well as how and when a new constitution is prepared and presidential elections held.  Egypt has changed its plans several times.  Now even the first round of parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28 is in doubt.  Yemen has never had a clear plan, and the opposition Syrian National Council is just now elaborating a program.

But even more critical than a plan is an authority recognized as legitimate by most people who support the revolution.  The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces lost it legitimacy with many of those who supported the revolution months ago.  The Libyan National Transitional Council seems still to have it.  The Syrian National Council is still trying to acquire it.  Yemen has intended to rely on the existing, constitutional order, with power turned over to the vice president in preparation for elections three months later.

International recognition of an interim authority can help, as it did in Libya, but it cannot substitute for strong roots within the country.  This is what makes Bahrain so difficult:  the Sunni monarchy there will want to manage a controlled transition to a slightly more constitutional system on its own, without serious input from the country’s Shiite majority.  Tomorrow’s publication of an independent commission of inquiry report on the February/March protests there will mark a new phase–the protesters will need to decide quickly whether to restart their efforts in the street or look instead to the negotiating table.

Most important in Bahrain and elsewhere is that protesters need to be certain that they have truly broad popular backing as they press for faster and more complete change.  It is not enough to claim to represent the 99%, as Occupy Wall Street does in the U.S.  They have to be truly in tune with the 99%, which is difficult when the 99% is split in many different ways, foreign powers are tugging in different directions and autocrats are warning of public disorder.  There is no substitute for wise, indigenous leadership that can decide when to go to the streets and when to go to the ballot box.

PS, November 23:  Here is the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report.