The Balkans in Europe whole and free
My colleague here at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Kurt Volker, testified earlier this month in the House on the Balkans. Kurt and I don’t agree entirely on some policy points in his presentation, but I think the analysis was spot on and the policy recommendations–as would be expected from a former ambassador to NATO and principal deputy assistant secretary for Europe at the State Department–were well crafted in the broader context of Europe whole and free. So I am delighted he has given me permission to post his written statement. It is well worth a read for the Balkan-watchers (and inhabitants) among you.
Here are Kurt’s main policy points:
• In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton framework has stalled out. It is time to launch a new, major push from the international community to go beyond Dayton and establish lasting, effective governing structures – a Dayton Two. The Butmir process of a few years ago was a good effort, but ultimately did not succeed. We should go further.
There are plenty of positive forces for change in Bosnia today – from reformers and young people to civil society to businessmen and so forth. The conditions for progress have never been better. But the current political structures have guaranteed long-term divisions inside the country that play to the hands of nationalist and separatists. We should not close down the Office of the High Representative, or phase out the EU Force, until political structures are settled and functioning. So we should make a major push to settle these very issues.
• Likewise, we need a fresh push for political progress on Kosovo – in particular arrangements for Mitrovica in the north. Ethnic Serbs in southern Kosovo are well-protected and able to participate actively in society in Kosovo. There is no reason ethnic Serbs in the north could not do the same, but they are radicalized and held back. Criminal interests – both local and from Serbia proper – Serbian interior ministry police, and of course the nature of the Kosovo government and international community’s past engagement, have all played a role. But it has gotten worse with time, not better, and it is time to push for a more wide-reaching resolution.
Here, one needs also to push the European Union on its role. Despite years of history and the ruling of the International Court of Justice, five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, as the United States and 22 other EU members have done. This serves to perpetuate the belief in Serbia, and in Mitrovica, that Kosovo’s independence can be un-done. It can’t. And neither can partitions or territory swaps solve Kosovo’s problems. Indeed, such steps would add new problems in the entire region. While no one can force any state to recognize another, the sooner the EU develops a stronger and more unified position, the sooner both sides in Kosovo can stop looking backward and start looking forward. With all the other problems Europe has to tackle right now, it makes no sense to continue contributing to this one.
• I want to add a word on Macedonia as well. In 2008, Macedonia was ready to be invited to join NATO, but there was no consensus within NATO to do so, because the name dispute with Greece was unresolved. Under the interim agreement of 1995, Greece had supported Macedonia’s participation in international organizations under the temporary name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” But Greece broke with this practice when it came time to admit Macedonia to NATO. Since then, Macedonia itself has slid backwards on some reforms, and has ramped up its use of controversial symbols of ancient Macedonia as a means of rallying the public and distracting from other issues at home.
Macedonia should be a vibrant crossroads of the Balkans – linking Greece to the north and linking the Western Balkans to Greece and the Mediterranean. The current stand-off serves no one’s interests: Not Greece, not Macedonia, not Europe, not the people of the Balkans, and not the United States. For years, we have supported the UN lead in negotiating a possible solution to the name issue. All of the elements have been put on the table at one point or another. It is time for the U.S. and EU together to make a concerted effort to (a) re-assert the validity of the 1995 interim agreement and use of FYROM as a temporary name, which – with Greek agreement – would allow Macedonia to join NATO and progress toward the EU; and (b) simultaneously, launch a major political push, including with incentives and disincentives, in support of the UN process, to get both sides to a final settlement.
Where would I differ?
Mainly on Bosnia: I would not be able to tell the Secretary of State that she should risk another failure like Butmir. Dayton 2 is much more likely to lead in a more ethnic nationalist direction, which is the wrong one in my view.
On Kosovo, only in nuance: I think we should make resolution of Kosovo issues–at least of the north–a condition for Serbia’s EU candidacy, which should not go ahead December 9 unless there is a clear and irreversible Belgrade commitment to cooperate in reintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo.
On Macedonia, not at all: the interim accord is the way to go. I understand an International Court of Justice decision on this is due December 5. Let’s hope it is clear and unequivocal in Skopje’s favor.
Thank you, Kurt for a terrific overview!
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” I would not be able to tell the Secretary of State that she should risk another failure like Butmir. Dayton 2 is much more likely to lead in a more ethnic nationalist direction, which is the wrong one in my view.”
if the usa is decisive and firm in its intentions to help bosnia and herzegovina overcome current direction led by dodik which is dissolution of bosnia and herzegovina the wrong way which is currently in its way will be reversed. no-one will stand in the usa way (espacially not local lunatics) for this to be accomplished and for bosnia and herzegovina to get back on the road for eu as a state compatible with eu standards (and standards of civilized world and other liberal democracies).
Of all the issues mentioned here, Bosnia is by far the most challenging. Harsh realism instead of wishful thinking is necessary to anyone with the ambition to solve the puzzle.
Ethnic structure is such that the formation of a nation state is infeasible. Moreover, as a result of the ethnic cleansing, Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity, Republika Srpska (RS), is all but ethnically homogenous (the percentage of non-Serbs there is so small that any pro-Bosnian political force would have no chance of rising to power).
In the other entity, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), Bosnian Muslims (commonly called Bosniaks) appear to be the only constituent people which, as a whole, are viewing Bosnia as their country. Croats, as the least numerous among three major ethnic groups, are mainly divided on the matter.
On balance, we are dealing with a devastating reality in which nearly a half of the country’s overall population do not regard it as their motherland, even though most of them were born and have spent their entire lives there.
In my opinion, there are only two viable solutions if we are to preserve Bosnia with its existing national boundary lines, both of which necessitate a much deeper involvement of the West, especially the United States (since the European powers themselves do not appear capable enough) – something where I fully agree with Mr. Volker.
The first solution – the one I would prefer – entails the abolition of the ethnic-based entities. However, given how intense a resistance from Bosnian Serbs it would inevitably be met with, not only diplomatic but also a military assistance would be necessary in its implementation.
The other option would spare the entities from the abolishment but instead obligate the OHR to permanently ban any politician from Bosnia’s political scene as soon as they exercise chauvinistic or anti-Bosnian rhetoric (I suppose Mr. Dodik would be the first to experience the ban).
Both of the proposed solutions are based on the hope that over time ordinary people – particularly those in RS – might relinquish their respective ethnic nationalisms and ultimately realize that they are all struggling with the same economic, social and other problems which they can solve only through cooperation, not a conflict.
Perhaps neither of these proposals would bear fruit in the end, yet it could well be worth a try. The question is, however, whether the U.S. and EU have any more appetite for yet another such venture in an ever restive region such as the Western Balkans.
it’s not wishful thinking but exactly what you said when i said no one will stand in the way if the usa decides to solve this issue once for all. dayton agreement states:
“7. Citizenship. There shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each Entity, provided that”
this is the reason for dayton 2 because this is being used by serbs to pave the way to disassemble bosnia and herzegovina. dodik using this to establish bosnia and herzegovina as a union of two states (rs and fbih) and thus establishing the right of rs to separate from bih. something has togive.
Daniel, I did not in any way, shape or form mean to allude to your previous comment when I used the phrase “wishful thinking”. I just tried to say that, in general, there are too many observers who often neglect some important parts of Bosnia’s reality when proposing ideas on how to solve the profound (perhaps even existential) crisis in this beautiful country so that, in the end, we can see much more of wishful thinking than practicable solutions when it comes to the West’s policies on Bosnia. I am sorry if my comment sounded as if it was a response to yours, but believe me it was not my intention at all.
my bad. yes i agree that too many observers who are muddling the view on what approach is to be taken to sort out bih. and that’s one decisive action. we’re dealing with primitive tribes here and i’ll explain this statement. e.g. when international community was more respectable no one had any idea of mentioning separation of bosnia. when international community said let’s treat them as grown ups or civilized people (they were that once at last) and say ok entities are here to stay let’s make functional state then tings changed it’s like serbian leadership felt weakness in international community (primitive tribes know only force) and started to believe they can continue milosevic’s and karadzic’s policy. international community with their head up their ass high above in clouds still don’t think that anyone could really work on that and when they pull their head out of their ass they’ll do so because things will deteriorate too much (like referendum). we’re now at the point in time where dodik is actively working on dividing the bosnia and no one is to do anything to sanction it. he (they) won’t stop. this must be clear to everybody. people here and international community (everybody) have much more to loose by procrastination of this problem than by solving it in decisive action of international community that’s to help bosnia exit these mad balkan schemes started 20 years ago.
A major problem in Bosnia is that its central (federal) institutions are almost completely crippled by the country’s constitution. That said, although Bosnia is formally defined and internationally recognized as a single state, it is de facto functioning as a mere sum of its two entities.
Now, if we assume that one of those entities is clearly anti-Bosnian (RS), whereas the other is (mainly) pro-Bosnian (FBiH), perhaps some useful ideas might come to our minds. For example, rather than just condemning and quarelling with Dodik over his indecent moves and rhetoric, we should place emphasis on and show a strong willingness to support and reward any political or other organization (or an individual, why not?) in the pro-Bosnian entity which would put forward a comprehensive plan on how to improve the entity’s economic performances.
In other words, we can suppose that the stronger Bosnia’s pro-Bosnian entity is (economically), the stronger Bosnia as a whole is likely to emerge in the end – and vice versa. Not only would such approach to dealing with the crisis in Bosnia be more sophisticated in itself than any of largely ineffective recent efforts to rein in Dodik, it would also help to promote the most quality individuals Bosnia has instead of all these false patriots among its mainstream politicians.
just two quick notes. it’s not mere sum but zero sum game. i would rather say to support those political options who are for strengthening bosnia at the state level. you would be surprised how many resistance could be found in retrograde elements in fbih as well. e.g. let’s say dayton agreement achieved its purpose and serbia and croatia who created the war in bosnia are now on its way to the europe and for croatia we can even say they don’t meddle into bosnia affairs too much or not in desctructive ways as it can be said for serbia. those elemens in fbih aren’t for modern liberal democracy (it implies secular state, civil rights for everybody modern school systems and putting religion in its place in society (same goes for rs of course)). what could be done is supporting those political options/parties that are to run their activities on complete territory of bosnia and herzegovina (and it’s mind blowing that that’s not something normal because almost every party in bih is of local character (entity is local charcter). first to say to the entities that every penny of considerable help they get from eu and other countries that help bosnia can go only through state and that considerable amount of it must go to the state level projects. this is what dodik doesn’t want. money on the state level would mean projects from the state level that would help people and in that way increase level of satisfaction amongst the people toward bosnia as a state. fbih is way to complicated and both entities are too heavy on many consumption just for administration. they’re how we say in enterprise world burning the money administration that is enormous even for much richer countries. bosnia received considerable more money from the international community but that money rarely goes into building factories or enterprises of value if at all. that said with country structure such as this one it’s throwing the money away into black hole on a patient that will always be one life support.
“you would be surprised how many resistance could be found in retrograde elements in fbih as well”.
No, I am not surprised at all, because I am very much aware of that, which is exactly the reason why I wrote the following sentence: “it would also help to promote the most quality individuals Bosnia has instead of all these false patriots among its mainstream politicians”. By the term “false patriots” I alluded specifically to those politicians (and clerical leaders, as well, given how many of them are acting as if they are politicians) in FBiH who publicly swear an oath of loyalty to Bosnia but in reality are working directly to its disadvantage.
The “comprehensive plan on how to improve the entity’s economic performances” which I mentioned would also include the issue of the enormous costs of the administration which you pointed out.
there are but two option:
1. the usa steps in and sorts out things like it had done it 95. (the same guys are still bad guys and are trying the same thing)
2. sanctions
I agree that the U.S. should step in; however, I do not agree that it should act in the same way as in 1995, because then – I must remind you – it virtaully rewarded the aggressor with a half of the invaded territory – consequences of which we are all witnessing today.
In fact, I regret that NATO did not intervene against Serbia as far back as 1991 when it commenced the war in Croatia. If Serbia had been stopped in that initial phase of the aggression, it could not have attacked Bosnia later.
that’s because inert as it is eu was solving the problem. since beginning eu was always kicking the can down the road and every stopgap had to be resolved by the usa stepping in. when i said to step in like they did in 95′ i meant just that. step in and solve the problem in a way that will put an end to the dreams of serbian nationalists in bosnia and in serbia.