The Balkans in Europe whole and free

My colleague here at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Kurt Volker, testified earlier this month in the House on the Balkans.  Kurt and I don’t agree entirely on some policy points in his presentation, but I think the analysis was spot on and the policy recommendations–as would be expected from a former ambassador to NATO and principal deputy assistant secretary for Europe at the State Department–were well crafted in the broader context of Europe whole and free.  So I am delighted he has given me permission to post his written statement.  It is well worth a read for the Balkan-watchers (and inhabitants) among you.

Here are Kurt’s main policy points:

• In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton framework has stalled out. It is time to launch a new, major push from the international community to go beyond Dayton and establish lasting, effective governing structures – a Dayton Two. The Butmir process of a few years ago was a good effort, but ultimately did not succeed. We should go further.

There are plenty of positive forces for change in Bosnia today – from reformers and young people to civil society to businessmen and so forth. The conditions for progress have never been better. But the current political structures have guaranteed long-term divisions inside the country that play to the hands of nationalist and separatists. We should not close down the Office of the High Representative, or phase out the EU Force, until political structures are settled and functioning. So we should make a major push to settle these very issues.

• Likewise, we need a fresh push for political progress on Kosovo – in particular arrangements for Mitrovica in the north. Ethnic Serbs in southern Kosovo are well-protected and able to participate actively in society in Kosovo. There is no reason ethnic Serbs in the north could not do the same, but they are radicalized and held back. Criminal interests – both local and from Serbia proper – Serbian interior ministry police, and of course the nature of the Kosovo government and international community’s past engagement, have all played a role. But it has gotten worse with time, not better, and it is time to push for a more wide-reaching resolution.

Here, one needs also to push the European Union on its role. Despite years of history and the ruling of the International Court of Justice, five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, as the United States and 22 other EU members have done. This serves to perpetuate the belief in Serbia, and in Mitrovica, that Kosovo’s independence can be un-done. It can’t. And neither can partitions or territory swaps solve Kosovo’s problems. Indeed, such steps would add new problems in the entire region. While no one can force any state to recognize another, the sooner the EU develops a stronger and more unified position, the sooner both sides in Kosovo can stop looking backward and start looking forward. With all the other problems Europe has to tackle right now, it makes no sense to continue contributing to this one.

• I want to add a word on Macedonia as well. In 2008, Macedonia was ready to be invited to join NATO, but there was no consensus within NATO to do so, because the name dispute with Greece was unresolved. Under the interim agreement of 1995, Greece had supported Macedonia’s participation in international organizations under the temporary name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” But Greece broke with this practice when it came time to admit Macedonia to NATO. Since then, Macedonia itself has slid backwards on some reforms, and has ramped up its use of controversial symbols of ancient Macedonia as a means of rallying the public and distracting from other issues at home.

Macedonia should be a vibrant crossroads of the Balkans – linking Greece to the north and linking the Western Balkans to Greece and the Mediterranean. The current stand-off serves no one’s interests: Not Greece, not Macedonia, not Europe, not the people of the Balkans, and not the United States. For years, we have supported the UN lead in negotiating a possible solution to the name issue. All of the elements have been put on the table at one point or another. It is time for the U.S. and EU together to make a concerted effort to (a) re-assert the validity of the 1995 interim agreement and use of FYROM as a temporary name, which – with Greek agreement – would allow Macedonia to join NATO and progress toward the EU; and (b) simultaneously, launch a major political push, including with incentives and disincentives, in support of the UN process, to get both sides to a final settlement.

Where would I differ?

Mainly on Bosnia: I would not be able to tell the Secretary of State that she should risk another failure like Butmir. Dayton 2 is much more likely to lead in a more ethnic nationalist direction, which is the wrong one in my view.

On Kosovo, only in nuance: I think we should make resolution of Kosovo issues–at least of the north–a condition for Serbia’s EU candidacy, which should not go ahead December 9 unless there is a clear and irreversible Belgrade commitment to cooperate in reintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo.

On Macedonia, not at all: the interim accord is the way to go.  I understand an International Court of Justice decision on this is due December 5. Let’s hope it is clear and unequivocal in Skopje’s favor.

Thank you, Kurt for a terrific overview!